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A number of the participants in this symposium have described the
failure of various law reform agendas-efforts to modify the laws
governing rape and sexual harassment, for example. They have drawn a
distinction between the law on the books, which may appear quite
progressive and protective of women, and the law in action, which
continues to reflect longstanding cultural attitudes that demean, discredit,
and subordinate women.1 Our message is very similar, although we focus
on a different set of laws: the provisions governing orders of protection in
domestic violence reform statutes.
During the 1980s, the legislatures in forty-eight states and the District
of Columbia enacted domestic violence reform statutes.2 Among other
things, the statutes permit a victim of domestic violence to obtain a civil
order of protection-a binding court order that, at a minimum, prohibits an
abuser from committing further acts of violence. The order may also
enjoin other conduct, such as all contact whatsoever with the woman;
3
award custody of the children to the woman and limit the man's visitation
rights; and grant the woman possession of the residence or other property,
child support, or other economic relief. In most states, violations of
protective orders are punishable as misdemeanors or criminal contempt.
4
These reform statutes typically create a two-step process for obtaining
an order of protection. A battered woman first obtains an order commonly
referred to as an emergency or ex parte order. Emergency orders are
1. See, e.g., Lynne Henderson, Getting to Know: Honoring Women in Law and Fact, 2 TEx.
J. WOMEN & L. 41 (1993) (discussing the chilling effect of societal norms on enforcement of
seemingly progressive rape statutes).
2. PETER FINN & SARAH COLSON, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, CIVIL PROTECTION ORDERS:
LEoISLATION, CURRENT COURT PRACTICE, AND ENFORCEMENT at iii (1990).
3. We use the female pronoun to refer to petitioners because most victims of domestic violence
are women. See Thurman v. City of Torrington, 595 F. Supp. 1521, 1528 n.1 (E). Conn. 1984)
(noting that women are the victims in 29 of 30 spousal abuse cases); BUREAU OF JUSTICE
STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, REPORT TO THE NATION ON CRIME AND JUSTICE: THE DATA
21 (1983) (finding that 95% of domestic violence victims are women). See generally S. REP. No.
545, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 30-31 (1990) (describing the "gender gap" in domestic violence and
noting that more women were abused by their husbands in 1989 than became married).
4. FINN & COLSON, supra note 2, at 2. In some states, however, violations are treated only
as civil contempt. Id. at 50-51.
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temporary orders that usually expire after several weeks; they are issued
based on the woman's petition alone and require no prior notice to the
alleged abuser. The ex parte nature of the order is considered appropriate
when the petitioner can make a credible claim that she will be subjected to
further abuse if the respondent is notified of her intention to obtain an
order of protection.
5
At the time an emergency order is granted, the judge typically sets a
date for a hearing on the second order of protection, usually referred to as
the plenary or permanent order.6 The emergency order and notice of the
plenary hearing must then be served on the respondent, who has an
opportunity to attend the second hearing to challenge issuance of the
plenary order.7 If the judge decides to issue the plenary order at this
second hearing, the order typically can remain in effect for six months to
a year, although the maximum duration varies somewhat depending on the
specific statute.
8
Civil protective orders thus give battered women a legal remedy other
than, or in addition to, filing a criminal complaint or seeking a divorce.
In theory, orders of protection have a number of advantages: they provide
protection more expeditiously than the criminal justice system or the
divorce court; they offer more complete relief than the criminal process by
resolving issues such as custody, visitation, and economic remedies; they
may be easier to obtain than a criminal conviction because the standard of
proof in this civil action is presumably less exacting than the reasonable
doubt standard; 9 unlike divorce, they do not limit relief to spouses;
10
and they may be a preferable option for women who wish to end the
violence but not the relationship or who need the man's continued financial
5. E.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 40, para. 2312-17(a)(3)(i) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1992) (allowing
ex parte relief when "the harm which that remedy is intended to prevent would be likely to occur
if the respondent were given any prior notice, or greater notice than was actually given, of the
petitioner's efforts to obtain judicial relief").
6. Even if the judge finds that the petitioner has not satisfied the prerequisites for ex parte relief
and therefore denies her request for an emergency order, the judge will still schedule a plenary order
hearing.
7. See also infra note 130 and accompanying text (noting that most state statutes allow the
respondent to contest the emergency order prior to the plenary hearing if it evicts him from the
residence).
8. See FINN & COL.SON supra note 2, at 16-17. Thirty-one states set the maximum duration
somewhere between six months and a year, seven states provide no limit, three states allow orders
to last more than one year, and the remaining eight states limit them to less than 180 days. Id.
9. See id. at 14 (noting that 11 statutes prescribe a preponderance of the evidence standard and
that most of the others are silent regarding the standard of proof); cf. MD. FAM. LAW CODE ANN.
§ 4-5 06(c)(2) (Supp. 1992) (using a clear and convincing standard).
10. For example, 46 statutes protect former spouses, 39 protect those who are living in a
spousal-type relationship with the abuser, and 36 protect those who previously lived in such a
relationship. See FINN & COLSON, supra note 2, at 8-9 (listing all categories of eligible petitioners
for each state's protective order statute).
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support." In practice, however, the effectiveness of protection orders
depends on the willingness of judicial and law enforcement officials to
issue and enforce them to the extent authorized by statute. Unless the
reform statutes are fully implemented, they cannot provide the protection
to battered women that the legislatures envisioned.
For example, the Illinois Domestic Violence Act of 198612 offers a
broader range of remedies and extends protective relief for a longer period
of time than almost any other statute.13  The Illinois Act compares quite
favorably with other state statutes in terms of what type of abuse justifies
a protective order and who is eligible to obtain relief. 14 The statute also
requires an expedited ex parte hearing and expedited service of the
emergency order in an effort to provide protection as quickly as possible
to victims of domestic abuse. 15  Nevertheless, our experience in
Champaign County, Illinois led us to question whether the statute was
being effectively implemented.
16
Our concern that the reform statutes might not be having their
intended effect sparked our decision to evaluate the protective order statutes
empirically. We therefore distributed a lengthy survey to 843 domestic
violence organizations nationwide that help battered women obtain
protective orders.17  The survey focused on three issues. The first issue
11. Id. at 2-3; U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, UNDER THE RULE OF THUMB: BATTERED
WOMEN AND THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUsTICE 4143, 47-48 (1982).
12. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 40, para. 2311-1 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1992).
13. See FINN & COLSON, supra note 2, at 16-17, 38-39 (comparing the provisions of each state
law).
14. Id. at 7-8, 12-13.
15. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 40, paras. 2312-12(a), 2312-10(c) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1992).
16. We worked with A Woman's Place, the local shelter for battered women, in setting up a
program that trains University of Illinois law students to assist the shelter's legal advocates in helping
women obtain orders of protection. Through this project, we discovered that the judge assigned to
hear protective order petitions in Champaign County denies a significant percentage of requests for
emergency orders and fee waivers and at times also refuses to grant certain remedies authorized by
the Illinois statute. For example, the judge sometimes refuses to grant an emergency order if the
petitioner previously filed for a protective order and then failed to pursue the petition or if she waited
a few days after the violence to seek protective relief-regardless of the reasons for the delay. In
addition, the judge is often unwilling to grant child support in protective orders, advising petitioners
that they must contact child support enforcement authorities or file for divorce to obtain that remedy.
Finally, the judge has denied motions to waive the fees for filing and serving orders of protection
in cases where the petitioners were entitled to fee waivers under the terms of the statute.
In addition, Fischer conducted a formal study of the effectiveness of protective orders in
Champaign County. Karla Fischer, The Psychological Impact and Meaning of Court Orders of
Protection for Battered Women (1992) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Illinois
(Urbana-Champaign)). She observed 287 emergency order hearings over a 14-month period and
extensively interviewed 83 petitioners, as well as attending their plenary hearings, in an effort to
determine whether orders of protection provide battered women with the economic, social, and
psychological resources they need to escape an abusive relationship.
17. We mailed a survey to every domestic violence organization that was listed as providing
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was access to the courts: Is the protective order remedy accessible to
battered women? The second issue related to the procedures for obtaining
orders of protection: Are judges granting orders in appropriate cases, and
are they awarding the full range of remedies contemplated by the reform
statutes? The third issue involved the procedures for serving and enforcing
protective orders: Are emergency orders being served promptly, and are
the police, the prosecutors, and the courts responding adequately to
violations? We were interested in discovering what types of problems exist
in these three areas, and whether they are attributable to inadequacies in the
domestic violence reform statutes themselves or simply to the way the
statutes have been implemented by executive and judicial officials.'
8
We received 326 completed surveys, for a reply rate of 38.7%.
Responses came from all but three of the states and territories included in
our mailing. 19 Moreover, the answers to the survey questions fell along
a broad spectrum, suggesting that the respondents-advocates who,
admittedly, tend to be identified with only one of the parties in the
proceeding 20-were not biased in any particular direction with respect to
the strengths and weaknesses of the protective order system.
In general, the survey results show that while some statutory
modifications would result in modest improvements, the domestic violence
reform statutes are, on the whole, protective of battered women's interests.
On the other hand, the responses uncovered serious implementation
problems in all three areas of inquiry. In many instances, these problems
are traceable to the attitudes of the judicial and law enforcement personnel
charged with applying and enforcing the statutes. In addition, we found
that ultimately the three issues are not quite so distinct; problems in one
area spill over and create difficulties in the other areas as well.
legal services or advocacy in the National Coalition Against Domestic Violence's 1991 National
Directory of Domestic Violence Programs. A copy of the survey and a summary of its results are
reprinted in Appendix A of this Article.
18. The survey was divided into two sections. The first section sought information about the
particular features of the protective order process in effect in the respondent's community. The
second section elicited the respondent's assessment of any problems that existed in our three areas
of inquiry. For each potential problem identified in this part of the survey, we gave the respondent
four choices: we asked her to indicate whether the issue was not a problem in her community, a
slight problem, a significant problem, or a very serious problem. In describing the results of the
survey in this Article, we classify something as a problem in a particular community unless the
respondent said it was not a problem at all, and we also report the percentage of respondents who
considered a problem either significant or very serious.
19. The three are Mississippi, Utah, and the Virgin Islands.
20. An advocate is someone who helps battered women obtain orders of protection by assisting
them in completing the paperwork necessary to obtain the order and often by accompanying them
to court. An advocate may be an attorney, but usually is not. See FINN & COLSON. supra note 2,
at 24-26 (describing the various ways advocates are used to assist victims filing for protective relief).
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In setting out these findings, Part I of this Article explores the access
question, Part II examines the issuance and scope of protective orders, and
Part III discusses service and enforcement issues. Each part first analyzes
the survey responses and identifies problem areas and then suggests steps
to rectify those problems.
I. Access to the Courts: Is the Protective Order Remedy Readily
Available to Battered Women?
Despite legislative efforts, orders of protection may be unavailable to
battered women for a number of reasons. Battered women may (A) be
unaware of the availability of protective orders or lack the legal knowledge
or assistance necessary to obtain them; (B) face difficulties getting to the
courthouse during the times judges are available to issue protective orders;
or (C) lack the financial resources necessary to obtain such orders.
Before addressing these three specific access problems, it is important
to note that the survey respondents identified some groups of women as
particularly vulnerable to the barriers blocking access to orders of
protection. Almost one-half (46.4%) of the respondents felt that women
of color have more difficulty obtaining access to the courts in their county;
17.9% described this as a significant or very serious problem.2 1
Similarly, almost three-fourths (70.4%) reported that women with the
fewest economic resources face greater access problems; more than one-
third (37.6%) characterized this as a significant or very serious
problem. 22 Finally, access by non-English-speaking women was one of
the most serious access problems identified in the survey. More than four-
fifths (80.6%) of the respondents indicated that access problems are more
acute for non-English-speaking women; more than one-half (53.5%)
thought this was a significant or very serious problem.3
A. Knowledge and Assistance Problems
Victims' lack of familiarity with orders of protection was one of the
most serious access problems identified by the respondents to the survey.
Almost four-fifths (78.5%) of the respondents reported that lack of
information was a problem in their counties, and more than one-third
21. Kit Kinports & Karla Fischer, Survey on the Implementation of Orders of Protection,
section II, question 27 [hereinafter Survey, followed by section and question numbers]. The survey
is reprinted as Appendix A to this Article.
22. Id. at II, 28. However, women with the fewest economic resources fare better in obtaining
fee waivers than women with minimal resources. See infra text accompanying notes 67-71.
23. Survey, supra note 21, at I1, 29.
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(36.5%) described it as a significant or very serious problem. 24 As one
respondent from a rural northeastern community observed:
Although every effort is made to inform women of their legal
rights and to provide transportation to legal appointments, many
women in remote areas are unaware of the services available to
them. Therefore, that faction may not come forward to exercise
their legal claims as readily as women living in more populated
areas.
25
Various steps have been taken in an attempt to overcome these
informational problems and assist a woman obtain an order of protection.
For example, many domestic violence reform statutes require the use of
simplified forms. 26  These forms are designed to streamline the process
for obtaining an order so that a battered woman theoretically does not have
to hire an attorney. 27  In addition, some statutes instruct court clerks to
provide assistance to women who need help completing the forms.2 8 A
battered woman may also be able to turn to an advocate or attorney for
legal assistance. Nevertheless, the survey results suggest that efforts to
provide battered women with legal assistance and information about their
legal options have not been particularly successful.
1. Simplified Forms.-Many women have trouble completing even the
so-called simplified forms on their own. Only about one-fifth (21.8%) of
the respondents thought that the forms necessary to secure an order of
protection in their county could be completed by petitioners without any
assistance of some kind.29  More than one-half (57.5%) reported that
petitioners need a limited amount of assistance, and an additional one-fifth
(20.6%) thought they need a great deal of assistance.30 For example, one
24. Id. at II, 26.
25. Comments such as this one were made either in space provided in the survey for specific
remarks or in separate letters some respondents attached to the survey. (All survey responses are
on file with the authors.) When quoting these remarks, we identify the region of the country in
which the respondent works and whether the county is an urban or rural one (based on whether the
county population is higher or lower than 100,000). Following the practice of social science
research, and because we want to protect the anonymity of respondents who were critical of the
protective order procedures in their community, we provide no additional identifying information.
26. See FINN & COLSON, supra note 2, at 20-21 (noting that 35 states have explicitly provided
for the use of simplified forms); see, e.g., WASH. REv. CODE ANN. §§ 26.50.030(3)-.035 (West
1986 & Supp. 1993) (requiring court clerks to provide simplified forms and ordering the court
administrator to develop and provide these forms).
27. In fact, 30 state statutes specifically allow pro se filings for orders of protection. FINN &
COLSON, supra note 2, at 20-21.
28. Id. at 26.
29. Survey, supra note 21, at I, 3(a).
30. Id. at 1, 3(b)-(c); see also Rural Justice Center, Not in My County: Rural Courts and
Victims of Domestic Violence 32 (Dec. 1991) (report available from the Rural Justice Center)
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respondent listed the multiple forms required to obtain a protective order
in her rural southern community: "Our superior court judges require a
lengthy petition, lengthy temporary order, detailed pauper's summons
(where applicable), sheriff's entry of service, verification, notification,
[and] notarized sworn statement, along with copies of warrants, police
reports, [and] medical records." Another respondent from a rural
midwestern county reported that, although other counties in the state use
a simpler form, "Our district judge redid the protective order form and
doubled its length.... The revised one was done so 'a woman could not
falsely accuse a man.'"
More specifically, approximately three-fifths (61.5%) of the
respondents indicated that battered women have difficulty understanding the
technical terms, or "legalese," in the petitions-terms such as
"respondent" and "petitioner," for example. More than three-fourths
(77.2%) said that petitioners have trouble understanding what the remedies
mean or knowing what to ask for in the order. For example, one
respondent from a rural northeastern county noted that some petitioners do
not even consider requesting financial remedies in protective orders because
they are simply unaware of their availability. In addition, almost two-
thirds (63.4%) reported that petitioners have trouble describing the abuse
so that the judge can understand what happened. 31 As one respondent
from an urban southern county explained, women tend to describe the
abuse by saying "we were fighting," rather than "he hit me." These
complexities are compounded for women who are not fluent in English.
Only eleven (3.4%) of the respondents indicated that the simplified forms
used to file for protective orders are available in any language other than
English.32
The number and complexity of the forms required to petition for a
protective order discourage some women from turning to the courts for
assistance. Almost one-half (49.9%) of the respondents indicated that the
complexity or quantity of paperwork required to obtain an order of
protection prevents women from filing petitions in their county; 16%
characterized this as a significant or very serious problem. 33  As one
respondent from an urban southern county concluded, "Many low income
battered women are daunted by court procedures and need an attorney or
(concluding that "from the victim's perspective, the forms may be far from simple to fill out").
31. Survey, supra note 21, at I, 4.
32. Id. at I, 3(e). The forms are available in more than one language other than English in only
one of the counties served by the respondents.
33. Id. at 1H, 8. In addition, the Pearson correlation coefficients reported in connection with
our regression analyses suggest that counties in which simplified forms are unavailable or difficult
to complete have not only significantly higher access problems, but also significantly higher relief
and enforcement problems. See App. C, Tables 3-5.
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court advocate to guide them through. Simply having a bunch of forms
available for the asking, without any back-up support, is not much real
help." Another respondent from an urban western community likewise
reported, "Almost all petitioners who have first tried to fill out their own
papers without our assistance give up because of the volume of papers, the
lengthy instructions (12 pages) and an inability to fully understand the
instructions." Finally, a respondent from an urban southern county noted
that "[w]omen are intimidated by the sheer number of forms" they are
required to complete.
2. Court Personnel.-In a substantial number of counties (41.8%),
court clerks help battered women complete the paperwork necessary to
obtain an order of protection. 34  In other jurisdictions, however,
legislation prohibits court clerks from providing such services. 35 Even
where clerks are allowed to help, the survey results suggest that their
assistance is of limited value for several reasons.
First, and not surprisingly, clerks are rarely available to accompany
petitioners to court.36  Second, court clerks typically provide little
assistance to women with special needs. Only about one-fourth (27.1 %)
of the respondents indicated that court personnel assist petitioners who have
literacy barriers,37 and only 16% indicated that court personnel are
available to provide translation services to non-English-speaking
petitioners.38 As one respondent from an urban midwestern community
reported, "If a woman doesn't speak English, the clerk's office says she
must bring an interpreter or they can't help her." Third, more than one-
half of the respondents (56%) indicated that the court clerks in their county
do not provide enough assistance to petitioners, or even actively discourage
them from filing for protective orders; more than one-fourth (26.3%)
described this as a significant or very serious problem.
39
A number of respondents provided narratives to illustrate this third
point. One respondent from an urban northeastern community reported
that "clerks are generally competent and courteous, but do not explain the
process to the woman or offer her options. A woman who does not know
her options before applying (for example, that she can have him vacated
34. Survey, supra note 21, at I, 1(c).
35. FINN & COLSON, supra note 2, at 26-27.
36. See survey, supra note 21, at I, l(d) (noting that only 2.8% of respondents reported that
clerks accompany petitioners to court).
37. Id. at 1, 5(c).
38. Id. at I, 5(d).
39. Id. at II, 7. For similar findings, see Rural Justice Center, supra note 30, at 22 (noting that
only 44% of county clerks surveyed said they would tell a battered woman who had walked in their
office about the availability of protective orders).
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[from the home] or get custody) will probably not be informed of them,
regardless of her needs." Even more disturbing, another respondent
indicated that the court clerks in her urban midwestern county evaluate the
merits of the petition and "tell[] petitioners they do not have a right to file"
for relief before the judge ever sees the case. When asked what changes
could be made to improve the accessibility of the courts in her urban
southern community, another respondent suggested hiring "more
knowledgeable clerks who are informed about domestic violence and have
not closed their mind to it." Finally, a respondent from a rural southern
community concluded, "Court personnel will avoid helping women in any
way they can."
3. Advocates.-Advocates seem to be quite helpful in facilitating
access to the protective order remedy: the respondents' overall rating of the
courts' accessibility improved substantially if advocates were available to
provide assistance. When asked about the accessibility of the courts to
petitioners accompanied by advocates, only about one-tenth (9.9%)
reported that the courts are inaccessible or very inaccessible. 40  By
comparison, when asked the same question about petitioners who are not
accompanied by advocates, almost one-fourth (24.3%) found the courts
either inaccessible or very inaccessible.
41
In addition to providing the technical assistance necessary to complete
petitions for protective relief, advocates may be helpful in other ways.
They are trained in the dynamics of domestic violence and experienced in
working with battered women and therefore may be in the best position to
provide the women with emotional support. 42 Moreover, in many cases,
advocates are available to assist battered women by accompanying them to
court.
43
Nevertheless, some women may not be able to obtain assistance from
an advocate: More than one-half (50.4%) of the respondents reported that
the demand for protective orders is so high that their advocacy program
cannot help everyone who needs assistance; more than one-fifth (21.6%)
characterized this high demand as a significant or very serious problem.
44
In addition, location may impede some women's access to an advocate.
As one respondent from a rural midwestern county noted, "The distance
40. Survey, supra note 21, at I, 1.
41. Id. at II, 2. The mean accessibility rating for women who had advocates was 3.4 on a scale
of one to four (with four reflecting the highest level of accessibility), whereas the mean rating for
women who did not have advocates was only 2.9. Id. at II, 1-2.
42. FINN & COLSON, supra note 2, at 26; Fischer, supra note 16, at 72 (finding that 92% of
the women interviewed in Champaign County rated their advocates as being very supportive).
43. Survey, supra note 21, at 1, 1(b).
44. Id. at II, 6.
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women have to travel to receive advocacy from our program is extreme.
We are a program responsible for eight counties; if women want advocate
services they may have to travel up to 100 miles."
4. Attorneys.-Although lawyers help battered women obtain orders
of protection in some cases, 45 the survey results indicate that many
petitioners cannot afford to hire private counsel and that pro bono
assistance is unavailable in many communities. Even more fundamental,
the results provide conflicting signals on the advisability of introducing
more lawyers into the protective order process.
Financial constraints that prevent women from hiring attorneys for
protective order hearings were identified by the respondents as the most
serious problem in the entire survey. Two-thirds of the respondents
thought that this was a significant or very serious problem, and less than
one-fifth (19.7%) said it was not a problem at all in their community.
46
Estimates of the cost of hiring counsel ranged from "as high as $500" in
an urban county in the Midwest, to an "[a]verage cost of $900" in a rural
community in the West, to anywhere "from $150 to $5,000" in an urban
northeastern community.
Despite the prohibitive cost of retaining private counsel, only 11.4%
of the respondents reported that their local bar association has a program
to provide pro bono services for battered women seeking protective orders.
Even fewer (6.5%) indicated that private attorneys are frequently willing
to provide such services in the absence of an organized pro bono program.
By contrast, more than two-fifths of the respondents (42.8%) noted that
private attorneys rarely represent battered women on a pro bono basis.
47
Attempts by domestic violence organizations to establish pro bono
programs have often proved fruitless. For example, one respondent from
an urban northeastern community reported that her organization "contacted
350 attorneys to try to set up a pro bono program. Currently we have 5
attorneys who will provide pro bono services on a one-per-month and
rotating basis." Likewise, another respondent from a rural midwestern
community said that only one of the forty attorneys her organization
contacted was willing to commit to represent even one woman a year on
a pro bono basis. Finally, a respondent from an urban midwestern county
45. Overall, 27.3% of the survey respondents indicated that many petitioners appear with
attorneys, while 31.4% reported that many respondents appear with attorneys. These figures
increase when matters such as child custody or support are at issue. In such cases, 35.2% indicated
that petitioners appear with counsel, and 44.8% said that respondents appear with counsel. Id. at
I, 16.
46. Id. at 11, 49.
47. Id. at I, 2.
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said that her organization "has actively pursued this idea with the local bar
association for ten years with no success."
A woman whose income level qualifies her for free legal assistance
might pursue that alternative to obtain representation in a protective order
hearing. But many legal assistance offices are too understaffed to provide
much assistance. For example, one respondent from an urban midwestern
community reported that her organization referred 367 women to the local
Legal Aid office during the past year; only eighteen of those women were
helped. Likewise, another domestic violence organization in a rural
southern county requests Legal Aid's help with protective orders only in
cases where the respondent has an attorney or the woman is seeking a
divorce or custody of the children. Even with these limits, the Legal Aid
office in that area is "[so] busy . . . that there are no lawyers available."
Finally, a respondent from an urban northeastern community reported
waiting lists for pro bono and Legal Aid lawyers.
48
Before taking steps to alleviate these problems by increasing the
availability of attorneys, it is critical to consider the impact of introducing
more lawyers into the protective order process. Unfortunately, the survey
results do not clearly resolve this issue. Some respondents thought that
representation by counsel was a significant benefit for battered women,
while others suggested that the presence of lawyers was problematic.
On the one hand, almost one-half (46 %) of the respondents indicated
that battered women in their county do not get what they need in an order
of protection unless they have the assistance of counsel; 14.5%
characterized this as a significant or very serious problem.49 In fact, in
some communities, an attorney is a virtual necessity in order to obtain a
protective order. In one rural midwestern community, for example:
You cannot get all forms of relief by filing one petition. For complete
relief, you have to file for criminal and civil injunctions. Though
victims are entitled to proceed pro se by statute, the process is so
complicated that victims actually must have an attorney .... Victims
are not emotionally or financially prepared following assault crimes to
follow through with these complicated procedures.
Likewise, another respondent reported that the court in her urban western
county actually discourages proceeding pro se because the system is so
complex that a woman needs an attorney.
In other communities, the system is theoretically conducive to pro se
petitions, but women represented by counsel obtain much better results.
One respondent from a rural southern county reported that women without
48. For similar findings, see FINN & COLSON, supra note 2, at 24.
49. Survey, supra note 21, at II, 48. For similar findings, see FINN & COLSON, supra note
2, at 19.
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attorneys wait about ten days for an emergency order, while private
attorneys can obtain an order immediately. Likewise, the judge in one
urban midwestern community "denies requests for anything other than
protection against abuse [e.g., for custody or possession of the residence]
unless an attorney draws up the order." Another judge in a similar
community "will not issue protective orders to married women without a
lawyer." As one respondent concluded, "[The] system works well for
clients who have an attorney, but it is almost non-existent for one who has
no attorney."50
Some respondents suggested that battered women have a special need
for an attorney when their husbands are represented by counsel. As one
respondent from an urban southern county explained, "When defendants
have an attorney, the plaintiff suffers a tremendous disadvantage and the
case is often dismissed." Similarly, another respondent described several
cases where women proceeding pro se became confused by the presence of
counsel representing their husbands.51
Although these reports suggest that additional assistance from the bar
would improve the accessibility of the protective order remedy, other
responses to the survey question the advisability of introducing more
lawyers into the system. First, the presence of attorneys may create
additional delays rather than simplify the process. One respondent from
an urban midwestern community reported, "I wish we didn't need an
attorney. [They] slow[] the process significantly [because] all of our
attorneys do pro bono work and we are not their priority. I could get an
order in one day without an attorney. With one, [the process] takes a
week." Similarly, a respondent from a rural western county reported that
for the few women in her town who can afford private counsel, "The
waiting period for action can be up to six months or more." Second, more
than three-fourths (76.6%) of the respondents indicated that attorneys in
their county are unwilling to work with petitioners or are difficult to work
with, and 43.7% described this as a significant or very serious
problem*
5 2
Interviews with women seeking protective orders in Champaign
County provide additional corroboration for these findings. Approximately
one-fifth of those women were represented by counsel; of those, only forty-
four percent were satisfied with their attorneys' performance. Thirty
percent were dissatisfied, and the remaining twenty-six percent were
50. An almost identical comment was made by a respondent from a rural midwestern county:
"Procedures work well if an attorney is involved; however, very little is available for unrepresented
victims."
51. For similar findings, see FINN & COLSON, supra note 2, at 19.
52. Survey, supra note 21, at II, 50.
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ambivalent. In addition, more than one-third (36%) thought that their
attorney's presence made absolutely no difference in the outcome of the
hearing.
53
Specifically, a significant percentage of the women interviewed
expressed dissatisfaction because their attorneys tried to take charge of the
case, either by making decisions about the order (38%) or by trying to
discourage them from obtaining a plenary order (25%). In some cases, the
women thought that their attorneys did not ask for the remedies they
wanted or were willing to negotiate them away-to use the protective order
as a bargaining chip by sacrificing their safety in return for a financial
remedy they were entitled to anyway. In other cases, women felt that they
were forced to agree to unfavorable settlements regarding custody and
other issues.
54
There are a number of possible explanations for these reports.
Perhaps the attorneys were unwilling to take the time necessary to find out
precisely what their clients wanted or were acting out of a paternalistic
sense of benevolence. 55 Alternatively, the clients might have been too
intimidated to talk frankly with the lawyers. Whatever the explanation,
these findings suggest that the simple presence of attorneys may not
improve the protective order system.
Whether or not attorneys are used to represent women seeking orders
of protection, however, it is clear that many of the current systems are not
as "user-friendly" as they should be, or as the reform statutes intended
them to be. Many battered women are unaware of the protective order
remedy, and those who are familiar with it often lack the legal knowledge
or assistance necessary to obtain an order. In many cases, the simplified
forms are still too complex for the average petitioner to complete, court
clerks are unhelpful or even a hindrance, and advocates are not available
in the numbers needed to meet demands. Finally, hiring a lawyer is
expensive and may actually hinder the process.
53. See Fischer, supra note 16, at 75.
54. See id.
55. This possibility does not seem far-fetched given the concerns expressed by others that
attorneys may not always have the same interests as their clients because of financial and other
factors. See Judith Resnik, Ters, 57 S. CAL. L. REv. 837, 1008 (1984) (observing that "[r]esource
constraints on the public side and market incentives on the private side result in the divergence of
attorneys' and clients' interests at discrete and identifiable points" in criminal cases); Louis M.
Seidman, Factual Guilt and the Burger Court:An Examination of Continuity and Change in Criminal
Procedure, 80 COLuM. L. REv. 436, 467-68 (1980) (explaining how the interests of a defendant and
her attorney may diverge in criminal cases); Jeffrey M. Smith & Thomas B. Metzloff, The Attorney
as Advocate: "Arguing the Law," 16 GA. L. REv. 841, 842-43 (1982) (expressing the concern that
appellate counsel may prefer to "educate the judge or the attorney for the other side in what the law
ought to be" instead of attempting to win the client's case).
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B. Logistical Problems
A battered woman may find the protective order remedy inaccessible
because (1) the courthouse where she must go to obtain the order is
inconveniently located, (2) the courthouse is not open at the times when she
is most in need of assistance, or (3) she has difficulty taking time off from
work and finding babysitters for court proceedings that are unpredictable
in length. The survey results indicate that these logistical problems are
quite serious in many communities.
First, in terms of location, more than two-thirds (67.9%) of the
respondents reported that women need to travel significant distances in
order to obtain protective orders; almost one-third (30.5%) considered this
a significant or very serious problem. 56  As one respondent from the
West reported, "The biggest access problem is the sheer enormity of our
county. We are a rural, farming community whose county seat and only
courthouse is a two-hour drive from the most outlying communities."
Another respondent from the West explained, "One family court handles
domestic violence, and it is far from many small rural cities. Many
victims do not have the means to travel."
Second, in terms of timing, most abuse takes place during evenings or
weekends, 57 and battered women therefore need access to the courts on
a twenty-four-hour basis in order to obtain emergency orders. Some
women may not be able to secure temporary housing at a shelter or with
family or friends while they wait for the courthouse to open.58  Even
when a safe place is available, there is no reason why the victim should be
the one forced from the home in the middle of the night-either packing up
her children as well or leaving them with her violent partner-rather than
the alleged perpetrator of the abuse. Ideally, a battered woman should
know that she can call the police any time of the day or night and that they
56. Survey, supra note 21, at 11, 9.
57. FINN & COLSON, supra note 2, at 29; U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, ATTORNEY GENERAL'S
TASK FORCE ON FAMILY VIOLENCE: FINAL REPORT 40, 140 n.30 (1984) [hereinafter ATTORNEY
GENERAL'S TASK FORCE]; Karen Baker et al., Report on District of Columbia Response to Domestic
Violence 34 (Nov. 3, 1989) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the authors).
58. See U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note I1, at 19, 77, 81-82; see also S. REP. No.
545, supra note 3, at 37, 39 (describing shortage of shelters and citing one study's finding that as
many as half of all homeless women and children are fleeing domestic violence); Maria Henson, To
Have and to Harm: Kentucky's Failure to Protect Women from the Men Who Beat Thcm, LEXINGTON
HERALD-LEADER, July 1992 (special reprint), at 5 (reporting that there are about 1,200 shelters for
abused women in the U.S. compared to approximately 3,200 dog pounds). But cf. Mary Durkin,
Domestic Violence in West Virginia: A Study of the Court Response 40, 47 (1991) (unpublished
manuscript, on file with the authors) (finding that although some counties are two hours away from
the nearest shelter, the filing rate for orders of protection in West Virginia is not affected by "the
presence or absence of a shelter or other support facility or the actual distance from such a facility").
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will respond promptly, arrest the accused, and obtain an emergency order
for her over the telephone.
59
If this assistance is not available during the hours when domestic
violence typically occurs, battered women's lives are placed in further
jeopardy. Overall, more than three-fifths (63 %) of the respondents thought
that judges' unavailability during certain hours increased victim risk;
17.7% characterized this as a significant or very serious problem. 60  As
one respondent from an urban western community explained, closing the
courts at night "causes the victim to stay in the presence of the abuser until
morning when she can seek assistance."
Despite the critical need for after-hours assistance, less than one-fourth
(22.8%) of the respondents indicated that judges are available twenty-four
hours a day to grant orders of protection. Moreover, 60.5% reported that
judges are unavailable during the lunch hour, and 23.8% indicated that the
clerk's office is closed at lunch.61 In fact, one respondent indicated that
the judges in her urban midwestern community are only available from
nine o'clock to eleven o'clock in the morning and then again from one
o'clock to three o'clock in the afternoon: "The judges' hours are a barrier
for working women," she said. 62 Another respondent noted that judges
in her rural midwestern community rotate among a number of counties.
Therefore, if the judge is not in town, "we must go to the county he's in
in order to get the initial order signed." Even more disturbing, a
respondent from a rural southern county reported that judicial relief is often
completely unavailable: "[I]f the . . .judge is out of town (which he
frequently is), no one signs orders ex parte."
Even in jurisdictions where protective orders are purportedly available
twenty-four hours a day, the reality may be quite different. For example,
one respondent from an urban midwestern county said that orders "can be
obtained theoretically, but to my knowledge it hasn't been done" after
business hours. Overall, more than one-fifth (21.3%) of the respondents
59. Alternatively, there might be less need to issue emergency orders after business hours if
the police would respond to a woman's call for assistance, arrest the alleged abuser, and keep him
in jail overnight until she has an opportunity to obtain an order the next morning. Unfortunately,
however, the police often refuse to arrest. See infra notes 249-61 and accompanying text. Even
when they do so, the accused is often released from custody immediately. See ATTORNEY
GENERAL'S TASK FORCE, supra note 57, at 105; U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 11,
at 42.
60. Survey, supra note 21, at II, 16. Somewhat fewer respondents reported that judges are
available so infrequently or at such inconvenient times that filing for an order becomes impracticable:
36.3% indicated that this was a problem, and 9.2% considered it a significant or very serious
problem. Id. at H, 15; cf. Rural Justice Center, supra note 30, at 30 (finding that judicial
availability increases the number of emergency orders sought and granted).
61. Survey, supra note 21, at I, 10(a)-(c).
62. Another respondent likewise reported that judges are available to grant protective orders
for only one and a half to four hours a day in her urban western county.
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indicated that, although judges are supposedly available any time of day,
there is some reluctance to request assistance after hours. 63  This
reluctance may be quite understandable given the experience described by
one respondent from a rural southern community: "It is still hard at times
to get magistrates out on the weekend if a petition is needed. And most of
the time when they (magistrates) do come [to the courthouse], they are
upset[,] . . . and it shows in [their] attitude towards the petitioner."
Several other respondents reported that judges simply will not grant
protective orders after business hours even though the state's domestic
violence statute mandates that they do so.
64
The final logistical difficulty reported by the respondents was one of
the most serious access problems identified by the survey-that women
must take time off from work or find babysitters for lengthy and often
unpredictable amounts of time in order to attend the emergency
hearing. 65 More than three-fourths (77.9%) of the respondents thought
this was a problem, and almost two-fifths (39.1 %) characterized it as a
significant or very serious problem. 66 The more inconvenient it becomes
to schedule and obtain emergency orders, the less likely women are to
consider them a realistic option.
C. Financial Problems
Despite encountering substantial access problems in the areas
described above, battered women have had a reasonable amount of success
overcoming the financial hurdles involved in obtaining orders of protection.
In many jurisdictions, petitioners can obtain orders of protection without
63. Survey, supra note 21, at I, 10(d). A respondent from an urban western county explained:
Law enforcement agencies need to be better trained in the [types] of emergency
protective orders ([such as] telephone restraining orders) available when police respond
to . . . domestic violence calls after regular court hours. Officers are not generally
willing to take the time to fill out paperwork and notify the judge on call for a
signature.
64. Although the Pearson correlation coefficients reported in connection with our regression
analyses suggest that statutes making emergency orders available 24 hours a day do not significantly
reduce access problems (or relief or enforcement problems), see App. C, Tables 3-5, the absence
of a correlation may be due to the fact that in practice emergency orders are not available after
business hours. Alternatively, requiring judges to consider emergency orders after hours may
exacerbate other related problems, such as negative attitudes and insensitive behavior on the part of
judges, thus accounting for the lack of any systematic relationship between judges' availability and
the extent to which problems arise in the protective order process.
65. For discussion of the related problem of court delays in issuing emergency orders, see infra
text accompanying notes 93-97.
66. Survey, supra note 21, at II, 13.
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paying any filing or service fee. 6 7  Those statutes that do impose fees
almost uniformly provide waivers to indigent petitioners.
68
The survey results indicate that judges in most counties grant fee
waivers in appropriate cases. 69 Nevertheless, 13.7% of the respondents
reported that judges sometimes refuse fee waivers even in cases where the
petitioner has little income and cannot afford the filing fee; 4.1%
characterized this as a significant or very serious problem.70 In addition,
several respondents indicated that judges are unwilling to grant any fee
waivers at all, even for petitioners who receive public assistance.
Although these problems are apparently somewhat isolated, one
significant problem that does remain in this area is that court clerks do not
always inform petitioners that fee waivers are available. Almost two-fifths
(39.7%) of the respondents indicated that this was a problem, and almost
one-fifth (19.5%) characterized it as a significant or very serious
problem. 71. As one respondent from a rural southern county reported,
"[O]ften petitioners are not informed that fees can be waived by court
clerks; rather they are told[,] 'It will cost $50.00 to file for a protective
order."' Even more disturbing, another respondent from a similar
community said:
Clerks sometimes try to discourage petitioners from filing orders of
protection, especially if the petitioner is requesting a fee waiver. At one
time the clerk's office was even requiring the petitioner to bring a
witness with her to court to verify her situation. . . before the fee
waiver could be considered.
Even if these problems are overcome and fees are waived for all
eligible women, orders of protection do not necessarily become affordable
67. See FINN & COLSON, supra note 2, at 19-21 (listing six states that expressly prohibit filing
fees and 19 others whose statutes do not explicitly provide for filing fees). Approximately 44% of
the respondents reported that fees are not required for orders of protection. Survey, supra note 21,
at I, 7(h).
68. FINN & COl.SON, supra note 2, at 19 (noting that Hawaii is the only exception).
69. Survey, supra note 21, at 1n, 11 (reporting that 86.3% of the respondents indicated that
denial of fee waivers to indigent petitioners was not a problem).
70. Id. Eighty-nine of the 120 respondents who provided the relevant data indicated that 100%
of fee waiver requests were granted in their counties in 1991. The figures for the remaining 31
ranged from 0% to 99.68%, with an overall mean of 95.4% for all 120 responses. Id. at III, 4-5.
Specifically, four of those 31 respondents reported that fewer than half of all fee waiver requests had
been granted, two put the figure between 50% and 75%, four said between 75.01% and 90%, five
said between 90.01% and 95%, and 16 said more than 95%.
Given that so many of the respondents failed to supply statistical information about fee waiver
requests, however, these figures may be less representative of the entire sample than the other
findings.
71. Id. at U, 10; see also Rural Justice Center, supra note 30, at 22, 32 (reporting that 70%
of court clerks admit that they do not routinely inform women about fee waivers and concluding that
failing to tell a petitioner about the availability of a fee waiver is tantamount to denying the waiver).
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for women with minimal resources. As one respondent from an urban
midwestern community noted:
The most common accessibility problem seems to be not for those
women with fewest economic resources, because they can easily file to
have costs waived, but [for] those who have some economic resources,
[e.g.,] part time or minimum wage jobs.... Our judge is inconsistent
at best in waiving costs in those situations but may defer or delay costs
upon his discretion. I hear of more people not filing due to these
circumstances than others.
D. Recommendations
Although the domestic violence reform statutes intended that battered
women could use the courts for protection, the protective order remedy is
currently inaccessible for many women. Some women are not aware that
the remedy exists, and others do not have the legal expertise or assistance
needed to obtain relief. Logistical difficulties create additional barriers to
access. Women may be required to travel significant distances to the
courthouse, and judges typically do not issue protective orders during the
hours when most abuse occurs. Most significant, the fact that women must
spend a great deal of time away from their work and children to obtain an
order of protection substantially reduces the chances that they will seek
judicial relief. Finally, financial constraints may make protective orders
inaccessible for women who are unaware of or ineligible for fee waivers.
Our recommendations for improving access to orders of protection fall
into four categories: (1) further educate the public about the protective
order remedy; (2) improve the sources of legal assistance available to
battered women; (3) make emergency orders available after business hours
and over the telephone; and (4) eliminate all fee requirements for orders
of protection.
1. Educate the Public About Orders of Protection.-Additional steps
need to be taken to inform the community about the availability of
protective orders so that battered women will realize they are an option.
72
If a woman is not aware that orders of protection are available or does not
know how to secure an order, even an ideal system for obtaining and
enforcing protective orders will be under-utilized.
2. Improve Sources of Legal Assistance for Petitioners. -Legal
assistance needs to be made available to battered women seeking orders of
72. See S. REP. No. 197, 102d Cong., Ist Sess. 60 (1991) (recommending that federal funds
be allocated for this purpose).
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protection. There are at least four ways to accomplish this goal. First, pro
se filing can be facilitated by further simplifying the so-called "simplified"
forms. The forms should be written in terms understandable to a person
with no legal training who is experiencing a very traumatic event.
Providing written materials that explain the procedures and
requirements for obtaining an order of protection would further assist those
who file for protective relief pro se. Only about one-third (35.7%) of the
respondents reported that the court currently provides petitioners with
written guidelines that describe the procedures for obtaining protective
orders, and fewer than one-fourth (24%) indicated that the court offers
written guidelines outlining the requirements for obtaining orders or fee
waivers. 73  Our statistical analyses suggest that communities that do
provide such guidelines tend to experience significantly fewer access and
relief problems.
74
In drafting these guidelines, care should be taken to ensure that they
are comprehensible, so as to avoid the situation described by one
respondent from a rural western community: "Many times written
guidelines are worse than the forms." In addition, all forms and materials
should be available in languages other than English in areas with a
significant non-English-speaking population.
Providing simplified forms and guidelines, thereby ensuring that the
protective order process is conducive to pro se filing, may have the
independent advantage of empowering battered women.75  As one
respondent from a rural southern community noted:
[B]eing able to fill the forms out, . . . file them with the clerk, and
talk[] with the judges makes a difference for women because it
empowers them ... to complete the process. It may take a bit longer
... but we have seen this help break the cycle [of violence].
6
Second, court clerks should be required to help petitioners complete
protective order petitions as part of their job.77 They should be given
73. Survey, supra note 21, at I, 5(a)-4b).
74. See App. C, Tables 3-4.
75. Empowering battered women has long been a goal of the domestic violence movement.
E.g., SUSAN SCHECHTER, WOMEN AND MALE VIOLENCE 169 (1982).
76. For similar findings, see Gary Brown et al., Comment, Starting a TRO Project: Student
Representation of Battered Women, 96 YALE L.J. 1985, 2019 (1987) ("[Ihe importance of the TRO
[temporary restraining order] process as an empowering experience cannot be overestimated. For
many abused women, a TRO can be an important first step toward breaking out of a battering
relationship."). Cf. David A. Ford, Prosecution as a Victim Power Resource: A Note on
Empowering Women in Violent Conjugal Relationships, 25 LAw & Soc'Y REv. 313 (1991) (arguing
that battered women should have control of the decision whether to prosecute abusers); Fischer,
supra note 16, at 69 (suggesting that a major function of protective orders is their symbolic meaning
to the victim).
77. This reform will require legislation in those states where clerks are prohibited by statute
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training and written guidelines concerning the state's domestic violence
statute so that they do not misinform women about the requirements for
obtaining orders of protection and do not unintentionally usurp the judge's
function by rating the merits of the petition. Clerks should also be
educated about domestic violence so that they understand, for example,
why battered women find it difficult to leave an abusive relationship and
why they may therefore drop their first request for protective relief only
to return later to seek a second order. Refresher courses should be offered
periodically. Additionally, court personnel should be instructed to provide
special assistance to petitioners who are not literate or do not speak
English. Finally, notices should be posted in conspicuous places in the
courthouse informing potential petitioners of the services provided by the
clerk's office.
78
Third, any battered woman who needs help filing for protective relief
should have access to an advocate. Although advocates are already
offering assistance in many communities, the demand for their time is high,
and women in some areas may not be able to obtain this valuable service.
Increasing funding for domestic violence organizations to enable them to
hire additional legal advocates would help solve this problem.
79
Finally, pro bono programs operated by local bar associations or law
schools can help provide legal assistance to petitioners. In New Mexico,
for example, the Young Lawyers Division on Assistance to Victims of
Domestic Violence has set up a toll-free telephone number that battered
women can call to receive legal assistance with orders of protection.
Similarly, Yale Law School has established a student-run legal assistance
program to help battered women obtain protective orders.8 0 In any such
program, providing attorneys to women whose abusers are represented by
counsel should be the first priority. Given our inconclusive findings about
the effects of involving lawyers in the process, however, caution should be
exercised before dramatically increasing the role attorneys play in a
protective order system.81 In any event, those who participate in such
from providing such services. See supra note 35 and accompanying text; cf. State v. Errington, 310
N.W.2d 681 (Minn. 1981) (upholding a statutory requirement that court clerks help petitioners
complete the forms necessary to obtain a protective order and rejecting claims that the provision
involved court employees in the unauthorized practice of law).
78. See, e.g., Mo. ANN. STAT. § 455.02-5 (Vernon Supp. 1992) (requiring that notice of the
assistance available from court clerks be posted conspicuously in the clerk's office).
79. See S. REP. No. 197, supra note 72, at 55-56 (recommending federal grants to "boost[]
resources for victim services programs").
80. See Brown et al., supra note 76 (describing the program and its results). Recently, Duke
Law School used the Yale model to start the Battered Women's Law Project, which currently
involves 90 law students from Duke, the University of North Carolina, and North Carolina Central
assisting the shelter in Orange County, North Carolina.
81. See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
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pro bono programs should be given special training regarding the dynamics
of domestic violence.
3. Make Emergency Orders Available After Business Hours and Over
the Telephone.-Judges should be available to grant emergency orders of
protection twenty-four hours a day. 82 Currently, twenty-three domestic
violence reform statutes authorize the issuance of emergency orders during
non-business hours, but some jurisdictions have not established procedures
to put those provisions into effect. 83 Similar legislation should be passed
in the remaining states and should be implemented in all areas that have not
yet done so.
84
In addition, emergency orders should be available by telephone.
Statutes in several states now authorize the issuance of short-term
emergency orders of protection that can be obtained over the phone when
the courthouse is closed.85 In these states, a police officer who responds
to a battered woman's request for assistance calls the judge for the short-
term order; the woman then has several days to go to the courthouse to
obtain a regular emergency order before the short-term order expires.
86
Making emergency orders available twenty-four hours a day and over
the phone would obviously alleviate the problem of judicial inaccessibility
during non-business hours. It would also minimize access problems in
areas where petitioners must travel long distances to reach the courthouse.
In addition, issuing orders by phone during non-business hours rather than
at the courthouse may not have an adverse effect on judicial attitudes and
behavior because telephone orders require less of a judge's time and
effort.
87
82. See ATTORNEY GENERAL'S TASK FORCE, supra note 57, at 40 (making the same
recommendation).
83. FINN & COLSON, supra note 2, at 29.
84. Even in the absence of specific legislation mandating 24-hour access, motivated judges can
open their courtrooms to issue emergency orders around the clock. See, e.g., Henson, supra note
58, at 8 (noting that Chief Justice Robert F. Stephens of the Kentucky Supreme Court publicly urged
all state judges to make protective orders available 24 hours a day).
85. CAL. CiV. PROC. CODE § 546(b) (West Supp. 1992); COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 14-4-103,-404
(1987 & Supp. 1991); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 209A, § 5 (West Supp. 1992); cf. 2 WAYNE
R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT § 4.3(c), at 174 (2d
ed. 1987) (noting that police officers can obtain search warrants by telephone in the federal system
and a few states).
86. By contrast, the 24-hour system in place in Vermont is not quite so accessible. In that
state, a court employee is on call and can be reached via a toll-free number during non-business
hours. But after the petitioner speaks to the court employee over the telephone, she must go to the
police station and the court employee calls the judge from there to obtain an emergency order. Rural
Justice Center, supra note 30, at 30.
87. If judges or magistrates are available during non-business hours to issue warrants or hold
bond hearings, it makes sense to give those individuals responsibility for issuing emergency orders
of protection as well.
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4. Eliminate Fees for Orders of Protection.-Fee requirements should
be abolished for all petitioners. Eliminating fees would ensure that no
victim of domestic violence is prevented from seeking protection because
of financial constraints and would also symbolize society's commitment to
ending domestic abuse. Many states have already taken this step; 88 the
remaining jurisdictions should follow that lead. 89
II. Issuance and Scope of Orders of Protection: Are Judges Granting
Orders Promptly in Appropriate Cases, and Are They Awarding the
Full Range of Remedies?
Even if battered women gain access to the courts, the survey
respondents indicated that the judges responsible for issuing protective
orders also erect significant hurdles that prevent many women from
securing the protection intended by the domestic violence reform statutes.
In explaining this finding, we analyze separately the judicial record in
issuing emergency orders and plenary orders and then discuss judicial
behavior and attitudes toward battered women.
Initially, however, we note that minority and low-income women tend
to find it more difficult to secure relief through the protective order
process. As we found with access problems, more than one-third (35.5%)
of the respondents reported that women of color have more difficulty
obtaining what they need through an order of protection; almost one-tenth
(9.4%) described this as a significant or very serious problem.
90
Likewise, more than half (52.9 %) of the respondents indicated that women
with the fewest economic resources have more difficulty obtaining what
they need. Almost one-fourth (24.6%) characterized this as a significant
or very serious problem.
91
Again, the most serious problems confronted non-English-speaking
women. Almost three-fourths (72.3%) of the respondents reported that
non-English-speaking women have more difficulty obtaining what they
need, and almost two-fifths (38.4%) considered this a significant or very
88. See supra note 67 and accompanying text.
89. Any concern that abolishing fee requirements may encourage frivolous requests for
protective relief reflects the same distrust of women's credibility that has proven unfounded in rape
and sexual harassment eases. See infra note 102. Moreover, there have been no reports of an
increase in the incidence of frivolous protective order petitions in those states that have already
eliminated fee requirements.
90. Survey, supra note 21, at II, 44.
91. Id. at II, 45. Several respondents, however, thought that women of color and indigent
women may obtain orders of protection more easily-perhaps because myths about domestic violence




serious problem. 92 For example, one respondent reported that her urban
western county does not provide translators even to non-English-speaking
women with low incomes, so that "if a domestic violence victim can't find
someone to translate for her the whole process is almost impossible."
A. Emergency Orders
In order to effectively safeguard battered women, judges must issue
emergency orders promptly in all appropriate cases and must include all
appropriate remedies in those orders. Accordingly, our evaluation of the
judicial record in issuing emergency orders focuses on three potential
problem areas: delay in the issuance of the order, denial of the order
altogether, and denial of certain remedies in the order.
1. Delay in Issuance of Emergency Orders.-Delays in issuing an
emergency order can put a battered woman at considerable risk, especially
if the abuser discovers that she has filed for protective relief. In fact, the
most dangerous time for a battered woman is when she tries to leave her
violent partner.93 Of course, the woman might be killed even if she has
obtained a protective order. Unfortunately, such cases are not
uncommon. 94  But it is also possible that an order of protection,
especially one issued in a system with adequate enforcement, will save her
life.
Although almost one-half (45.2%) of the respondents reported that
judges issue emergency orders within an hour after a petition is filed,
almost one-fifth (19.6%) indicated that the process typically takes at least
twenty-four hours. 95 Moreover, more than one-third (37.6%) thought
that petitioners must wait too long to obtain an emergency order and that
the delay increases victim risk; 11% characterized this as a significant or
very serious problem.
96
92. Id. at II, 46.
93. FINN & COLSON, supra note 2, at 2, 10; Martha R. Mahoney, Legal Images of Battered
Women: Redefining the Issue of Separation, 90 MICH. L. REv. 1, 64-65 (1991); Rural Justice
Center, supra note 30, at 24.
94. See, e.g., Flynn McRoberts & Teresa Wltz, Slain Wife Had the Law Behind Her, CHI.
TRIB., Mar. 19, 1992, § 1, at I (describing murder of Connie Chaney, whose husband shot her at
her suburban Chicago office even though she had obtained a protective order against him); Don
Terry, Stabbing Death at Door of Justice Sends Alert on Domestic Violence, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 17,
1992, at Al (describing murder of Shirley Lowery, who had obtained an emergency order the week
before her death and was stabbed by her boyfriend in a Milwaukee courthouse when she arrived for
the plenary hearing).
95. Survey, supra note 21, at I, 12.
96. Id. at II, 14. In addition, the Pearson correlation coefficients reported in connection with
our regression analyses suggest that counties where emergency orders are issued within an hour have
not only significantly fewer relief problems, but also significantly fewer access and enforcement
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In a number of counties, both rural and urban, judges are not always
available to grant emergency orders, and petitioners may therefore have to
wait hours or even days to obtain emergency relief. For example, as noted
above, one respondent from a rural southern community indicated that
women without private counsel must wait approximately ten days for
emergency orders. 97  Another respondent from an urban western
community said that emergency order hearings can be difficult to schedule:
"Currently one might have to call numerous times to reach the person
responsible for scheduling the hearings-she's usually in court or away
from her desk and messages don't seem to get passed on to her." Such
delays substantially diminish the benefits of obtaining protective relief.
2. Denial of Emergency Orders.-In many jurisdictions, judges issue
emergency orders of protection in virtually all cases. One respondent
indicated, for example, that no emergency order had been denied in her
rural southern county during the past ten years. Another respondent from
a similar community said, "[I]n 5 years we have never been turned down
on an ex parte ... order." Overall, ninety-four of the 168 (56%) survey
respondents who supplied the relevant data indicated that all of the
emergency order petitions filed in their county in 1991 were granted. In
the seventy-four jurisdictions where some emergency orders were denied,
the percentage of orders granted varied from 14.3% to 99.5%, with an
overall mean of 94.7% for all 168 respondents.
98
Despite this high overall issuance rate, emergency orders are seldom
granted in some jurisdictions. For example, one respondent from the
Midwest observed that "[s]ome counties do not recognize the [domestic
violence] law-they 'don't have' ex partes." Another respondent replied,
"We have two judges in our [rural western] county and one judge refuses
to even hear ex partes. He generally has an excuse of some sort." A
respondent from a rural northeastern community reported, "We have never
obtained an ex parte order of protection . .. in this county; all petitions
are scheduled on the court calendar for hearing at a date two weeks or
more in the future." 99
problems. See App. C, Tables 3-5.
97. See supra text accompanying note 50.
98. Survey, supra note 21, at III, 2-3. Specifically, five of the 74 respondents working in areas
where some emergency orders were denied reported that fewer than half of all emergency order
petitions had been granted, six put the figure between 50% and 75%, 15 said between 75.01% and
90%, 19 said between 90.01% and 95%, and 29 said more than 95%.
Given that so many of the respondents failed to supply the necessary statistical information
about emergency order petitions, however, these figures may be less representative of the entire
sample than the other findings.
99. See also Henson, supra note 58, at 4 (quoting one Kentucky judge as saying that he
"'refuse[s] to sign those things [emergency orders]'").
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Such variations in the issuance rate for emergency orders are not
found solely among localities that are very distant and very different from
each other. In fact, several respondents commented on the disparities that
characterize the process for obtaining emergency orders in their own
community. For example, one respondent indicated that the judges in her
urban western county grant all requests for emergency orders, whereas in
a neighboring county, "a battered woman has less than a 25% chance of
having her motion granted." A respondent from a rural midwestern
community likewise reported:
We can take in two protective order petitions which are exactly alike and
have the same income, and the judge will grant the protective order and
fee waiver for one and deny both for the other. He is extremely
inconsistent on his requirements. He will sometimes grant a protective
order in a very mild case of abuse ... and refuse one where there is
severe abuse.
Because domestic violence is a widespread problem in all regions, and
among all racial and socio-economic groups, 100 there appears to be no
justification for these inconsistencies-a conclusion that seems all the more
obvious given the disparities found at even a very localized level.
Moreover, domestic abuse in general is one of the most underreported
crimes in this country, 101 and there is no reason to suspect that false
charges are a substantial problem. 102  Emergency orders should
therefore be granted whenever a petitioner makes a credible claim that ex
parte relief is appropriate because notifying the abuser of her intent to
obtain an order of protection is likely to be dangerous for her.103 In
such cases, the risk of harm to the petitioner outweighs the order's
temporary impact on the abuser.
104
100. S. REP. No. 545, supra note 3, at 37; ATTORNEY GENERAL's TASK FORCE, supra note
57, at 2.
101. S. REP. No. 197, supra note 72, at 38; ATrORNEY GENERAL'S TASK FORCE, supra note
57, at 82; U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 11, at 1.
102. See, e.g., Report of the New York Task Force on Women in the Courts, 15 FORDHAM URB.
L.J. 11, 39-40 (1986-87) (rejecting the notion that women seek protective orders as a litigationtactic
for divorce). The specter of false charges has been raised and refuted on other occasions when legal
reforms designed to reduce violence against women have been proposed. See, e.g., Karla Fischer,
Note, Defining the Boundaries of Admissible Expert Psychological Testimony on Rape Trauma
Syndrome, 1989 U. ILL. L. REv. 691, 696-700 (criticizingthe fear of false charges reflected in the
rape laws); cf. Nancy S. Ehrenreich, Pluralist Myths and Powerless Men: The Ideology of
Reasonableness in Sexual Harassment Law, 99 YALE LJ. 1177, 1207-08 (1990) (comparing myths
about sexual harassment to the fear of false rape charges and the "general distrust of women").
103. Most protective order statutes limit ex parte relief to cases involving some type of
emergency, such as an "immediate and present danger" of domestic violence, a "substantial
likelihood of immediate danger," or a likelihood of "irreparable injury." FINN & COLSON, supra
note 2, at 14.
104. See id. (reporting that emergency orders typically last only between 10 and 20 days
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Overall, more than two-fifths (43.2%) of the respondents indicated
that judges' unwillingness to accept that abuse was serious enough to justify
issuing ex parte relief was a problem in their community; 14.6%
characterized it as a significant or very serious problem. 15 Specifically,
one respondent reported that a judge in her rural western county "made a
statement in public stating that he had not seen a 'legitimate case of
domestic violence go through his court.'" Another respondent described
the judges in her urban western community as "more concerned with
protecting the rights of the abuser rather than the safety of the
petitioner."106 Finally, a third indicated that emergency orders are
"difficult to obtain" in her rural southern community "because [judges
think that] most petitioners can stay in shelters and [be] safe."
The respondents' narratives describing specific cases in which
emergency orders were denied because the judge did not think the abuse
was sufficiently serious contained a number of common themes. First,
while each of the domestic violence reform statutes authorizes emergency
relief in cases involving physical abuse, 107 some judges deny emergency
orders unless the woman can produce physical evidence of the assault. As
one respondent from an urban northeastern county commented, "Some
judges need to see visible signs of abuse, [such as] bruises." Another
respondent reported that emergency orders are denied in her rural
midwestern community if there are "no [physical] signs of abuse-even if
several days have passed" since the violence. In effect, these judges are
considering only certain forms of evidence and are refusing to credit the
victim's testimony.1
08
Second, some judges deny emergency relief in cases of clear physical
abuse because they do not deem the violence serious enough. For
example, one respondent reported that some judges in her urban
northeastern county "spliti] hairs like 'was his fist opened or closed?'"
She continued, "Most women don't know-their eyes are closed-but it
somehow makes a difference [to the court]." Another respondent from the
Northeast said that emergency orders are denied in her county unless the
abuse was "life threatening."
Third, some judges do not consider non-physical abuse or threats of
physical abuse an adequate basis for an emergency order-even though the
because of the accelerated procedures for hearings in domestic violence cases); see also id. at 41
(noting that in most states abusers can request a hearing more quickly if the emergency order awards
the petitioner sole possession of the residence).
105. Survey, supra note 21, at II, 33.
106. For a discussion of the respondent's rights, see infra text accompanying notes 132-39.
107. See FINN & COLSON, supra note 2, at 10-11.
108. Theevidentiary burdens placed on domestic violence victims in such cases are reminiscent
of the special rules the courts imposed in rape cases. E.g., Fischer, supra note 102, at 695-96.
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state's domestic violence statute authorizes protective relief in such
cases. 109 With respect to threats of violence, one respondent noted that
the judges in her rural western county "feel that threats of shooting or
stabbing aren't enough, even if past experience shows a violent pattern."
Likewise, a respondent from the Northeast complained that the judge
"narrowly interprets the law-a raised fist isn't a threat unless [the abuser
also] says 'I'm going to kill you.'" 110 With respect to non-physical
abuse, one respondent said that the judges in her rural southern community
"do not believe emotional or verbal abuse is abuse; 'when did he last hit
you?' is a common question." Another respondent reported that the judges
in her urban northeastern county had a similar attitude because they do not
"understand the cycle of violence or escalation pattern." l
109. Forty-three states authorize protective relief in cases of threatened physical abuse, 40 in
cases of attempted physical abuse, and 28 in cases of sexual assault. See FINN & COLSON, supra
note 2, at 10-11. By contrast, few statutes allow issuance of protective orders based solely on proof
of harassment or psychological abuse. Lisa G. Lerman, Protection of Battered Women: A Survey
of State Legislation, 6 WOMEN's RTs. L. REP. 271, 272 (1981).
The respondents quoted in this paragraph are all describing situations in which judges refused
orders of protection even though the relevant state statute authorized protective relief in cases of
threats or non-physical abuse.
110. For similar results, see Durkin, supra note 58, at 39 (finding that 47% of the West
Virginia magistrates surveyed question the statutory rule providing that the threat of violence is an
adequate basis for issuing a protective order); Rural Justice Center, supra note 30, at 24 (noting that
judges often discount very real danger posed by pro-battering threats).
Refusing to issue protective orders in cases involving threats of abuse in effect requires victims
of domestic violence to experience a further beating before obtaining legal relief and thus denies
them the ability to avoid violence they can anticipate. E.g., LENORE E. WALKER, THE BATrERED
WOMAN 55-59 (1979).
111. Although many states do not authorize protective relief in cases involving only non-
physical abuse, see supra note 109, such abuse-verbal abuse, harassment, sexual abuse, and
psychological abuse-often escalates into physical abuse. See, e.g., WALKER, supra note 110, at
xiv-xv, 59. In addition, non-physical abuse is quite injurious in and of itself. In fact, some women
have described psychological degradation and humiliation as the most painful abuse they have
experienced. See, e.g., id. at 172 ("Despite having suffered severe physical injuries, most of the
women interviewed in this sample reported that verbal humiliation was the worst kind of battering
they had experienced."); Diane R. Follingstad et al., The Role of Emotional Abuse in Physically
Abusive Relationships, 5 J. FAM. VIOLENCE 107, 114 (1990) (reporting that 72% of those sampled
indicated that emotional abuse had a more severe impact on them than physical abuse).
In addition, research on the psychological impact of rape suggests that sexual abuse adversely
affects the victim's mental health, causing depression, anxiety, suicidal ideation, and a loss of self-
esteem. These effects are particularly likely when the woman knows the assailant. See Bonnie L.
Katz, The Psychological Impact of Stranger Versus Nonstranger Rape on Victims' Recovery, in
ACQUAINTANCE RAPE: THE HIDDEN CRIME 251 (Andrea Parrot & Laurie Bechhofer eds., 1991);
Mary Koss et al., Stranger and Acquaintance Rape: Are There Differences in the Victim's
Experience?, 12 PSYCHOL. WOMEN Q. 1 (1988). Thus, protective orders should be available in all
cases of sexual abuse, as well as in cases involving other forms of non-physical abuse, at least where
the abuse creates fear of physical harm. Cf. Lucke v. Lucke, 300 N.W.2d 231;234 (N.D. 1980)
(interpreting state statute to include "all forms of abuse, including mental harm").
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In addition to refusing emergency relief because the abuse is not
considered serious enough, some judges deny emergency orders on the
basis of informal rules that are not contemplated by the statute. Almost
three-fifths (59.6%) of the respondents reported that judges in their county
rely on such informal rules, and almost two-fifths (19.2%) characterized
these rules as a significant or very serious problem.
12
Specifically, we found that judges commonly follow an informal
practice of denying emergency orders to women who delay in filing for
relief or who dropped a prior order. For example, one respondent from
an urban northeastern county indicated that a battered woman who waits
more than two days to file her petition may be denied an emergency order
because the "judges feel she is not in danger." The judges in that county
also tend to refuse emergency relief to a woman who failed to pursue a
prior order of protection on the theory that "if she dropped it [once], she'll
do it again and [thus] is wasting the court's time." Another respondent
from a similar community reported that a woman who has dropped a prior
petition may be denied an emergency order "even if years have elapsed and
even if it is a different abuser."
113
These informal rules not only circumvent the intent of the protective
order statutes, but they also unfairly penalize battered women who are
otherwise entitled to protection. First, there are many reasons why a
woman might wait to seek relief: she might be undergoing treatment for
injuries caused by the violence; the abuser might be in jail and therefore
pose no immediate threat to her; she might be unaware of the availability
of protective orders; 114 she might not be psychologically ready to take
what she sees as the dramatic step of obtaining a court order against her
partner; she might be busy securing alternative shelter for herself and her
children; she might wait until she gets a day off from work; or she might
be too afraid to go to court to seek relief. Whatever the explanation for
the delay, it has nothing to do with the danger the woman is likely to face
once the abuser discovers she has gone to court to file for an order of
protection. It is often the woman's decision to seek a protective order that
puts her at greatest risk, 115 and her need for protection while she waits
for the plenary hearing is completely unrelated to the amount of time that
has elapsed since the most recent abusive incident.
112. Survey, supra note 21, at H, 34.
113. For similar findings, see FINN & COLSON, supra note 2, at 11, 28 (noting that judges are
reluctant to grant orders when petitioner delayed or dropped a prior order); Durkin, supra note 58,
at 38-39 (finding that a majority of West Virginia magistrates consider petitioners "unworthy" if they
dropped a prior petition).
114. The survey results suggest that this is a widespread problem. See supra notes 24-25 and
accompanying text.
115. See supra note 93 and accompanying text.
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Second, the petitioner's persistence in pursuing an earlier protective
order has little to do with the likelihood that she will be injured if the
abuser is notified of her intent to obtain an order of protection at a later
date. In addition, there are a number of reasons why a woman might have
dropped a previous order of protection. She might have done so in the
face of further threats or violence on the part of the abuser, or because she
believed his promises to reform. Almost all (95.2%) of the respondents
indicated that some petitioners fail to appear for the plenary hearing
because they believe the abuser's promises to change or leave them alone,
and almost two-thirds (65.7%) characterized this as a significant or very
serious problem. 116  In fact, this was one of the most serious relief
problems identified by the respondents. In addition, almost nine-tenths
(88.8%) of the respondents reported that some petitioners do not appear for
the plenary hearing because the abuser threatens to retaliate if the woman
obtains an order of protection; almost two-fifths (38.3%) considered this
a significant or very serious problem." 7  Again, it was one of the most
serious relief problems reported by the respondents.
There are other reasons why a battered woman might have dropped a
prior request for an order of protection. 118  She might have been
discouraged by the court's refusal to issue the relief she sought in her
emergency order. 119  In addition, research has shown that battered
women often do not make a clean break from an abusive relationship the
first time they try; many make several attempts before they ultimately
decide to leave. 120  Thus, women who have dropped prior petitions and
later return to court to obtain an order of protection are not necessarily
abusing the process or filing frivolous claims. In fact, the results of
research in Champaign County indicate that women who dropped prior
116. Survey, supra note 21, at 1, 56. This finding is consistent with the description of
domestic abuse as a cycle of violence. According to this theory, a violent episode is followed by
a period of calm, during which the abuser is extremely contrite and seeks the woman's forgiveness
for his abusive behavior; he claims to love her and promises not to subject her to further violence.
E.g., WALKER, supra note 110, at 65-70.
117. Survey, supra note 21, at II, 55; see also Fischer, supra note 16, at 76 (finding that all
of the women interviewed in Champaign County who were physically assaulted by their abuser after
receiving an emergency order ultimately dropped their petitions).
118. More than one-third (34.2%) of the respondents, for instance, indicated that some
petitioners fail to appear for the plenary hearing because they do not realize that they need to do so
in order to obtain an order of protection; 4.9% considered this a ignificant or very serious problem.
Survey, supra note 21, at I, 54.
119. See infra text accompanying note 141.
120. See, e.g., FINN & COLSON, supra note 2, at 29 ("[A] judge noted that, just as most
cigarette smokers attempt to quit many times before they finally succeed for good, many victims of
abuse make several unsuccessful attempts to try to stop the battering by themselves-or to leave the
situation-before they are emotionally and economically able to seek legal protection."); WALKER,
supra note 110, at 66-69.
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petitions are significantly more likely to extend their emergency orders than
are other petitioners. 
121
Other respondents described various other informal rules judges use
to deny emergency orders. For instance, one respondent from an urban
southern county and another from an urban midwestern county each
reported that judges refuse to issue emergency orders if there is no police
report, even though police reports are not required by law. 122 Another
respondent from a rural southern community said that emergency orders
are denied in cases involving the first incident of abuse 123 or simply
because the judge "feels [the petitioner] will go back" to the abuser.
Finally, a number of respondents indicated that informal rules
regarding the nature of the petitioner's relationship with the abuser may
dictate the court's response to her request for protective relief.124 For
example, one respondent reported that the judge in her rural southern
county "flat out refused to sign an ex-parte or even read it because the
petitioner and respondent weren't married." On the other hand, a
respondent from an urban western community commented, "If this is a
marriage of long standing, one judge will set the petition for a hearing
rather than issue the emergency [order]." Several respondents noted that
the judges in their communities (an urban northeastern county and an urban
southern community) would not grant emergency orders if the couple was
in the process of obtaining a divorce. And finally, completing the circle,
one respondent indicated that the judge in her rural midwestern community
"told a woman she was not eligible [for ex parte protection] because she
was divorced."
These reports starkly illustrate the inconsistencies found in the courts'
treatment of emergency order petitions in some jurisdictions. Although the
issuance rate for emergency orders is quite high in many communities, in
others the purposes of the domestic violence statutes are being undermined
by the judiciary's unwillingness to issue emergency relief in appropriate
cases.
3. Denial of Particular Remedies in Emergency Orders.-Almost
three-fourths (71.1%) of the respondents reported that judges in their
counties deny individual remedies in some emergency orders, thereby
121. See Fischer, supra note 16, at 38.
122. Cf. inf& note 330 (noting that police often fail to file reports in domestic violence cases
even when required to do so).
123. But cf. Fischer, supra note 16, at 36 (finding that women with no prior history of physical
abuse are more likely to pursue protective order petitions than are others).
124. The respondents quoted in this paragraph are all describing situations in which judges




limiting the orders' effectiveness; more than one-third (34.7 %) thought that
this was a significant or very serious problem.' 25  The two most
common problems identified in this area were, first, that judges deny
petitioners possession of the residence, and, second, that they grant the
alleged abuser unrestricted visitation. 126 As one respondent from a rural
northeastern county explained, the judges "feel that the women should be
satisfied with just being safe and [that] these other items can be taken care
of in a divorce."
Despite this sentiment, every domestic violence reform statute
authorizes the court to award possession of the residence in an emergency
order. 127 They do so in an effort to fully protect the petitioner.
Granting her possession of the residence is crucial because "family violence
is not easily reversed and may escalate with continued access, [and] safety
concerns dictate that the offender not be permitted to continue to live with
the victim." 128 Although the couple could be separated by insisting that
the woman find alternate living arrangements, "[riequiring offenders to
vacate provides an additional deterrence to criminal behavior, whereas
requiring victims to do so would discourage them from seeking needed
protection (and possibly reward the offender for his crime)." 129 Given
that most state statutes allow the alleged offender to request a hearing to
contest the eviction within a few days, 3 ' the balance of hardships favors
awarding possession of the residence to a woman who has demonstrated
that she is in danger of abuse.
Nevertheless, this remedy is denied in numerous cases. For example,
one respondent noted that in her rural northeastern community, "[Mjost
victims have children and want to remain in their homes, but over 70% are
told to go somewhere else even if they are married." Another respondent
from a rural western county described a case where the judge permitted the
alleged abuser to "spend nights in the home from 7:00 p.m. to 7:00 a.m.
because [the man] said he had no place to go at night." Similarly, a
respondent from a rural southwestern county reported:
The judge was reluctant to remove Spanish-speaking offenders from the
home since they did not speak English, did not have a place to live, and
. . . it would be difficult for them to function without their English
125. Survey, supra note 21, at II, 35.
126. Approximately 40 respondents commented specifically on the court's refusal to grant
petitioners possession of the residence, about 25 on unrestricted visitation.
127. FINN & CoLsoN, supra note 2, at 33.
128. Id. (referring to the remedy authorizing exclusive possession of the residence as "perhaps
the key provision of protective order statutes").
129. Id. at 41 (reporting that "almost all of the judges interviewed agreed that the prevention
of criminal violence is better served" by this alternative).
130. Id.
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speaking spouses. Trying to get [the judge] to understand that it would
not be a problem if they were not batterers fell on deaf ears. 
13 1
In some cases, this reluctance to award the petitioner possession of the
residence seems to be based on the judge's belief that ex parte orders
evicting alleged abusers raise due process concerns. 132  As one
respondent from a rural northeastern community reported, "One judge..
. believes 'the man's rights are always violated'" when he is evicted from
his home as part of an ex parte order. 133  Nevertheless, domestic
violence statutes that authorize ex parte relief "fit[] in with a long history
in American civil law of issuing temporary restraining orders as a means
of preventing immediate and irreparable harm." 134  Whenever there is
a substantial risk of immediate and irreparable harm, the courts have
traditionally rejected due process challenges to ex parte deprivations taken
as an interim measure before a full-fledged hearing can be held.
135
Here, too,-the abuser's due process rights must be balanced against the risk
to the victim. When notice to the respondent is likely to subject a battered
woman to further violence, immediate and irreparable harm can be
prevented only if the abuser is restrained from approaching both the home
and the petitioner. As several courts have recognized, this temporary
eviction fully comports with the law governing temporary restraining
orders.
136
In addition to authorizing the court to award possession of the
residence, most statutes allow emergency orders to include a temporary
131. For similar findings, see id. at 33 (finding that judges are reluctant to award possession
of residence in emergency orders).
132. Because orders of protection are civil matters, concerns about the presumption of
innocence and the rights of criminal defendants are not implicated.
133. For similar findings, see Durkin, supra note 58, at 54 (reporting that many judges claim
that eviction of the abuser violates individual rights).
134. FINN & COLSON, supra note 2, at 33.
135. See, e.g., Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600 (1974) (upholding ex parte seizure
of debtor's property before hearing on merits).
136. See State ex rel. Williamsv. Marsh, 626 S.W.2d 223,232 (Mo. 1982) (en bane) (rejecting
due process challenge to statute that authorized ex parte orders to award custody and possession of
the residence); Marquette v. Marquette, 686 P.2d 990, 995-96 (Okla. Ct. App. 1984) (finding that
an ex parte order did not violate the appellant's due process rights even though it effectively denied
visitation); cf. Blazel v. Bradley, 698 F. Supp. 756 (W.D. Vis. 1988) (rejecting facial challenge to
protective order statute, but finding order entered there unconstitutional because petition failed to
allege risk of immediate harm).
A number of respondents also listed various other explanationsjudges have offered in refusing
to grant women possession of the residence: " there are shelters available" to the petitioner; the judge
'operates from the 'man's home is his castle' perspective"; the judge is "not going to throw a man
out in the streets"; the apartment 'belongs to him; the protective order says not to hurt and that
should do"; and the "judges want to make sure that if a 'kick out' is granted ... the abuser has
another place to live that does not cause him financial hardship."
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resolution of custody issues. 137  Awarding the petitioner temporary
custody of the children and limiting the alleged abuser's visitation rights is
crucial because "[j]udges and victims alike agree that nowhere is the
potential for renewed violence greater than during visitation."138
Although a father obviously has a legitimate interest in maintaining contact
with his children, his rights lose force when awarding him custody or
unrestricted visitation is likely to pose a danger to the woman or the
children.
139
Nevertheless, judges sometimes refuse to resolve temporary custody
issues at the emergency hearing or to limit the abuser's visitation rights.
For example, one respondent noted that the judge in her urban northeastern
community "feels that visitation has nothing to do with domestic violence."
Another respondent from an urban western county concluded, "Judges
often feel the abuser's right to visitation overrides the petitioner's right to
be free of abuse." Some respondents indicated that judges are even stingy
with custody orders when the welfare of the children is at issue. In one
urban northeastern county, "[J]udges feel that the respondent has every
right to see the children even if there has been physical and emotional harm
to them." Another respondent reported that the judge in her rural
midwestern county "grants the abuser visitation rights even though he has
threatened to kidnap or kill the children."
A number of respondents described the adverse consequences that
result when the woman is required to have continued contact with her
abusive partner because the court insists on granting him unrestricted
visitation rights. One respondent from an urban western county observed,
"Many of our clients have trouble about visitation; the abusers often use
the children as a way of continuing to control the woman." Another
respondent from a similar community reported that "the abuser uses the
children to psychologically torment the petitioner." A third pointed out
that visitation allows the abuser to visit "ongoing harm and harassment on
the petitioner and children." Furthermore, our research in Champaign
County indicates that contact with abusers may be psychologically harmful
to women: we found that petitioners who had more contact with their
abusers were more likely to experience depression and low self-esteem than
other petitioners.
140
137. FINN & COLSON, supra note 2, at 33.
138. Id. at 43.
139. Some states have expressly endorsed this point by enacting custody statutes that allow
judges to consider a history of domestic violence in child custody proceedings, e.g., MD. FAM. LAW
CODE ANN. § 9-101.1 (1991), or that create a rebuttable presumption that awarding custody or
visitation to the abuser is not in the child's best interest, e.g., N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-05-22(3)
(1991).
140. Fischer, supra note 16, at 107.
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In some jurisdictions, judges are sensitive to these problems. One
respondent from a rural western county reported that any disagreements
about visitation typically arise when the judge wishes to deny visitation
over the objection of the petitioner and respondent. In other communities,
judges have crafted creative remedies that permit visitation while
substantially minimizing the risk of further abuse. For example, one
respondent noted that the judge in her rural northeastern county "does not
like to separate a dad from his kids, [but] is very good in allowing the
woman to demand and be granted supervised visitation." Likewise,
another respondent from an urban southern community reported that
although "most judges strongly feel the abuser needs to have visitation with
the children, we try to arrange a safe, neutral area-not the residence
protected by [the order of protection]."
The judges who are not so sensitive to these and other issues-who
delay the issuance of emergency orders, deny the orders altogether, or
refuse to include certain remedies-not only place women at risk, but also
affect their willingness to pursue a plenary order. Our experience in
Champaign indicates that women who were denied an emergency order, a
fee waiver, or the specific remedies they requested were much less likely
to return to court to extend their orders than women who were granted the
relief they felt they needed. 141 By denying relief, the court sends a




Similar concerns arise in evaluating the procedures for issuing plenary
orders, and we therefore examine the same three issues discussed above in
connection with emergency orders: delay in issuing the order, denial of the
order altogether, and denial of certain remedies in the order. Our findings
suggest that the judicial track record here is similar, although slightly better
in certain respects when compared to the emergency order process.
1. Delay in Issuance of Plenary Orders.-More than one-half (54.8%)
of the respondents described the docket for plenary hearings as
crowded-that is, a number of hearings are set for the same time. The
number of hearings scheduled at one time varied tremendously, ranging
from one to seventy-five, with a mean of 13.1.143
141. See id. at 36-37, 46.
142. See id. at 40 (noting that denial of relief suggests to petitioners that "the abuse they have
suffered is trivial compared to real victims").
143. Survey, supra note 21, at I, 14(b).
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The respondents' general assessment of the courts' promptness in
issuing plenary orders was only slightly more positive than their assessment
of the emergency order process. Almost one-third (32.5%) thought the
docket is so crowded that the wait discourages battered women from
seeking plenary orders; almost one-tenth (9.4%) characterized this as a
significant or very serious problem. 144 For example, one respondent
from an urban western county described the procedure for obtaining
plenary orders as "a long process." "The hearing calendar is usually
lengthy so a petitioner may spend all afternoon at court," she explained.
Another respondent from an urban northeastern community said that
petitioners have a "long wait" on their day in court because all cases are
set for a nine o'clock docket call.
In some cases, petitioners may have to wait on more than one occasion
to obtain a plenary order, which only exacerbates the problems associated
with arranging to be at the courthouse. In one rural southern county, for
example,
[i]f respondents do not appear for the second order hearing sometimes
the order is extended but only for a period of 10 days. The petitioner
is required to return to court sometimes several times-this seems to be
designed to "wear down" the petitioner and actually seems to favor the
respondent, even in cases where the respondent continually fails to
appear for scheduled hearings.
Likewise, nineteen percent of the women we interviewed in Champaign
County were required to attend more than one plenary hearing (and some
as many as five), either because the emergency order was not served in
time for the plenary hearing or because the abuser requested an attorney
and asked that the case be continued. 145
These delays are likely to discourage a woman from pursuing
protective relief, not only by making it more inconvenient to obtain, but
also by giving the respondent access to her while she waits in the
courthouse for the hearing to begin. During this time, he can harass her,
try to convince her to drop the order, or even subject her to additional
abuse. 146
2. Denial of Plenary Orders.-In many jurisdictions, plenary orders
are granted in virtually all cases. Many respondents who reported that all
petitions for emergency relief are routinely granted in their counties said
the same about plenary orders. 147  But other respondents described
144. Id. at i, 22.
145. See Fischer, supra note 16, at 77, Table 12.
146. See supra note 94.
147. See supra text accompanying note 98. Overall, 69 of the 134 respondents who supplied
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jurisdictions where protective orders are almost never issued. One
respondent from a rural midwestern community reported that there simply
are no orders of protection in one of the counties in which she works:
"The prosecutor won't assist and the judges won't grant [them]." Another
respondent from the Northeast concluded, you "have to be about dead" to
get an order of protection in one of the counties in which she works.
These disparities are no more justifiable than those we discovered in the
emergency order process.14
8
Just as disparities in issuance rates can be found at both the emergency
order and the plenary order stage, the survey results indicate that plenary
orders, like emergency orders, are denied because the judge is unwilling
to accept that the abuse or violence occurred. Approximately two-fifths
(40.3 %) of the respondents reported that this was a problem at the plenary
stage, and 8.6% characterized it as a significant or very serious
problem.'149  These figures are comparable to, though slightly better
than, the responses we received to a similar question concerning emergency
orders. 15
0
The respondents' descriptions of the reasons why courts deny plenary
orders were very similar to those discussed above in connection with
emergency orders. 151  First, some judges impose unrealistic standards
of proof in cases involving physical abuse. For example, one respondent
reported that the courts in her rural northeastern county have refused to
grant protective orders where there is "[n]ot enough documentation and/or
evidence that abuse or violence has occurred (e.g., pictures, hospital bills,
bruises etc.)." Another respondent from a rural southern community
indicated that protective orders have been denied because the petitioner did
not have "specific dates or medical records" or "lack[ed] physical
evidence." Again, these judges appear to be willing to consider only
the relevant data indicated that 100% of plenary order petitions filed in their county in 1991 were
granted; the figures for the remaining 65 ranged from 0% to 99.4%, with an overall mean of 93.8%
for all 134 responses. Survey, supra note 21, at 1H, 6-7. Specifically, five of the 65 respondents
working in areas where some orders were denied reported that fewer than half of all plenary order
petitions had been granted, eight put the figure between 50% and 75%, 16 said between 75.01% and
90%, 14 said between 90.01% and 95%, and 22 said more than 95%.
Again, these figures may be less representative of the entire sample than our other findings
because so many of the respondents failed to supply statistical information about plenary order
petitions.
148. See supra notes 100-04 and accompanying text. In fact, there is even less reason to deny
a plenary order because the heightened standard that might be appropriate at the emergency order
stage, see supra note 103 and accompanying text, has no place when the hearing is not an ex parte
proceeding and the abuser has an opportunity to attend and contest issuance of the order.
149. Survey, supra note 21, at H, 36.
150. See supra note 105 and accompanying text.
151. See supra notes 107-11 and accompanying text.
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certain forms of evidence, thereby imposing a stricter standard of proof
than is applied in other cases.
Second, some judges are reluctant to accept threats of physical abuse
or non-physical abuse as serious enough to justify an order of protection,
even though the statute authorizes relief in such cases. 152  As one
respondent from an urban southern county said, "Judges are reluctant to
grant an order of protection just on a threat; many times the petitioner
knows there will be violence and seeks an order of protection to prevent
it and the system is not responsive." 153 Another respondent from a
similar community provided an even more egregious example: "[O]ne
judge here told [a] victim that her husband was not raping her when he
forced sex on her; [the judge] told her it was part of [the] marital
contract." Finally, a respondent from an urban western community
commented, "The judges don't seem to believe in mental or psychological
abuse and are reluctant to give an order without seeing any physical
disorder such as abrasions [or] contusions."
In addition to relying on reasoning similar to that used in denying
emergency orders, judges find insufficient evidence of abuse and therefore
deny plenary orders on several other grounds as well. First, some plenary
orders are denied because the judge focuses only on the specific incident
that led the petitioner to seek the order and refuses to consider the violent
history of the relationship between the parties. For example, one
respondent from the Northeast said that the judge in her community
"doesn't see domestic violence as a problem, but as a fight between two
people .... The judge focuses only on the most recent event which may,
in isolation, not be especially abusive under the law but in its entirety
[within the context of the relationship] points clearly to power and control,
domination, and abuse." Likewise, another respondent reported that one
of the judges in her urban midwestern county "refuses to listen to the
pattern or history of abuse and makes decisions based on the one incident
which may have caused a woman to obtain an order." Given that the
domestic violence statutes broadly authorize relief to women who have
suffered abuse, there is no justification for such a narrow focus.
Second, other respondents reported that battered women encounter
some difficulty obtaining plenary orders in contested cases. For example,
one respondent indicated that one of the judges in her urban midwestern
community "will not sign an order if it is contested. He requires an
152. The respondents quoted in this paragraph are all describing situations in which judges
refused orders of protection even though the relevant state statute authorized protective relief in cases
of threats or non-physical abuse.
153. A respondent from a rural northeastern county likewise reported, "[O]rders have been
denied because of lack of evidence and because the judge felt that a raised fist did not constitute
abuse under the guidelines of the law."
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unbiased witness to the abuse, which, of course, is a rarity." Likewise,
another respondent from an urban northeastern county observed, "The
standard ... is ... a preponderance of the evidence. When each side
has only one witness, the petitioner and the respondent, the judge must test
credibility. Some judges find this difficult and are unwilling to continue
the order unless the respondent makes an admission." 154 This logic
seems somewhat odd given that judges are required to make credibility
determinations in contested cases on a regular basis; 155 there is no
reason why they cannot question both parties and then make a judgment
based on all the evidence in domestic violence cases as well.
Plenary orders, like emergency orders, are also denied based on
informal rules that are not specified in the statute. Although the courts'
use of these informal rules does not seem quite as widespread as it is at the
emergency order stage, more than two-fifths (42.3%) of the respondents
reported that the judges in their county deny some plenary orders based on
informal rules, and one-tenth considered this a significant or very serious
problem. 156 The informal rules mentioned most often were the same
ones judges rely on most frequently in denying emergency orders-the
petitioner's delay in fling for protective relief or her failure to pursue an
order on some prior occasion. 157
In other cases, judges do not deny -plenary orders altogether, but issue
mutual orders, giving each the petitioner and the respondent a protective
order against the other. Mutual orders of protection should be granted
only when each party files a petition for protective relief and proves that
the other engaged in abusive behavior. Issuing mutual orders in other
cases sends the message that the abuser is not accountable for his violence.
154. At least in Champaign County, few plenary hearings involve evidence other than the
testimony of the parties. See Fischer, supra note 16, at 74 (finding that such evidence was presented
in only six percent of the hearings, and on each occasion was presented by the petitioner).
155. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Ligas, 441 N.E.2d 1277, 1281 (1l1. Ct. App. 1982); Smith
v. Smith, 412 N.E.2d 985, 991 (1ll. Ct. App. 1980).
156. Survey, supra note 21, at II, 37.
157. For example, one respondent from an urbanwestern community reported that" [thejudges
think if the petitioner has waited then it must not be a serious problem." Likewise, another
respondent from a rural northeastern county commented, "Judges still do not understand that a
woman may be fearful even after.., abuse occurring several weeks before." A third respondent
said that the courts in her rural midwestern community have denied protective orders on the theory
that the petitioner "is not serious about wanting one because she dropped the last one."
In addition, approximately one-tenth (10.6%) of the respondents reported that the courts will
not issue even a basic order of protection enjoining further violence if the petitioner wishes to try
living with the abuser again. Survey, supra note 21, at I, 18(b). Despite this judicial policy, the
protective order statutes recognize that a woman's desire to continue a relationship does not mean
that she wants the abuse to continue or that she is free from danger. Thus, the statutes do not
require a woman to leave a relationship in order to obtain relief. See FINN & COLSON, supra note
2, at 7-10 (noting that even the most restrictive statutes provide relief to women who are currently
living with abusive spouses).
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In addition, it further victimizes and stigmatizes the woman by suggesting
that she is somehow responsible for the violence or is abusive herself.158
As one study concluded, "Only ignorance of the dynamics of an abusive
relationship could explain 'mutual orders of protection.'"
1 59
Nevertheless, mutual orders are quite common in some jurisdictions.
Almost three-fifths (58.6%) of the respondents indicated that judges tend
to grant mutual orders in inappropriate cases; more than one-fifth (21.1%)
considered this a significant or very serious problem. 160  For example,
one respondent from an urban midwestern community reported, "We have
a problem with some judges only granting mutual restraining orders in
many contested cases. This forces the survivor to accept restrictions in
order to get protection." Similarly, a respondent from an urban
midwestern community noted, "Sometimes dual restraining orders are
granted even though the person who is the respondent has not filed
properly.... [I]t is quite victim blaming." Another respondent from a
rural western county said simply, "Our orders always pertain to both
parties." Several respondents even indicated that judges continue to grant
mutual orders in inappropriate cases though expressly prohibited from
doing so by the state's domestic violence statute.
161
Finally, some judges are unwilling to grant plenary orders for the
maximum duration specified by the statute; instead, they grant the orders
for some shorter period of time. For example, one respondent from a rural
western county reported that the "[c]ourt is very reluctant to grant one year
orders because it is skeptical that the petitioner will stay away from the
respondent for a year." 162  Another respondent from an urban
northeastern community noted that the judge in one county in which she
works grants orders for weeks or months instead of one year. Finally, a
158. In addition, mutual orders are often less enforceable because the police are "uncertain how
to proceed when there is a mutual protection order" and "may be misled as to which party actually
has a history of battering"; as a result, the police often choose to do nothing or arrest both parties.
FINN & COLSON, supra note 2, at 47; see also Report of the New York Task Force on Women in the
Courts, supra note 102, at 38-39.
159. Rural Justice Center, supra note 30, at 25; see also Report of the New York Task Force
on Women in the Courts, supra note 102, at 39 ("The domestic-violence victim with a mutual order
of protection is in a worse position than if she had no order.").
160. Survey, supra note 21, at II, 41. For similar findings, see Report of the New York Task
Force on Women in the Courts, supra note 102, at 38 ("Nearly two-thirds of male (sixty-five
percent) and female (sixty-six percent) survey respondents reported that judges 'often' or 'sometimes'
issue mutual orders even though respondents have not filed petitions.").
161. One judge in Kentucky takes mutual orders to an even further extreme: he orders the
couple to socialize together-to attend church services or football games or go out drinking together.
Henson, supra note 58, at 6.
162. What the petitioner may or may not do while the order is in force should not be the issue
because the protective order applies only to the respondent's actions. See infra notes 255-61 and
accompanying text.
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third respondent reported that the court in her urban northeastern
community typically grants plenary orders for twenty days rather than the
thirty days allowed under the state statute, despite the fact that even the
thirty-day maximum is "too short."
One possible explanation for some of the problems facing battered
women who seek orders of protection is that judges may not credit a
woman's testimony if she becomes emotional or confused in court. More
than one-half (51.8%) of the respondents reported that the judge in their
county tends to disbelieve women in such cases; 15.4% characterized this
as a significant or very serious problem. 163 A woman who decides to
obtain a court order against her abusive partner-especially a woman with
no legal training-is likely to find the experience traumatic and therefore
can be expected to become emotional or confused. In fact, more than one-
half (57.2%) of the respondents said that the courthouse environment is so
intimidating that it is difficult for petitioners to explain what they need or
to describe their experiences; almost one-fifth (19.4%) considered this a
significant or very serious problem.
164
Apparently, however, some judges do not understand this and instead
interpret emotion or confusion as a sign that the petition lacks substance.
One respondent from a rural western county explained, "The judge expects
the petitioner to have 'her ducks in a row' and is not tolerant of the
confusion and low. self-esteem typical of the battered woman. She must
know and be able to say what she needs and why she needs it in a clear
manner." A second respondent from an urban southern county noted,
"[S]ometimes the judges don't understand why the petitioner may not speak
up during a hearing, [or why] she is not clear or is vague with wording;
thus, the judge takes the position that abuse did not occur." Likewise,
another respondent reported that plenary orders have been denied in her
rural western county because petitioners were "not able to speak up for
themselves due to nerves." Finally, a respondent from an urban
midwestern community described a particularly sad case where a mentally
handicapped woman was denied a protective order "because she was unable
to remember a previous hearing."
The judiciary's tendency to discredit battered women's testimony may
explain some of the difficulties women encounter when they attempt to
obtain plenary orders: outright denial of the orders, inappropriate use of
mutual orders, and issuance of plenary orders for less than the maximum
duration. In refusing to issue complete relief in such cases, judges deny
163. Survey, supra note 21, at II, 42.
164. Id. at 11, 20. In addition, a similar number (58.7%) of respondents reported that the
intimidating courthouse environment prevents some women from seeking protective orders; 17.1%
considered this a significant or very serious problem. Id. at II, 19.
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battered women the protection they are entitled to receive from the
domestic violence statutes.
3. Denial of Particular Remedies in Plenary Orders.-Limiting the
remedies included in plenary orders is directly contrary to both the express
language and the spirit of the domestic violence reform legislation. Most
of the statutes envision that orders of protection will go beyond merely
prohibiting further violence and will also determine custody and visitation
issues and award possession of property and financial support.
165
Although about one-half (51.9%) of the respondents indicated that the
judge is always willing to consider granting each of the remedies requested
by the petitioner, more than two-fifths (42.9%) said that the judge is
typically unwilling to consider awarding certain remedies even though they
are authorized by statute.
166
The particular remedies that are most often denied are requests for
custody, child support, and other financial remedies, remedies that the
legislatures wisely included in the domestic violence statutes. First, unless
the order awards the petitioner custody of the children and limits the
respondent's visitation rights, the respondent may use his access to the
children to subject the woman to additional violenfce or harassment.
167
Moreover, a protective order without an award of custody is virtually
useless to women who are unwilling to leave an abusive relationship unless
they can take the children with them. 168
Nevertheless, 11.2% of the respondents indicated that the judges in
their county will not consider awarding the woman custody of the children
in an order of protection. 169  As one respondent from a rural western
county explained, "Some judges are reluctant to grant child custody,
especially... if there is no abuse of the children." Ultimately, she said,
whether or not custody is awarded "[d]epends on which judge is hearing
the petition." Another respondent from an urban southern county
165. See FINN & COLSON, supra note 2, at 38-39 (reporting that 40 of the domestic violence
reform statutes authorize an award of temporary custody, 27 allow temporary child support, 29
permit temporary spousal support, 14 authorize monetary compensation, and 24 allow compensation
for the costs of obtaining the protective order (including attorney's fees)).
166. We arrived at this figure by adding together all respondents who indicated that the judge
in their county typically refused to consider granting at least one of the remedies listed in section 1,
question 18(b) of the survey. In answering this question, the respondents were instructed to indicate
that the court was unwilling to grant a certain remedy only if that particular remedy was actually
authorized by the state statute.
167. See supra text accompanying notes 138-40.
168. A number of researchers have noted that children tend to tie a woman to an abusive
relationship. See, e.g., DEL MARTIN, BATTERED WIVES, 5, 73, 79-80, 85 (1976); WALKER, spra
note I10, at 149.
169. Survey, supra note 21, at I, 18(b).
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commented, "Judges feel that child custody belongs with the divorce
proceedings"; therefore, they "will not consider child custody issues in an
injunction unless very extreme circumstances are involved, even though the
state statute provides for it." Finally, one respondent reported that the
judge in her rural southern community holds similar views, and she
described the consequences as follows:
The [jiudge in these cases minimizes the dangerous nature of domestic
violence and creates ambiguity in regard to issues that will keep the
petitioner involved with the abuser. If child custody issues are not
resolved the abuser still has rights to his children but no clearcut
guidelines are set forth, so petitioners are forced into continually having
contact with their abusers ([and] then they are accused of breaking the
order of protection).
Second, unless child support and other financial remedies are included
in an order of protection, the woman may have no choice but to continue
living with the abuser in order to support herself and her children.
170
Protective orders cannot simply shield women from further abuse; they
must also provide them with the resources they need to survive on their
own.
Nevertheless, almost three-fifths (58.6%) of the respondents reported
that the judges in their county deny some economic remedies in plenary
orders-for example, child support, maintenance or alimony, and
compensation for losses suffered as a result of the abuse-thereby greatly
reducing the petitioner's ability to provide financially for herself and her
children. Almost one-third (30.5%) thought that the denial of such
remedies was a significant or very serious problem. 171 Specifically,
more than one-fifth (22%) reported that the judge will not order the abuser
to pay child support, and 16.1% said the judge will not award the
petitioner possession of property. 
172
In explaining this reluctance to award economic relief, one respondent
from an urban northeastern county commented that judges do not feel they
have authority to grant such remedies, even though they are plainly
170. For example, in one case in Kentucky, a judge lectured the petitioner about her
inadequacies as a mother rather than awarding child support. Two years later, she was still living
with her abusive spouse. She sought a protective order from a different judge, who granted her
child support, and she then divorced her husband within a month. Henson, supra note 58, at 5. See
also JENNIFER B. FLEMING, STOPPING WIFE ABUSE: A GUIDE TO THE EMOTIONAL,
PSYCHOLOGICAL, AND LEGAL IMPLICATIONS FOR THE ABUSED WOMAN AND THOSE HELPING HER
83-84 (1979) ("Mhe husband invariably controls the family finances-usually with an iron hand.
It is the rare victim who has more than a few dollars she can call her own."); MARTIN, supra note
168, at 83-84 (explaining why even battered women who have "a place to go... may not have the
money to get there"); WALKER, supra note I10, at 127-44.
171. Survey, supra note 21, at II, 38.
172. Id. at I, 18(b).
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provided for in the state's domestic violence statute. Another respondent
said that the judges in her urban southern county "don't want to deal with
these problems at the hearing. They will deal with the violence only and
tell victims to get a lawyer and settle [the rest] in divorce court." Finally,
a respondent from a rural southern county noted that judges refuse to
award economic remedies because of "the attitude... that if the petitioner
decides to leave she can provide for herself."
Given the importance of custody and financial remedies, it should not
be surprising that our experience in Champaign County indicates that
women who requested more extensive relief in their emergency orders of
protection were significantly more likely to follow through and seek
plenary orders. In particular, the promise of both custody and child
support seemed to provide a real incentive to extend an emergency
order.173 Thus, the broader the remedies available in orders of
protection, the more likely that a battered woman will seek judicial relief
and that the protective order will serve her needs.
174
C. Judicial Behavior and Attitudes
The survey results suggest that judges not only deny orders of
protection and individual remedies in some cases, but also fail to give
battered women and their petitions the consideration they deserve. First,
they often treat petitioners in insensitive and disrespectful ways. Second,
they do not seem to take protective order cases seriously and do not take
steps to send the message that the abuser's behavior is unacceptable. The
humiliation and embarrassment caused by this behavior deters some women
from seeking judicial relief.
With respect to the first problem, more than one-half (55.4%) of the
respondents reported that the judges in their county express impatience and
respond insensitively to women who become emotional or confused while
testifying; 18.9% considered this a significant or very serious
problem. 175 Likewise, more than one-half (55.7%) indicated that the
judge's commentary during protective order hearings includes victim-
173. Fischer, supra note 16, at 39, 41.
174. In addition, the Pearson correlation coefficients reported in connection with the regression
analyses suggest that counties where judges routinely deny certain remedies have not only
significantly more relief problems but also significantly more access and enforcement problems. See
App. C, Tables 3-5.
175. Survey, supra note 21, at 1I, 43. In addition, judges tend to discredit the petitioner's
testimony in such cases. See supra notes 163-164 and accompanying text (explaining in additionwhy
petitioners can be expected to become emotional or confused in court).
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blaming statements, and 17.8% characterized this as a significant or very
serious problem. 
176
For example, one respondent described the judges in her rural western
county as "sexist" and explained, "They refuse to try to understand
domestic violence and often blame the victim. The judge who hears the
majority of petitions ridicules, makes moral judgments and cites immaturity
for the problem." Another respondent characterized one of the judges in
her rural northeastern county as "a macho-type ... judge who makes the
victim feel like the offender." Finally, a third said that the "worst
problem" in her rural southern community is "the embarrassing humiliation
[tactics] some sexist magistrates use to ask questions at the hearing."
This insensitive judicial behavior may be an even greater problem for
women of color. For example, one respondent said that the judges in her
rural southern county "often treat battered women in demeaning
ways-giving them messages they don't need. Women of color.., are
treated even worse. In addition to being ignorant about domestic violence,
many court folks ... are racist and arrogant."
In addition to being generally insensitive and disrespectful, such
behavior can also affect women's willingness to pursue the protective order
remedy. As one respondent from an urban midwestern community
commented, the judges "shame the woman and scare her [into believing]
that she is not going to get the order of protection. That prevents many
women from going to the hearing." Likewise, another respondent from a
rural southern community noted, "Some petitioners don't return for the
second hearing because of the judge's abusive behavior."
177
With respect to the second problem, taking domestic violence seriously
and communicating that fact to the parties can have an impact both on the
petitioner, by emphasizing that the judicial system believes she "do[es] not
have to tolerate assaultive behavior," 178 and on the respondent, by
deterring future violence. 179  Nevertheless, almost three-fifths (59.1 %)
176. Survey, supra note 21, at II, 52.
177. See also Rural Justice Center, supra note 30, at 29 (concluding thatjudges' attitudes about
domestic violence affect filing rates). Contra Durkin, supra note 58, at 46-47 (finding that
magistrates' attitudes did not affect filing rate in West Virginia).
178. FINN & COLSON, supra note 2, at 53.
179. See, e.g., ATrORNEY GENERAL's TASK FORCE, supra note 57, at 36 ("Judges should not
underestimate their ability to influence the defendant's behavior. Even a stern admonition from the
bench can help to deter the defendant from future violence."); FINN & COLSON, supra note 2, at 53
("Lectures from the bench, in particular, can be eye-opening to many batterers."); GAIL A.
GOOuKASIAN, U.S. DEP'T OF JUsTICE, CONFRONTING DOMESTC VIOLENCE: A GUIDE FOR
CRIMINAL JUsTICE AGENCIES 67-68 (1986) (recommending that judges make use of their status as
"primary authority figures in our society... [to] take every opportunity to reinforce the message
that battering is criminal behavior, and that the criminal justice system holds batterers accountable
for the violence"); BARBARA E. SMITH, U.S. DEP"T OF JUSTICE, NON-STRANJER VIOLENCE: THE
CRIMINAL COURT'S RESPONSE 96 (1983) (finding that "judicial warnings and/or lectures to
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of the respondents reported that the judge's behavior and commentary
during the hearings fail to send the message that the judicial system
supports the petitioner's right to end the violence; more than one-fourth
(26%) characterized this as a significant or very serious problem.'
80
Specifically, more than two-fifths (42.9 %) of the respondents indicated that
the judge does not routinely lecture the abuser about the inappropriateness
and seriousness of his violent behavior. Almost one-third (32.7%) reported
that the judge fails to tell the respondent that the protective order is an
order of the court that the judge takes very seriously. And almost one-half
(45.1%) reported that the judge does not inform the petitioner that she
should report any violations of the order to the police.'1
8
As one respondent from a rural western county explained, "The judges
offer very little [information], other than whether or not they will grant the
petition, unless specifically asked." Our "biggest problem," she continued,
is this "lethargy exhibited by the judges in our community, which adds
insult and embarrassment to an already humiliating experience." Another
respondent from an urban northeastern community commented that judges
"hate orders of protection and try to move those cases in and out of the
courtroom as quickly as possible." 182 Finally, a respondent from an
urban western county persuasively argued:
The courts need to recognize that these domestic violence restraining
order cases, almost without exception brought by unrepresented and
legally unsophisticated plaintiffs, deserve the court's full attention. No
case should be rushed through a five-minute so-called hearing. The
judge should at least refer to the plaintiff's allegations and comment on
the seriousness of the acts alleged. But in reality, few judges ever read
the plaintiff's petition prior to the hearing and so are unfamiliar with the
plight of the plaintiff. I sincerely feel it is judicial snobbery that treats
these pro se cases like nuisance cases-to be dispatched quietly and
quickly. This is morally wrong and hurtful to plaintiffs. Yes, the courts
are extremely overburdened and understaffed. That reality, though, does
not diminish the need for the full attention of the courts on domestic
violence victims.
defendants concerning the inappropriateness and seriousness of their violent behavior apparently
improved the future conduct of some defendants").
In addition, the Pearson correlation coefficients reported in connection with our regression
analyses suggest that counties in which judges take the protective order hearing seriously have not
only significantly fewer relief problems, but also significantly fewer access and enforcement
problems. See App. C, Tables 3-5.
180. Survey, supra note 21, at nI, 51.
181. Id. at 1, 17.
182. See also Fischer, supra note 16, at 25, 74 (finding that emergency order hearings in
Champaign County typically lasted less than 15 minutes, most plenary hearings were shorter than
five minutes, and the vast majority included no lecture or threat of imprisonment).
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When judges exhibit impatience or disrespect toward battered women and
their petitions, they send a clear message that the judicial system does not
support the women's right to end the violence. In so doing, they act to
undermine the objectives of the domestic violence reform statutes.
D. Recommendations
The survey results suggest that the issuance of protective orders is
often delayed. In addition, judges in a substantial number of jurisdictions
deny orders even though women are entitled to protection under the terms
of the statute. Even more frequently, they refuse to grant battered women
at least some of the remedies contemplated by the statute. Finally,
disrespectful and insensitive behavior by judges discourages battered
women from turning to the judicial process for relief.
Our recommendations for addressing these relief problems and
improving the procedures for issuing orders of protection fall into six
categories: (1) increasing the judicial resources allocated to domestic
violence cases; (2) educating judges about the dynamics of domestic
violence and the state's domestic violence statute; (3) holding protective
order hearings in the judge's chambers; (4) facilitating appeals of
unfavorable judicial, decisions; (5) expanding the role of advocates in the
judicial process; and (6) limiting the use of mutual orders of protection.
In addition, we suggest a number of miscellaneous statutory reforms.
1. Increase the Judicial Resources Allocated to Domestic Violence
Cases.-Crowded dockets and delays in issuing orders of protection
discourage women from seeking protective relief and expose them to the
risk of additional violence. Devoting more judicial resources to domestic
violence cases should help minimize these problems.
2. Educate the Judges.-To some extent, the relief problems
confronting battered women may be corrected by educating judges about
both the state's domestic violence statute and the dynamics of domestic
violence. Taking steps to improve judicial understanding of domestic
violence and the parameters of the state's statute may reduce the number
of cases in which judges deny protective orders altogether, refuse to
include specific remedies, or engage in insensitive, victim-blaming
treatment of the women appearing before them.183
183. In some communities, judicial training programs already exist. See, e.g., N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 2C:25-20 (West Supp. 1992) (requiring development of a domestic violence training
program); W. VA. CODE § 48-2A-13 (Supp. 1992) (mandating three hours of judicial training each
year); FiwNz & CoLsON, supra note 2, at 63 (describing programs implemented by chief
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Approximately three-fifths (60.9%) of the respondents reported that
the judges in their county deny some orders or some remedies due to a lack
of knowledge or training about domestic violence; almost one-third
(29.2%) characterized this as a significant or very serious problem.
184
Even more surprising, about two-fifths (40.9%) believed that the judges in
their county deny some orders or remedies due to a lack of knowledge or
training about the domestic violence statute itself; 12.9% thought that this
was a significant or very serious problem. I85 As one respondent from
an urban northeastern county commented, judges "need training badly
[because] as a whole, they are the weakest link in the system."
186
Training might alleviate these problems, educating judges on issues
such as
why it is hard for women to leave permanently, how a man who has
beaten a woman can convince her that he's changed overnight, how to
handle requests to drop the orders, how to handle repeated requests for
protective orders by the same person, and why battered women are
sometimes "nervous" wrecks in court while batterers are calm and
collected. 
187
Several respondents pointed to the benefits they had seen result from
judicial training. One respondent from an urban northeastern county
described the impact of a brief domestic violence training course recently
conducted for the judges in her state: "Since the training I have noticed a
greater effort on the judges' parts not to' [victimize] and to explain the
process in a more understandable way, as well as efforts to tell the
defendant this is inappropriate behavior." Likewise, another respondent
from a rural northeastern county reported, "More emotional abuse is being
accepted [as the basis for protective relief] compared to one year ago. Our
judges have had courses offered to them in domestic violence, [and] many
have made themselves more aware of the issues."
188
administrative judges in several cities).
184. Survey, supra note 21, at I1, 40; see, e.g., Durkin, supra note 58, at 29-30 (finding that
70% of West Virginia magistrates believed that their training regarding the dynamics of domestic
violence was inadequate).
185. Survey, supra note 21, at II, 39.
186. For similar findings, see Durkin, supra note 58, at 53 ("[Mlagistrates in general do not
fully understand and accept the social and psychological dynamics of domesticviolence. While they
are apparently familiar with the concepts and endorse them as important considerations, they are
somewhat intolerant of the actual behavior which is manifested."); Rural Justice Center, supra note
30, at 37 ("[J]udges without knowledge and understanding of domestic violence cannot have the
capacity to justly decide abuse cases. Without comprehensive education, it is highly unlikely that
a judicial decision maker will be able to discern life-threatening versus moderate levels of violence,
to recognize common manipulative behaviors of abusers, to assess risks to young children, or to
sentence abusers fairly.").
187. Rural Justice Center, supra note 30, at 29-30; see S. REP. No. 197, supra note 72, at 63
(recommending similar training).
188. For similar findings, see GOOLKASLAN, supra note 179, at 81 ("[A]ccording to battered
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Others, however, said that efforts to educate judges had not been
particularly successful. Some respondents noted that judges were often
unwilling to participate in training programs. As one respondent from the
Midwest reported, "Some [judges] have done education on their own and
a selected few have been open to education from us, but overall, in this
rural area, the judicial system is reluctant to learn about domestic violence
from us." Other respondents explained that judges resist training because
"they already know it all" or because they "do not wish to visit with
'special interest groups. ' " 189
Conversely, some respondents indicated that the judges in their
community had undergone training, but with no noticeable improvement in
their treatment of battered women. For example, one respondent reported
that the judge in her rural midwestern county has been trained, but still
denies remedies in protective orders; "training is not the problem," she
concluded.
Judicial training programs might meet with less resistance if they were
a collaborative effort involving both court personnel and domestic violence
organizations and thus were legitimated in the eyes of the judges. 190 In
addition, refresher courses should be held periodically in order to maximize
their effectiveness.
3. Hold Protective OrderHearings in Chambers.-Holdingprotective
order hearings in an informal setting may alleviate some of the problems
women encounter when they become emotional or confused while testifying
and may also encourage more women to seek relief. Currently, however,
the hearings are often formal courtroom proceedings. Although more than
four-fifths (83.5 %) of the respondents indicated that some judges will issue
emergency orders without seeing the petitioner at all or after holding an
informal hearing outside the courtroom, about one-third (32.2%) reported
that some judges will sign an emergency order only after a courtroom
hearing.191 Most of the formal proceedings occur in open court: only
women's advocates, the attitudes of many judges have been 'turned around' completely as a result
of efforts to educate them about domestic violence .... ."); Rural Justice Center, supra note 30, at
27 (quoting a judge telling an abuser who had violated an order of protection, "'Last week I would
have let you go home. But I went to a domestic violence program on Friday and now I know better.
You're going to jail.'").
189. C. Family Violence TrainingLaw Ignored: '89 Statutefor Judges Not Implemented, HoUS.
POST, Sept. 19, 1992, at A23 (noting that a Texas statute requiring domestic violence training for
judges has never been implemented because "details of how to accomplish the training were never
spelled out").
190. Such a collaborative effort might best be accomplished in connection with a coordinated
response to domestic violence issues. For a discussion of the coordinated response approach, see
infra notes 309-13 and accompanying text.
191. Survey, supra note 21, at I, 11. The responses to this question exceed 100% because in
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5.9% of the respondents indicated that the judge refuses to permit
observers in the courtroom during the hearing. 192 The plenary hearing
is even more likely to be a formal courtroom proceeding. Even if the
abuser does not appear for that hearing, only about one-third (33.7%) of
the respondents indicated that the judge will sign the order without seeing
the petitioner or after an informal hearing outside the courtroom.
193
Moving protective order hearings to a less formal setting may have
two advantages. 194  First, women may find the protective order process
less intimidating and therefore may be able to testify more clearly if not
forced to do so during a formal hearing in open court. As a result, judges
may be more inclined to credit their testimony and less likely to treat them
in an impatient or insensitive manner.
Second, a less formal process might encourage more women to seek
relief. About three-fourths (75.8%) of the respondents reported that the
public nature of the procedures for obtaining orders of protection and the
embarrassment of going to court prevent some women in their county from
seeking protective relief; more than one-fifth (22.2%) considered this a
significant or very serious problem. 195  Moreover, our interviews in
Champaign County suggested that women who were required to publicly
describe the abuse they had experienced in order to obtain an emergency
order were significantly less likely to return to court to obtain a plenary
,order. 19
6
Admittedly, a per se policy of holding all plenary hearings in
chambers is likely to run afoul of the First Amendment right of public
access to trials. 197  The right of access is only a "qualified" one,
19 8
however, that may be overcome by "an overriding interest based on
findings that closure is essential to preserve higher values and is narrowly
some communities different judges have different practices.
192. Id.
193. Id. at 1, 15.
194. Although an emergency order could probably be issued most quickly if the petitioner were
not required to see a judge at all, allowing the woman to tell her story to a sensitive judge and
having the court validate the seriousness of the abuse might serve as an important symbol of the
judicial system's commitment to end domestic violence and might also have therapeutic value for the
petitioner. See Fischer, supra note 16, at 13-14; cf. FINN & COLSON, supra note 2, at 27-28
(summarizing the pros and cons of requiring the petitioner to see the judge before an emergency
order is granted).
195. Survey, supra note21, at H, 21.
196. Fischer, supra note 16, at 30, 31-40.
197. See, e.g., Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court, 478 U.S. I (1986) [hereinafter Press-
Enterprise 11]; Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596 (1982). Although these cases
discuss the right of access in the context of criminal proceedings, the federal courts have applied
them to civil cases as well. See, e.g., Publicker Indus., Inc. v. Cohen, 733 F.2d 1059, 1066-71
(3rd Cir. 1984); In re Continental Illinois See. Litig., 732 F.2d 1302, 1308-09 (7th Cir. 1984).
198. Press-Enteiprise H1, 478 U.S. at 9.
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tailored to serve that interest." 199 Just as protecting the victims of sex
crimes from "the trauma and embarrassment of public scrutiny may justify
closing certain aspects of a criminal proceeding," 200 allowing a battered
woman to testify in chambers may be necessary to protect the woman or
to fully elicit her testimony. Judges should therefore be required to make
case-by-case determinations concerning the appropriateness of moving
plenary hearings to less formal surroundings.
201
Holding emergency order hearings in chambers is much less likely to
raise constitutional concerns. The qualified right of public access applies
only when a certain proceeding has historically been open to the public and
public access "plays a significant positive role in the functioning of the
particular process in question." 202 Civil courts have traditionally had
the authority to conduct business other than trials in chambers.2 3
Moreover, the emergency order is only intended to protect the petitioner
temporarily, until a plenary hearing can be scheduled; denying the public
access at this preliminary stage of the proceedings therefore does not seem
particularly problematic.
204
4. Facilitate Appeals of Unfavorable Decisions.-Judicial oversight
through the appellate process may help improve the courts' record in
issuing orders of protection. Encouraging battered women to appeal
unfavorable rulings might provide a check on those judges who circumvent
the state's domestic violence statute by, for example, refusing orders in
cases involving threats or non-physical abuse, enforcing informal rules, or
denying remedies contemplated by the statute. The appellate process might
also provide guidance to judges as to when orders of protection are
appropriate and what remedies they ought to include.
Facilitating appeals by battered women requires, however, removing
some barriers that hinder use of the appellate process today. Currently, it
appears that very few protective order cases make their way to the
appellate courts. Only 12.2% of the respondents indicated that both
emergency and plenary orders can be appealed directly to the state court
199. Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court, 464 U.S. 501, 510 (1984).
200. Press-Enterprise H1, 478 U.S. at 9 n.2.
201. Cf. Globe Newspaper Co., 457 U.S. at 607-09 (striking down state statute that mandated
closure of criminal sex offense trials during testimony of minor victims because trial courts were not
required to find that closure was necessitated by a compelling governmental interest in each
particular case).
202. Press-Enterprise 11, 478 U.S. at 8.
203. See 12 CHARLEs A. WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PRoCEDuRE § 3082 (1973).
204. C. Press-Enterprise HI, 478 U.S. at 12 (coming to the contrary conclusion with respect
to the preliminary hearing in criminal cases because the high incidence of guilty pleas often makes
that hearing "the final and most important step in the criminal proceeding").
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of appeals, and even fewer remembered actual instances when orders had
been appealed.2 °5 In addition, the few appeals that are filed are more
likely to involve the abuser challenging the issuance of the order than the
petitioner appealing its denial.206
These figures are not particularly surprising. The denial of an
emergency order may be a nonappealable interlocutory decision.
207
Although there should be no comparable legal bar to appealing the denial
of a plenary order or the judge's refusal to include certain remedies in that
order, other factors make the appellate process unattractive. First, orders
of protection last no longer than one year in most states;20s an appeal
might still be pending at that time, and the petitioner might not see much
benefit in ultimately being vindicated after the order would have expired
anyway. Second, in many instances, no record is made of the rationale for
the court's ruling, making it difficult to challenge the decision on
appeal.20 9 In Champaign, for example, the judge refuses to provide
written, and sometimes even oral, reasons for his decisions, even though
the Illinois statute explicitly requires a written explanation.
2 10
Third, women who cannot afford to hire an attorney to represent them
at the protective order hearing2 n' presumably cannot afford to retain
appellate counsel, and filing a pro se appeal is much more difficult than
using the simplified forms to petition for an order of protection without
counsel. As one respondent from a rural northeastern community reported,
205. Survey, supra note 21, at 1, 22.
206. Id. (showing that with respect to plenary orders, only 4.7% of the surveys reported that
petitioners had appealed, whereas 6.9% said that respondents had appealed; with respect to
emergency orders, 4.1% indicated that petitioners had filed appeals, while 5.9% said that
respondents had appealed).
207. In Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 468 (1978), for example, the Supreme
Court held that interlocutory appeals are permissible in the federal system only with respect to non-
final orders that "conclusively determine the disputed question, resolve an important issue completely
separate from the merits of the action, and [are] effectively unreviewable on appeal from a final
judgment." The refusal to issue an emergency order conclusively denies the petitioner protection
pending the plenary hearing, a decision that cannot be reviewed on appeal, and thus satisfies the first
and third of these criteria. The second seems more problematic. In Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S.
511, 524-29 (1985), however, the Court allowed interlocutory appeals of orders denying defendants
qualified immunity in § 1983 cases, even though the qualified immunity inquiry is "quite closely
related" to the merits of the case. Id. at 545 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
208. See supra note 8.
209. More than one-third (37.7%) of the respondents indicated that the plenary hearing is not
taped or recorded. In addition, more than four-fifths (81.8%) reported that judges do not issue
written explanations describing their reasons for denying plenary orders or particular remedies in
those orders, and almost one-fourth (22.8%) said that no oral explanations are given. Survey, supra
note 21, at I, 15. The figures are even higher for emergency order hearings. Id. at I, 11.
210. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 40, para. 2312-21(a)(2) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1992).
211. See supra text accompanying notes 46-48.
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"Victims rarely appeal due to cost and difficulty finding an attorney who
will accept the case."
Finally, if, as our experience suggests, women who are denied an
emergency order tend to choose not to seek a plenary order,212 an
unfavorable outcome at the plenary hearing is similarly likely to discourage
women from pursuing an appeal. As one respondent from a rural southern
community noted, "Women are very reluctant to appeal denials as they are
intimidated by the judges who deny [the orders]."
Petitioners must be afforded legal assistance if they are to overcome
these barriers and appeal unfavorable decisions. Perhaps, then, this is one
area where lawyers and pro bono programs can be of the greatest help. In
addition, the legislature could authorize an expedited appellate process to
provide some additional incentive to appeal the denial of a protective order.
To further facilitate the appellate process, protective order hearings should
be taped or recorded by a court reporter. At a minimum, judges should
be required to explain in writing why they denied an order of protection or
refused to include certain remedies in the order.
5. Expand the Role of Advocates.-Allowing advocates to play a
greater role in protective order hearings may help ensure that orders of
protection are issued in all appropriate cases. First, the presence of an
advocate may enhance the accountability of the judges. As one respondent
from a rural southern community reported, "We believe our presence with
women has made a significant difference-we know it's different when
we're not there." For example, she said, "We have one magistrate that
routinely tells petitioners they must file criminal charges before he will
grant an order of protection. Often this is inappropriate. When we
accompany a woman this doesn't happen. But many women come to us
after such an experience and no order of protection." In addition, she said,
"Magistrates sometimes won't grant petitions-then we go and they do."
Likewise, another respondent from a rural northeastern community
concluded, "[W]e find when we write orders of protection ourselves and
accompany victims before the judge, there is a much better chance that the
order of protection will be granted."
213
Second, the presence of an advocate may reduce the risk that the
petitioner will be intimidated or become confused or emotional during the
hearing. The support provided by the advocate may help the petitioner feel
212. See supra text accompanying note 141.
213. Increasing the number of petitioners who are represented by counsel at protective order




more comfortable, 2 14 and thereby minimize the adverse impact that her
confusion or emotion can have on both the outcome of the case and the
judge's treatment of her.215
Almost all (93.5 %) of the respondents indicated that domestic violence
advocates accompany battered women to court for protective order
hearings,216 and some said that judges welcome their presence and input.
In many cases, however, the court places substantial limits on the role the
advocate can play at the hearing. More than two-fifths (43.2%) of the
respondents reported that judges impose restrictions on the advocate during
protective order hearings, and 17.4% characterized these limitations as a
significant or very serious problem.217 The restrictions imposed include
barring advocates from the courtroom altogether, prohibiting them from
sitting with the petitioner to provide emotional support, refusing to allow
them to talk to the petitioner during the hearing, and denying them
permission to speak in open court if the petitioner becomes upset or
confused.
Some respondents reported that the judges in their counties were quite
inconsistent in their treatment of advocates. One respondent from a rural
northeastern community noted that, "[d]epending on the judge, the
advocate's role changes. Sometimes advocates can speak for the client if
the client is having a difficult time; Sometimes judicial behavior is
insulting and demeaning to advocates .... " Likewise, another respondent
from an urban southern community commented that the advocate's role
"[d]epends on the personal mood of that judge at that time of the day."
A number of respondents observed that the limits placed on advocates
in these courts have had adverse consequences on both the petitioner and
the protective order process. For example, one respondent from a rural
midwestern county reported, "Judges will not usually allow an advocate to
approach the bench area with the survivor. This sometimes leaves a
survivor feeling very vulnerable and alone-especially if the advocate is
seated far back in the courtroom." Another respondent from an urban
southern community suggested that "victim advocates should be allowed to
speak on behalf of victims during hearings as most victims are scared to
speak out when the abuser is sitting across the table from them. They are
very intimidated." Finally, one respondent noted that the judges in her
rural western county refuse to permit the advocate to accompany the
petitioner to the bar; as a result, she said, women are often "so frightened
they will not go for the hearing."
214. See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
215. See supra notes 163-64 and 175 and accompanying text.
216. Survey, supra note 21, at I, 1(b).
217. Id. at n1, 47.
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In order to allay the petitioner's fears, the advocate should, at a
minimum, be permitted to sit with the petitioner and provide her with
information and support. In addition, the judge should have the discretion
to allow the advocate to speak on behalf of a petitioner who is too upset or
intimidated to present her case. The judge should be particularly open to
the advocate's input at ex parte emergency order hearings, plenary hearings
at which the alleged abuser does not appear, and any other hearings that do
not strictly adhere to formal courtroom procedures. 218 If the advocate
merely tells the judge what the petitioner told her about the abuse she
experienced and the relief she needs, the advocate functions essentially as
a translator and therefore should not be guilty of practicing law without a
license. 219  Nevertheless, legislation may be required to authorize this
reform, especially given the threats made in some states to charge domestic
violence advocates with the unauthorized practice of law.
22 0
6. Limit the Use of Mutual Orders.-Mutual orders of protection
should not be issued unless both parties have filed petitions and have
proved that they are entitled to relief under the statute. Use of the
appellate process is one way to end the practice of issuing mutual orders
as a matter of course.?2 Alternatively, legislation can be passed
abolishing mutual orders, or at least specifying the limited circumstances
in which they are appropriate. A number of states have already enacted
such provisions.=t
218. See Fischer, supra note 16, at 75 (finding that almost 80% of plenary hearings in
Champaign lacked any of the indices of courtroom formality).
219. See In re Domestic Abuse Advocates, No. C2-87-1089, 1991 Minn. LEXIS 34, at *1
(Minn. Feb. 5, 1991) (authorizing advocates to attend protective order hearings, sit at counsel's
table, consult with the victim, and address the court at the judge's discretion, and providing that
advocates are not practicing law when they do so).
220. For example, one respondent from a rural midwestern county commented, "IMhere is a
very strong lobby from members of the Bar Association which has tried to exclude advocates from
the courts, with the concern that they may be practicing law."
221. See Fitzgerald v. Fitzgerald, 406 N.W.2d 52 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987) (reversing issuance
of mutual order where only the woman filed for relief and there was no evidence that she had
engaged in any abusive behavior).
222. See, e.g., CAL. Civ. PROC. CODE § 545.5 (West Supp. 1992) (providing that mutual
orders may be issued only if each party personally appears and presents evidence of abuse); ILL.
ANN. STAT. ch. 40, para. 2312-15 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1992) (prohibiting mutual orders unless each
party files written pleadings, gives written notice to the other party, proves that the other party
engaged in abuse, and satisfies all the requirements for relief); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, §§
761-A(S), 762(6), 766(7) (West. Supp. 1992) (prohibiting the issuance of mutual order unless
respondent files separate complaint and serves the complaint and summons on petitioner and court
finds that petitioner committed abuse); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 209A, § 3 (West Supp. 1992)
(providing that mutual orders may be issued only if the court has made specific written findings of
fact).
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7 Miscellaneous Statutory Reforms.-In addition to the suggestions
described above, some of which can obviously be implemented by the
legislature, a number of other statutory changes could be made to help
refine the procedures for obtaining protective orders.
First, the likelihood that orders of protection will be issued in all
appropriate circumstances might increase if each statute explicitly
authorized protective relief in any case involving one of the following types
of abuse: physical abuse in any form; -3 threatened or attempted
physical abuse; sexual abuse; and non-physical abuse, including verbal
abuse, harassment, or psychological abuse, at least where that abuse creates
a fear of physical harm.22 4  In addition, the legislature should make
clear that the informal rules used to deny orders-most notably, delay in
filing for relief and failure to pursue a prior petition-are not proper
grounds for refusing orders of protection2  and that the history of the
abusive relationship as well as the most recent assault is relevant in
deciding whether to issue protective relief.? 6  Finally, in order to
facilitate oversight of the judicial process, the courts should be required to
keep separate records detailing the number of protective order petitions
filed and their disposition.
22 7
Second, in terms of remedies, the statute should authorize a broad
range of relief, including possession of the residence and temporary
custody at the emergency order stage, and custody, as well as child support
and other financial remedies, at the plenary stage. Visitation should be
denied when there is evidence that the abuser's violence has been directed
toward the children and should always be structured to safeguard the
woman from further abuse. Therefore, if visitation is ordered, the judge
should be instructed to impose conditions to protect the woman, such as
limiting visitation to situations where a neutral adult is present, where
arrangements are made for picking up and dropping off the children so as
223. In addition, the statute should specify that proof of physical abuse does not necessarily
require physical evidence of the assault.
224. See, e.g., W. VA. CODE § 48-2A-2(a)(3) (Supp. 1992) (defining abuse to include the
creation of "fear of physical harm by harassment, psychological abuse or threatening acts").
225. See MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 209A, § 3 (West Supp. 1992) (providing that protective
order may not be denied " solely because it was not filed within a particular time period after the last
alleged incident of abuse"); cf. OR. REv. STAT. § 107.710(I) (1991) (providing that protective order
may be issued if the abuse occurred within 180 days prior to filing of petition).
226. E.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 40, para. 2312-14(c)(1)(i) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1992) (requiring
that the judge consider "the nature, frequency, severity, pattern and consequences of the respondent's
past abuse" in determining whether to grant a particular remedy).
227. Only 37.4% of the respondents indicated that statistics about the number of protective
order petitions that had been filed and granted in their county in 1991 were readily available to
domestic violence programs. Survey, supra note 21, at M, 1.
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to avoid contact between the couple, and where the abuser agrees not to
use drugs or alcohol before or during visitation.
228
Finally, judges should be required to communicate certain information
to the parties. For example, the legislature could require judges to
emphasize to abusers that their behavior was inappropriate and to inform
them that an order of protection is a court order that the judicial system
takes very seriously. In addition, the judge could be asked to instruct the
petitioner to report any violations of the order to the police.
III. Service and Enforcement of Orders of Protection: Are Emergency
Orders Being Served Promptly, and Are the Police, Prosecutors, and
Courts Responding Adequately to Violations?
Many others have documented the substantial difficulties that confront
the woman who has survived the hurdles described above and then attempts
to enforce her order of protection. 2 9 These defects in the enforcement
procedures are particularly problematic: as one study concluded,
"Enforcement is the Achilles' heel of the civil protection order process,
because an order without enforcement at best offers scant protection and
at worst increases the victim's danger by creating a false sense of
security. "230
The respondents' general assessment of the three areas we focused
on-access to the courts, the judicial record in issuing protection orders,
and the enforcement process-indicates quite clearly that enforcement is the
weakest link in the system. Almost one-half (46.8%) described the
enforcement procedures in their counties as poor or very poor, and only
5.8% said that they worked very well.23 ' When asked what needed to
be changed in the area of enforcement, one respondent from a rural
midwestern county replied, "The entire system. The judge tells women to
228. E.g., Act of Sept. 24, 1992, Pub. Act 87-1186, § 214(b)(7), 1992 111. Legis. Serv. 2941,
2972-73 (Vest) (to be codified at ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 40, para. 2312-14(b)(7)) (requiring the court
to deny or restrict visitation in certain circumstances and to specify the terms and conditions of
visitation).
229. See, e.g., ATTORNEY GENERAL'S TASK FORCE, supra note 57, at 10-43; FINN & COLSON,
supra note 2, at 49-63; U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTs, supra note 11, at 12-61.
230. FINN & COLSON, supra note 2, at 49.
231. Survey, supra note 21, at 11, 58. The mean rating for the enforcement process was 2.4
on a scale of one to four (with one as the lowest rating). By comparison, the mean rating for the
courts' accessibility to petitioners who have no advocate was 2.9, with 24.3% ranking the courts
inaccessible or very inaccessible. Id. at II, 2. The mean accessibility rating for petitioners who
have advocates was 3.4, with 9.9% ranking the courts inaccessible or very inaccessible in such
cases. id. at II, 1. The mean rating for the procedures for obtaining protective orders was 3.1, with
15.5% ranking these procedures poor or very poor. Id. at H, 31.
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call the police, the police refer her back to the judge and nothing is...
accomplished."
Moreover, as we found with the access and relief issues, minority and
low-income women are likely to encounter even greater difficulty enforcing
their orders of protection. Almost one-half (47.3%) of the respondents
indicated that women of color are less likely to have their orders enforced
by either arrest or prosecution; almost one-fifth (19.3%) characterized this
as a significant or very serious problem. 232 Likewise, more than one-
half (54.7%) reported that the women with the fewest economic resources
are less likely to have their orders enforced; more than one-fourth (26.9%)
considered this a significant or very serious problem.233 Again, women
who do not speak English face the most serious problems. Almost two-
thirds (64.2%) of the respondents reported that non-English-speaking
women in their county are less likely to have their orders enforced, and
almost one-third (32.1%) described this as a significant or very serious
problem.
234
In describing the difficulties that these women-and all
women-encounter in enforcing orders of protection, we focus on four
areas: (A) service of emergency orders; (B) the police department's
response to violations of protective orders; (C) the prosecutor's response
to violations; and (D) the judge's response to violations.
A. Service of Emergency Orders
Law enforcement authorities first come into contact with the protective
order process when they serve the emergency order on the alleged abuser,
for in most jurisdictions, law enforcement officials perform this
function.23 5 Unfortunately, this initial experience often proves negative
for the petitioner because inordinate delays in service jeopardize her safety.
When asked approximately how long it takes to serve emergency
orders, the respondents' answers ranged from one to twenty-five days, with
a mean of just under three days. 236 In evaluating this record, only about
one-fifth (21.1%) of the respondents described the procedures for serving
232. Id. at I, 72. On the other hand, one respondent from a rural western community reported
that those who abuse women of color "have gotten some of the stiffest jail sentences." See also
GOOLKASIAN, supra note 179, at 24 (observing that women of color are often unwilling to report
violations for this reason). For a discussion of what might explain this phenomenon, see supra note
91.
233. Survey, supra note 21, at I1, 73.
234. Id. at I1, 74.
235. FINN & COLSON, supra note 2, at 60.
236. Survey, supra note 21, at I, 13. Of the 229 respondents who answered this question,
approximately one-third (34.9%) reported that service took one day, slightly fewer (31%) said two
days, about one-tenth (11.4%) said three days, and the remaining 22.7% said four days or longer.
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orders of protection as working very well. 23 7  More than three-fifths
(62.8%) thought that the sheriff is unable to serve emergency orders
rapidly enough to meet petitioners' needs; more than one-fifth (21.3%)
considered delays in service a significant or very serious problem.
238
To illustrate, one respondent characterized the efforts made to serve
protective orders in her rural southern county as "at best haphazard."
Another respondent from an urban southern community explained that
officers make one or two attempts to serve the order and then "get tired of
trying and take the paperwork back to the sheriff's department. They need
to be more concerned with following through." Likewise, another
respondent from a rural southern county reported, "Deputies do not like
to serve these orders. They take their time and don't try [the abuser's
place of] work if the abuser is not found at home." Finally, one
respondent commented that the sheriff's department in her urban
midwestern community has trouble serving orders even when the abuser is
in jail.
Some respondents attributed these delays in service to inadequate
funding or staffing. For example, one respondent from the Northeast
commented, "This is a 900 square mile rural county. The Sheriff's
Department consists of four officers who routinely serve all civil work,
transport inmates and provide courtroom security. We need more bodies."
A second respondent from an urban southern county likewise noted, "We
need funding for the civil sheriff's office; there are too many lawsuits, not
enough deputies to provide service; it's so easy for a defendant to dodge
service." On the other hand, a respondent from a rural western county
suggested that the delays were not caused by a lack of resources, but
instead by "law enforcement attitudes."
Slow service can create a number of problems for battered women.
First, and most obvious, it leaves them vulnerable to further abuse without
the protection afforded by the emergency order. One respondent from an
urban midwestern county stressed the importance of protecting women
"between the time of filing and serving; I find them to be in the most
danger during this time, especially if the respondent is evading
service. " 23 9  Moreover, the police department may not be able to
enforce an order until it has been officially served. In fact, this was one
of the most pervasive enforcement problems identified by the respondents:
more than one-half (52.3%) indicated that it was a significant or very
237. Id. at II, 4.
238. Id. at H, 17; see also id. at , 13(c) (indicating that 18.7% of the respondents reported that
the sheriff's department assigns low priority to emergency orders and does not attempt to serve them
promptly).
239. See supra note 93 and accompanying text.
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serious problem, and fewer than one-fifth (18.3%) reported that it was not
a problem at all in their county.240
Second, delays in service may deter women from continuing the
process of obtaining an order of protection. More than three-fifths
(61.3 %) of the respondents reported that some petitioners are discouraged
by the sheriff's inability to serve the emergency order and do not return to
court to extend it; 15% characterized this as a significant or very serious
problem.241  Slow service is particularly likely to have this effect in
jurisdictions where petitioners cannot renew the emergency order if it has
not been served in time for the plenary hearing.242 For example, one
respondent explained that in her rural western community, a woman whose
emergency order is not served before the plenary hearing is forced to "start
... all over again.... We have had extensions thrown out as not
mandated by statute."243
Even when law enforcement officials serve emergency orders
relatively promptly, they apparently do nothing more than physically
deliver a copy of the order on many occasions. Almost half (46.4%) of
the respondents reported that the officer does not warn the abuser that
violating the order can lead to arrest.244 Even more (58.1%) indicated
that the officer does not read the key terms of the order to the abuser.
245
Spending the few minutes necessary to communicate this information nght
go a long way toward reinforcing the terms of the order and sending the
message that additional violence will not be tolerated.
246
B. The Police Department's Response to Violations
Unfortunately, law enforcement's record in enforcing orders of
protection is no better after service has been completed. More than four-
fifths (86.4%) of the respondents observed that the police respond very
240. Survey, supra note 21, at n, 63. In some jurisdictions, the officers who respond to a
woman's call for help can serve the emergency order if they find that service has not yet been
effected. See id. at 1, 13 (indicating that 29% of respondents said this is possible).
241. Id. at H1, 18.
242. Almost three-fifths (57.9%) of the respondents indicated that renewal was possible in such
cases. Id. at 1, 13.
243. In addition, the Pearson correlationcoefficients reported in connection with our regression
analyses suggest that counties in which sheriffs serve emergency orders as soon as possible have not
only significantly fewer enforcement problems, but also significantly fewer access and relief
problems. See App. C, Tables 3-5.
244. Survey, supra note 21, at I, 13G).
245. Id. at I, 13(i).
246. In addition, the Pearson correlationcoefficients reported in connection with our regression
analyses suggest that counties in which sheriffs warn the abuser that violating the order can lead to
his arrest have not only significantly fewer enforcement problems, but also significantly fewer access
and relief problems. See App. C, Tables 3-5.
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slowly or ineffectively when violations of protective orders are reported;
more than two-fifths (41.3%) characterized this as a significant or very
serious problem. 247  In addition, more than three-fourths (78.1%)
indicated that the police response is so slow or ineffective that many
petitioners do not even call to report violations; more than one-third
(37.3%) considered this a significant or very serious problem.
248
When the police do respond to a battered woman's call for assistance,
they often refuse to arrest the respondent. Even though arresting those
who violate protective orders is necessary to protect women from further
harm and to deter abuse, and, in some cases, is required by prosecutors
before they will bring charges, 2 49 violators are rarely arrested. More
than one-third (36.1%) of the respondents indicated that the police have the
authority to arrest when they are called to the scene of a violation but
usually elect not to do so.
25 0
The police rely on a number of excuses for refusing to arrest. First,
more than one-fourth (26.2%) of the respondents reported that the police
will arrest only if the violation was committed in their presence, 25 1 even
though many states authorize the police to make warrantless arrests
whenever they have probable cause.
252
247. Survey, supra note 21, at II, 60. For similar findings, see ArroRNEY C EERAL's TASK
FORCE, supra note 57, at 18-19 (finding that many law enforcement agencies give low priority to
calls involving domestic violence because they consider it "a private, less serious matter than
violence between strangers"); U.S. COMM'N ON CMvL RionrS, supra note 11, at 14.
248. Survey, supra note 21, at H1, 61. For similar findings, see Baker et al., supra note 57,
at 27-28 (finding that the foremost reason victims do not call the police is the expectation that the
police will do nothing).
249. Almost one-fifth (18.5%) of the respondents reported that the prosecutor in their county
will not bring charges in connection with the violation of a protective order unless there was an
arrest at the scene of the violation. Survey, supra note 21, at 1, 24(d).
250. Id. at 1, 23(g). For similar findings, see S. REtP. No. 545, supra note 3, at 38 (noting that
"arrest rates may be as low as 1 for every 100 domestic assaults"); FINN & COLSON, supra note 2,
at 59 (suggesting that police officers often fall to arrest even when clearly authorized or required to
do so); GOOLASIAN, supra note 179, at 36 (finding that police refuse to arrest even when the abuser
caused injuries that would have led to arrest if the victim had been a stranger); U.S. COMM'N ON
CML RIGHTS, supra note 11, at 14 ("Police officers testifying before the Commission indicated that
arrests in domestic abuse cases are rare....").
The Pearson correlation coefficients reported in connection with our regression analyses
suggest that counties in which the police elect not to arrest have not only significantly more
enforcement problems, but also significantly more access and relief problems. See App. C, Tables
3-5.
251. Survey, supra note 21, at 1, 23(c). For similar findings, see Baker et al., supra note 57,
at 48 (finding that the police in the District of Columbia used that excuse to justify their failure to
arrest in 9.9% of the cases surveyed).
252. FINN & COLSON, supra note 2, at 54-55 (noting that 35 states authorize or require the
police to make warrantless arrests if they have probable cause to believe that a protective order has
been violated and 31 states authorize or require warrantless arrests if there is probable cause of
domestic abuse).
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Second, almost one-fifth (17.6%) of the respondents indicated that the
police will not arrest the abuser simply for violating the order. They
refuse to arrest unless the violation itself constitutes a separate offense,
such as battery, 253 even though most states make the violation of the
order an independent crime. 5 4  For example, one respondent from an
urban midwestern community observed, "Some officers do not realize that
(1) the breaking of an order is, in itself, a misdemeanor crime or (2) an
arrest can be made. We still hear 'Yes, ma'am he is on your porch, but
he's not doing anything.'" Another respondent from an urban western
county urged, "[T]he police need to arrest and the D.A. needs to prosecute
'stay away' violations before they turn into actual violence."
Third, some police officers refuse to enforce an order of protection
because they believe the woman "broke the order" by inviting the
respondent over or otherwise having voluntary contact with him. More
than four-fifths (88.2%) of the respondents indicated that this was a
problem in their communities, and more than one-half (56.1%) considered
it a significant or very serious problem.255  In such cases, one
respondent from an urban northeastern community explained, the police
"tend to tell the woman that the order 'is no longer in effect.'
25 6
Orders of protection are "orders of the court, not orders of the
victims," 257  and therefore can be invalidated only by a judge.
Moreover, the order governs only the abuser's conduct; it cannot be
253. Survey, supra note 21, at 1, 23(d). Even more respondents-almost two-fifths
(38%)-reported that the police will not arrest when the man violates the provisions in a protective
order governing custody and economic issues. Id. at I, 23(f). For similar findings, see Baker et
al., supra note 57, at 45 (noting that some police officers regard protective orders as "useless" or
"good only if the victim had been physically hurt").
254. In 38 states, violating a protective order is itself either a misdemeanor or criminal
contempt. Criminal contempt is treated like a misdemeanor in terms of authorizing the police to
arrest, unless state law expressly provides to the contrary. FINN & COLSON, supra note 2, at 50-52.
If the abuser's violation of the order does constitute a separate crime, it may be that the state
cannot simultaneously punish him both for violating the order and for the separate crime. The
Supreme Court has granted certiorari on the question whether the Double Jeopardy Clause prohibits
punishment for both criminal contempt and a substantive crime based on the same conduct. United
States v. Dixon, 598 A.2d 724 (D.C. Cir. 1991), cert. granted, 60 U.S.L.W. 3729 (U.S. Apr. 27,
1992) (No. 91-1231).
255. Survey, supra note 21, at II, 62. In fact, this was the second most serious enforcement
problem identified by the respondents.
256. Some respondents even reported that the police threaten to or actually do arrest the woman
if she voluntarily has contact with the abuser. For example, one respondent from the Northeast said,
"When a woman invites the abuser to the house to reconciliate, our local police have charged her
with a criminal statute because she was aiding the abuser to commit a crime-a very punitive and
unhelpful response." Another respondent from a rural midwestern community indicated not only
that the police threaten to arrest the woman in such cases, but also that "one town has a city
ordinance making the woman liable if she 'lures or entices' him to the residence."
257. People v. Townsend, 538 N.E.2d 1297, 1299 (111. App. Ct. 1989).
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violated by the petitioner. If the order prohibits the man from having any
contact with the woman, he is in violation even if the contact occurred at
her initiative. Thus, as the Illinois Court of Appeals ruled in People v.
Townsend, "a victim's invitation to violate the order" does not "free.
contemnors from conviction for wilful misconduct. 258
This ruling is not simply based on a technical reading of the law, but
also reflects the legitimate concern that it may not be easy to ascertain
whether a woman's invitation was truly voluntary. A battered woman may
feel compelled to assure the police that she initiated or agreed to the
contact for fear that the abuser will subject her to further violence for
turning him in-particularly if she is questioned in his presence. 259  In
addition, the woman may have been forced to have continued contact with
the abuser if the judge refused to limit visitation rights in the protective
order.2
6o
Currently, however, some police officers not only assume that any
contact between the parties is voluntary, but also refuse to enforce
protective orders even when the woman's "invitation" was clearly not
voluntary or when allegedly voluntary contact led to further abuse that was
not part of the "voluntary" bargain. As one respondent from a rural
western county noted, "A lot of our law enforcement believe that the order
is broken once the petitioner lets the respondent into the home, even to
visit the children,, and they will not arrest the respondent if he has
committed more acts of domestic violence."261
In addition to relying on these excuses to avoid arresting abusive men,
more than two-fifths (44.1%) of the respondents indicated that police
officers make no further effort to find or arrest an abuser if he is no longer
at the scene when they arrive.262  As one respondent from an urban
258. Id. at 1299. See generally 1 WAYNE R. LAFAVE & AUSTIN W. SCOrr, JR., SUBSTANTIVE
CRIMINAL LAW § 5.11 (1986) (noting that the victim's consent to a criminal act is not a defense to
criminal charges).
259. See FINN & COLSON, supra note 2, at 53 ("Many judges report being concerned when
victims agree to allow an offender back into the home... [because they] fear that victims in these
cases may be responding to intimidation or undue influence."); Fiscer, supra note 16, at 104
(finding that women interviewed in Champaign rarely had voluntary contact with the abuser).
260. See supra text accompanying notes 139 and 169.
261. Other respondents cited a number of additional excuses police officers use to avoid
arresting abusers who violate orders of protection. For example, one respondent from a rural
northeastern community reported, "Although most orders are standardized forms, women are
repeatedly told the order is not specific enough or 'invalid' or unenforceable." In fact, more than
three-fifths (62.7%) of the respondents indicated that police sometimes refuse to enforce an order
because its terms are so vague that it is unclear what behavior is prohibited; more than one-fifth
(22.6%) characterized this as a significant or very serious problem. Survey, supra note 21, at II, 66.
Another respondent said that the police in her urban northeastern community "will only make an
arrest if a copy pf the order is present in their out-dated manual system.... Police will not make
an arrest even if the victim has her copy."
262. Survey, supra note 21, at I, 23(e); see FINN & COLSON, supra note 2, at 3; Baker ct al.,
1993] Orders of Protection 227
northeastern community reported, "A respondent who violates the order
and is no longer on the premises is not pursued .... The petitioner has
to go to the commissioner to file charges. Our commissioners are centrally
located in our rather large county-transportation is a problem for many
petitioners." Another respondent from an urban western county observed,
"Many officers ... will not even make a report [when the abuser has fled
the scene], thus making it very difficult for petitioners to file contempt
charges."263
Rather than fulfilling their obligation to assist a battered woman
themselves, either by arresting or searching for the abuser, the police who
respond to the woman's call sometimes suggest that she look elsewhere for
assistance. For example, a number of respondents indicated that the police
advise a woman who already has an order of protection to contact an
attorney or the judge to file a complaint instead of simply arresting the
abuser on the spot for violating the order.264 On the other hand, if the
woman has not yet obtained a protective order, the police may tell her they
cannot help her for that reason.
265
Other police officers refuse not only to assist the woman themselves,
but also to tell her where she might find help. Directly flouting the
mandate of many state statutes, 26 they do not inform her that safe
housing is available at a shelter, or that she can seek a protective order, fie
a criminal complaint, or make a citizen's arrest herself if the law
enforcement system is not willing to initiate charges.
2 67
supra note 57, at 26-27, 42, 48 (finding that police also fall to obtain arrest warrants for absent
abusers even though required to do so by pro-arrest policy); cf. FINN & COLSON, supra note 2, at
59 (citing a small pilot study's finding that the number of repeat violations decreases when police
obtain arrest warrants for absent abusers).
The Pearson correlation coefficients reported in connection with our regression analyses
suggest that counties where the police make no further effort to find absent abusers have not only
significantly more enforcement problems, but also significantly more access and relief problems.
See App. C, Tables 3-5.
263. Rather than arresting or searching for those who violate protective orders, some police
officers apparently threaten to or actually do arrest the woman instead. As one respondent from an
urban midwestern county reported, "Individual law enforcement people (police and sheriff's deputies)
still refuse to adequately determine 'just cause' and arrest abusers. There are frequent incidents of
abuse victims in emotional crisis being arrested for disturbing the peace." Likewise, another
respondent from a similar community reported that the police "charge women with disorderly
conduct or mutual fifth degree assault when they are acting in self defense."
264. For similar findings, see Baker et al., supra note 57, at 45, 47.
265. See infra text accompanying note 308 (explaining that efforts to train the police about
protective orders may backfire and lead them to refuse to act unless the woman has obtained an
order).
266. See FINN & COLSON, supra note 2, at 54-55, 60 (reporting that 30 state statutes require
police to provide information about protective orders).
267. See Baker et al., supra note 57, at 47 (noting that police fail to provide women with
information about available options although required to do so); cf. U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS,
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Finally, in addition to passively refusing to help a battered woman
who calls for assistance, the police at times actively discourage her from
enforcing her order of protection. Almost three-fifths (58.4%) of the
respondents indicated that this was a problem in their community, and
more than one-fifth (21.2%) described it as a significant or very serious
problem. 268  As one respondent from an urban western community
noted, "Many law enforcement personnel will either try to dissuade the
victim from pressing charges or flat out refuse to assist them. Some clients
are actually afraid to call the police."
In short, law enforcement's response to violations of protection orders
has been both slow and ineffective. The police are often tardy in
responding to a battered woman's call for assistance and then fail to offer
much help when they do arrive. Battered women realize that their orders
are meaningless without adequate enforcement, and the police response to
violations thus discourages them both from seeking orders of protection and
from turning to the police for assistance.
C. The Prosecutor's Response to Violations
The picture is no brighter when we examine the prosecutor's response
to violations of protective orders. Almost three-fourths (70.9%) of the
respondents reported that prosecutors refuse to prosecute violations except
in very limited circumstances; almost two-fifths (38.8%) described the
failure to prosecute as a significant or very serious problem.269  In fact,
more than two-fifths (42.9%) of the respondents indicated that the
prosecutors in their county actively discourage battered women from
enforcing their orders of protection, and 13.1% characterized this as a
significant or very serious problem.
270
supra note 11, at 17 ("A citizen's arrest statute cannot become a useful law enforcement tool in
domestic assault cases ... unless police officers inform victims of its existence and help them to
meet its legal requirements.").
268. Survey, supra note 21, at II, 67; see ATTORNEY GENERAL'S TASK FORCE, supra note 57,
at 19 ("Believing eventual formal prosecution uncertain, the responding officer may attempt to
dissuade the victim from pressing charges or even filing a report."); cf Ford, supra note 76, at 323-
24 (finding that women are more likely to prosecute if police urge them to do so).
269. Survey, supra note 21, at 11, 68. For similar findings, see GOOLKASIAN, supra note 179,
at 56 ("Some prosecutors have even imposed special restrictions on battered women (such as a
waiting period to let her 'cool off and think about it') before filing a case."); U.S. COMM'N ON
CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 11, at 24-31, 33-34; Catherine F. Klein, Domestic Violence: D.C. 's New
Mandatory Arrest Law, WASH. LAw., Nov./Dec. 1991, at 24, 28 (describing policy applied by the
U.S. Attorney's Office in D.C. of refusing to press charges in domestic violence cases if the woman
does not appear at the prosecutor's office the morning after the violation, unless she is "physically
unable" to do so); Rural Justice Center, supra note 30, at 23.
270. Survey, supra note 21, at II, 69.
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Specifically, more than one-half (52.7%) of the 146 respondents who
provided the relevant data estimated that no more than one-tenth of all
violations result in prosecution. Approximately one-quarter (25.3%) of
these respondents put the prosecution rate at zero or one percent.271 As
one respondent from a rural midwestern community reported, "I have
never been involved in or informed of a prosecution for a violation in the
two and a half years I've worked here." Another respondent from a rural
western county likewise noted, "I have never seen a violation ...
prosecuted. Usually the woman leaves the area to avoid further
violations."
2 72
In explaining this reluctance to prosecute, the respondents indicated
that prosecutors use excuses similar to some of those relied on by the
police in failing to arrest and by the courts in refusing to issue orders of
protection. One respondent from an urban midwestern community
reported:
Our statute includes a penalty of criminal trespass if the order is
violated. The D.A. requires [either people who] are not related to the
victim or... the police to witness the trespass. To my knowledge,
very few, if any, cases of criminal trespass have been filed on protection
order violations. 73
Likewise, another respondent noted- that the prosecutor in her rural
midwestern community "routinely says that the petitioner invited the abuser
back in the house or otherwise had contact with him" and thus invalidated
the order.274 Finally, one respondent indicated that although violators
are arrested in her rural western county, they are not prosecuted because
the prosecutors believe that protection orders are unconstitutional and can
only be enforced by contempt of court proceedings-even though the
271. Estimates of the percentage of violations that are actually prosecuted ran the gamut from
0% to 99%, with a mean of 24.7%. Id. at I, 24(e). Approximately two-thirds (66.4%) of the 146
respondents who answered this question said that no more than one-quarter of all violations are
prosecuted, and 83.6% said that no more than one-half are prosecuted. Given that many respondents
failed to supply information about the likelihood of prosecution, however, these figures may be less
representative of the entire sample than the other findings.
272. Even when prosecutors choose to prosecute, they often file misdemeanor charges when
the facts warrant felony charges. See FINN & COLSON, supra note 2, at 4; U.S. CoMM'N ON CIVL
RIGHTS, supra note 11, at 30-31; Rural Justice Center, supra note 30, at 23; cf. WASH. REV. CODE
ANN. § 26.50.110(4) (West Supp. 1992) (classifying as a felony any protective order violation that
constitutes assault or that consists of reckless conduct creating a substantial risk of death or serious
physical injury to another).
273. Cf. supra text accompanying notes 154-55 and 252 (explaining that disinterested witnesses
are not required in other cases, and that most states permit arrests even when police did not witness
the violation).
274. Cf. supra notes 255-61 and accompanying text (explaining that petitioner's initiation of
contact with the abuser does not violate or invalidate the order).
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statute in her state expressly makes violations a crime rather than contempt
of court.
275
Other studies have found that prosecutors often explain their reluctance
to prosecute abusers on the ground that battered women frequently change
their minds and ultimately refuse to cooperate in the prosecution.
276
Although fear of further violence may understandably make a battered
woman reluctant to press charges, 277 it is not clear that battered women
are any less cooperative than other victims who know their assailants.278
In addition, the prosecutors' attitudes may become "a self-fulfilling
prophecy," 279 and battered women might be much more likely to press
charges against their abusers if prosecutors did not discourage them from
doing so.
280
Admittedly, a battered woman does have another enforcement
mechanism available in most states if the prosecutor refuses to bring
criminal charges: she can fie a petition asking that the respondent be held
in civil contempt for violating the order.281  In fact, in some
jurisdictions battered women have no alternative-the only way to enforce
an order of protection is through the civil contempt process. 212  That
option does not seem particularly attractive, however, because bringing
contempt charges is expensive, time-consuming, and likely to require the
services of an attorney. For example, one respondent from an urban
southern county observed, "As a practical matter, the petitioner needs a
lawyer; there are no forms to assist her in filing contempt
proceedings." 283 Not surprisingly, therefore, almost three-fourths (73%)
275. C. supra notes 132-36 and accompanying text (explaining why constitutional challenges
to ex parte protective orders should be, and have been, rejected).
276. E.g., U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 11, at 27-29.
277. ATrORNEY GENERAL'S TASK FoRcE, supra note 57, at 28; cf. Ford, supra note 76
(finding that battered women drop charges for rational reasons).
278. See ANN JONES, WOMEN WHO KILL 312 (1980).
279. U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 11, at 33.
280. See S. REP. No. 545, supra note 3, at 38 (noting that complaints increased by more than
100% in one community where prosecutors were encouraged to file complaints in domestic violence
cases); ATrORNEY GENERAL'S TASK FORcE, supra note 57, at 27-30 (recommending that
prosecutors encourage victim's cooperation by organizing victim assistance units to ensure that the
woman is informed of her legal rights and receives support during the prosecution); GOOLKASIAN,
supra note 179, at 56 (noting that victim's cooperativeness is influenced more by prosecutor's
conduct than by her own conduct or that of the abuser).
281. FINN & COLSON, supra note 2, at 50-51 (reporting that 31 state statutes allow civil
contempt charges).
282. Id. at 52 (noting that 19 states fall into this category).
283. C. id. at 3 (noting that a victim must hire counsel to initiate a contempt action because
at this stage the accused has the right to representation). In addition, non-attorney advocates may
not have sufficient expertise to assist with the contempt process. For example, one respondent from
an urban western county reported, "Our shelter does not have the staff or knowledge to assist
petitioners with contempt proceedings or in enforcing orders that are violated."
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of the respondents indicated that enforcing an order of protection through
the contempt process is so lengthy or complicated that most women do not
attempt it; more than two-fifths (44.7%) characterized this as a significant
or very serious problem.284  Thus, as one respondent from a rural
southern community concluded, "Officers need to be able to arrest if
someone has violated a protective order. It is far too cumbersome for the
victim to call court services and report the violation, and then get
scheduled for a very far off court date."
Given that the civil contempt process is an unrealistic option for many
women, the prosecutor's unwillingness to press charges leaves them
without an enforcement mechanism. As a result, many battered women are
understandably reluctant to seek and enforce orders of protection. As one
respondent from a rural western county noted, "The respondent needs to
be prosecuted so that others who fie [for protective orders] will know they
are taken seriously. The more abusers are prosecuted, the less we'll have
of women not filing." Likewise, a respondent from the Northeast
commented, "[S]ince violations are rarely prosecuted, many women lose
faith in the system and see no other option than to return to the
batterer."
28 5
D. The Judge's Response to Violations
Like police officers and prosecutors, judges have been quite lax in
enforcing orders of protection. First, approximately one-fifth (20.4%) of
the respondents noticed that judges are reluctant to convict those who
violate protective orders.286 Second, even when violators are convicted,
they do not receive meaningful sentences.
Although incarceration is often called for in order to serve the goals
of specific and general deterrence-to "clearly signal[] the seriousness with
which the offense is viewed by the community and providefl secure
protection to the victim" 287-the judiciary's refusal to impose
284. Survey, supra note 21, at II, 70.
285. The prosecutor's failure to file charges also discourages the police from arresting abusers.
GOOLKASIAN, supra note 179, at 22; Baker et al., supra note 57, at 8.
286. Survey, supra note 21, at 1, 25(a); cf. Henson, supra note 58, at 16 (reporting that two
Kentucky judges require police officers to call them in order to get permission to arrest for protective
order violations the police personally witnessed).
287. ATTORNEY GENERAL'S TASK FORCE, supra note 57, at 34 (noting that "incarceration is
the punishment necessary to hold the abuser accountable" whenever he causes the woman serious
injury, has "a history of repeated abusive behavior," or poses "a significant threat of continued
harm"); see U.S. COMM'N ON CIVL RIGHTS, supra note 11, at 54-55 (observing that inadequate
sentences 'dilute the effectiveness of protective orders as a remedy for spouse abuse" and send a
"message to the defendant, as well as to police officers, prosecutors, and society,... that spouse
abuse is not to be taken seriously as a crime against society").
1993]
Texas Journal of Women and the Law
appropriate prison sentences on those who violate protective orders was the
most serious enforcement problem identified by the respondents. More
than three-fifths (61.5%) described inadequate prison sentences as a
significant or very serious problem, and only 14.1% said it was not a
problem at all.
2 8
In fact, more than two-fifths (42.1%) of the respondents reported that
violators have never been sentenced to jail terms in their county.289 For
example, one respondent reported that no jail sentences or even fines have
been imposed in her urban southern county and that violators have been
sentenced to probation only twice. Another respondent from an urban
northeastern county noted that abusers "routinely violate civil orders of
protection-without having hardly any punishment (other than a lecture) as
a result." Another, describing a similar community, said that "sometimes
as many as a dozen violations are committed before a jail sentence is
imposed.".
Even when prison sentences are imposed, they tend to be light.
Although many state statutes set the maximum sentence for violating a
protective order somewhere between six months and one year, 290 the
respondents reported that actual sentences never come close to the
maximum in many jurisdictions. In many counties, they rarely exceed a
few days.
291
The courts' failure to impose appropriate sentences on those who
violate protective orders sends the clear message that these orders are not
taken seriously. Apparently, the import of that message has not been lost
on abusive men. As one survey respondent from an urban northeastern
In addition, the Pearson correlation coefficients reported in connection with the regression
analyses suggest that counties where violators have been sentenced to jail have not only significantly
fewer enforcement problems, but also significantly fewer access and relief problems. See App. C,
Tables 3-5.
288. Survey, supra note 21, at n1, 71. For similar findings, see FINN & COLSON, supra note
2, at 3 (noting that judges seem reluctant to sentence even serious repeat offenders to prison terms
or other punishment); U.S. COMM'W ON CIt. PRJtrrs, supra note 11, at 54-55; Fischer, supra note
16, at 113 (finding that only one violation in Champaign led to conviction, and the sentence in that
case was a $200 fine).
289. See Survey, supra note 21, at I, 25(e). By comparison, 56.5% of the respondents
reported that some violators had been lectured by the judge as punishment; 50.6% said they had been
sentenced to probation; and 48.1% indicated that they had been fined. Id. at 1, 25.
290. See FINN & COLSON, supra note 2, at 50-51 (noting that 21 of the 28 statutes that specify
maximum prison terms set the maximum between six months and a year).
291. For example, one respondent said that the maximumjail sentence imposed in her county
was twelve hours; a number said two or three days; one said "until they post bail"; one said "time
served has usually been the only punishment"; and two said that any prison sentence was suspended.
Instead of imposing prison sentences, some judges may be devising unusual ways of punishing
those who violate protective orders. One respondent reported that a repeat violator in her rural
western county "was urged to leave town or face a long sentence. He was ordered not to return for
one year, and he was escorted to the airport by the police."
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community explained, "Very few respondents obey restraining
orders-unfortunately, the court does little to send a clear message to the
respondent about his behavior." Likewise, a respondent from an urban
midwestern county convincingly argued:
Judges should enforce a stricter penalty for violating the order. Usually
a $50 fine is all that is received in our county. The fine should be
around $500 and somejail time should be served .... Repeat offenders
should serve the maximum penalty the law allows.... The way our
community enforces these orders I feel we say it is okay to abuse or
harass your partner for $50.... This doesn't send the message that it
is a crime and it's wrong.
The message communicated by judicial leniency is apparent to others
as well, most notably the police and victims of domestic violence. For
example, one respondent reported that in her rural northeastern community,
"mhe police arrest and the judge usually releases the abuser after a
hearing.... [T]he police hesitate to arrest as a result of the judge's
failure to prosecute." Likewise, a respondent from a rural western county
suggested:
[I1f law enforcement and our judges took this seriously and put the
abusers in jail we would have a better chance of protecting the victims.
We tell the victims that if the abuser breaks the order he probably won't
go to jail; many victims are aware of this and do not try to get out of the
situation. Law enforcement is discouraged by the fact that when they do
arrest, any sentence given is usually suspended by lenient judges. 92
E. Recommendations
The most serious defects in the protective order process arise at the
enforcement stage. Law enforcement officials are slow in serving
emergency orders, and the police refuse to arrest violators and to offer
victims any meaningful assistance. Prosecutors are reluctant to press
charges against those who violate protective orders, and, most significant,
judges impose minimal sentences even on repeat violators.
Our recommendations for improving the procedures for enforcing
orders of protection fall into four categories: (1) enact mandatory arrest
laws; (2) educate law enforcement and judicial personnel; (3) implement
a coordinated response approach to domestic violence; and (4) file civil
litigation in appropriate cases. In addition, we suggest a number of
miscellaneous statutory reforms.
292. For similar findings, see FINN & COLSON, supra note 2, at 58; GOOLKASIAN, supra note
179, at 22, 55 (noting that both police and prosecutors are discouraged by lenient sentences).
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1. Implement Mandatory Arrest Laws.-Enacting mandatory arrest
laws may help improve the police department's record in enforcing orders
of protection. By late 1991, fifteen states and the District of Columbia had
some form of mandatory arrest law.293 Some of these laws require
police officers to make arrests when they have probable cause to believe
that an act of domestic violence has been committed, and some mandate
arrest when they have probable cause to believe that a protective order has
been violated.294 Ideally, arrest should be mandated in both contexts,
and warraflless arrests should be permissible even if the police did not
witness the incident themselves. Pro-arrest policies that stop short of
requiring arrest have not proven particularly effective. 295
Other studies have suggested that arresting batterers is the most
effective way to end domestic violence,296 and analysis of the survey
293. Lawrence W. Sherman, The Influence of Criminology in CriminalLaw: EvaluatingArrests
for Misdemeanor Domestic Violence, 83 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1, 2 (1992). In addition,
84% of urban police departments had a mandatory or pro-arrest policy in effect by 1989. Id.; see
FINN & COLSON, supra note 2, at 54-55 (listing jurisdictions with mandatory arrest statutes).
294. Three of the 16 mandatory arrest laws apply only in suspected cases of abuse; six apply
only in suspected cases of protective order violations; and seven apply in both situations. FINN &
COLSON, supra note 2, at 54-55.
295. For example, an empirical study conducted by the District of Columbia Coalition Against
Domestic Violence and thie Women's Law & Public Policy Fellowship Program at the Georgetown
University Law Center concluded that a pro-arrest policy promulgated by the District's Polic5
Department had little effect on police behavior. See Baker et al., supra note 57, at 25-27. Six
months after the policy was issued, there had been "no noticeable change in the treatment of
domestic violence" in the District. Id. at 27. Despite the pro-arrest policy, the police made arrests
in only five percent of the domestic violence incidents studied by the D.C. Coalition, id. at 46, and
the decision whether or not to arrest had little to do with ihe seriousness of the abuse, the existence
of an order of protection, the severity of the woman's injuries, or the woman's request that the
abuser be arrested. See id. at 36-40, 45-46. Instead, the most important factor leading to arrest was
the abuser's attitude toward the police: the officers were far more likely to arrest if the abuser was
smug, argumentative, or insulting to them. See id. at 49-50.
296. See S. REP. No. 545, supra note 3, at 38 (noting that arrest can reduce assaults by as
much as 62%); ATrORNEY GENERAL'S TASK FORCE, supra note 57, at'22-25 (recommending that
arrest be the preferred response in cases of family violence); GOOLKASIAN, supra note 179, at 33
("Among experts in domestic violence, there is growing agreement that arrest, consistent with state
law, should be presumed the most appropriate response to domestic violence incidents."); Sarah M.
Buel, Recent Developments, Mandatory Arrest for Domestic Violence, 11 HARv. WOMEN'S LJ.
213, 215-16 (1988) (describing studies finding that arrest reduces the frequency and intensity of
family violence); Lawrence W. Sherman & Richard A. Berk, The Specific Deterrent Effects ofArrest
for Domestic Assault, 49 AM. SoC. R-v. 261 (1984) (discussing a study conducted in Minneapolis
over an 18-month period, which showed that arresting abusers, instead of using mediation techniques
or ordering them to leave the residence for eight hours, reduced repeat violations by almost one-
half; Baker et al., supra note 57, at 1-2 (finding that mandatory arrest decreases the incidence of
domestic violence homicides whereas non-punitive mediation techniques may "encouragel- further
violence by communicating to the abuser and his victim that beating one's mate is not a serious
crime"); cf. Lawrence V. Sherman et al., From Initial Deterrence to Long-Term Escalation: Short-
Custody Arrest for Poverty Ghetto Domestic Violence, 29 CRIMINOLOGY 821 (1991) (finding that
short-term three-hour arrest was not as effective a deterrent as longer twelve-hour detainment and
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results leads to the same conclusion: jurisdictions with mandatory arrest
requirements have significantly fewer overall problems with the
enforcement process.297 Specifically, respondents in mandatory arrest
jurisdictions gave substantially higher ratings to the enforcement procedures
in their community. They were also significantly less likely to report that
the police response is so slow or ineffective that many women do not even
call to report violations; that the police refuse to enforce a protective order
because the woman has "broken" the order by having contact with the
abuser or because the emergency order has not yet been served; that the
police and prosecutor discourage women from enforcing their orders; and
that women with the fewest economic resources face greater enforcement
problems.298
Although mandatory arrest laws might be expected to make a
difference with respect to enforcement issues, the survey results indicate
that they may also significantly improve both access to the courts and the
procedures for obtaining orders of protection. Respondents from
mandatory arrest jurisdictions reported a lower overall rate of access
problems, and they gave a higher rating to the procedures for obtaining
protective orders.299 In addition, respondents in these jurisdictions were
significantly less likely to experience a number of the specific access and
relief problems we identified. 3°
These differences suggest that mandatory arrest policies, along with
the education and training of police officers that often accompany them,
may tend to improve the overall responsiveness of the protective order
system. These findings may also indicate that in counties where ending
domestic violence is a priority-as illustrated by the presence of a
mandatory arrest policy-the judicial and enforcement systems also take
violence against women seriously. If adequate enforcement is the key to
an effective protective order system, it should not be surprising that
that longer detainment had a deterrent effect on employed abusers, but not on those who were
unemployed, whose abuse escalated after their release).
Recently, Lawrence Sherman has suggested that the results of a decade of police studies do
not support wide-scale use of mandatory arrest policies. See Sherman, supra note 293, at 43.
According to Sherman, the police studies demonstrate that arrest increases domestic violence among
abusers who are not bonded socially with their communities, especially the unemployed. LAWRENCE
W. SHEMAN, POLICINO DoMEST'c VIoLENCE 247 (1992). Several other researchers have
persuasively criticized Sherman's work, however. See, e.g., Joan Zorza, The Criminal Law of
Misdemeanor Domestic Violence, 1970-1990, 83 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOY 46, 65-72 (1992)
(questioning the methodology of the police studies relied upon by Sherman and criticizing his
distortion of the findings concerning the impact of arrest on subsequent abuse).
297. App. B, Table 1.
298. Id.
299. Id. Respondents from thes jurisdictions also tended to report a lower overall rate of relief
problems, although the differences here were not statistically significant.
300. Id.
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improving the enforcement component would have a beneficial impact on
the other areas as well.3°'
Nevertheless, laws mandating arrest are not a panacea; they are not
effective if police departments or individual officers resist their
implementation. For example, one respondent from an urban midwestern
county reported that "instead of arresting like the statute demands, the
police make a report and send it to the county attorney and then the county
attorney decides whether to prosecute or not."
More specifically, several respondents noted that because mandatory
arrest policies only require the police to arrest when they have probable
cause, officers who are reluctant to arrest violators can rely on the
probable cause requirement to justify their inaction. As one respondent
from a rural western county noted, it is "very easy for law enforcement to
be blind to probable cause." Another respondent from a similar
community observed that even after the adoption of a mandatory arrest
policy, enforcement practices "var[y] widely between departments (sheriff
[and] city) and even among officers."
Finally, several respondents reported that while mandatory arrest laws
may increase the number of arrests, some of the arrests are unjustified.
For example, one respondent from a rural northeastern county commented,
"We are finding that many arrests are inappropriate and that the number
of dual arrests is increasing sharply." Another respondent likewise noted
that "[m]ore arrests are being made but with a minimum of investigation,
so the victim may also be arrested. "3 2 In addition, others have pointed
out that mandatory arrest laws may lead the police to arrest men of color
in disproportionate numbers.
303
Several states have addressed the problem of dual arrests by amending
their mandatory arrest laws to authorize the arrest of only the primary
physical aggressor. 304 The other problems found in mandatory arrest
jurisdictions do not reflect shortcomings in the statutes, but attitudes on the
part of the police, which can perhaps best be addressed by the
recommendations described below.
301. Because the ttest analyses summarized in App. B, Table 1 report only a correlation
between mandatory arrest policies and a reduction in access, relief, and enforcement problems, they
do not necessarily reflect a causal relationship.
302. For similar findings, see GOOLKASIAN, supra note 179, at 37; Bud, supra note 296, at
225-26.
303. See GOOLKASIAN, supra note 179, at 37 (discussing fear that police will use mandatory
arrest laws to harass minority men).
304. At least seven states have enacted such provisions. See Klein, supra note 269, at 28, 29
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2. Educate Law Enforcement and Judicial Personnel.-Educating
police officers, prosecutors, and judges, and then periodically retraining
them, may help make them more responsive when protective orders are
violated .3 5  More than four-fifths (84.1%) of the respondents reported
that the police in their county fail to enforce orders of protection because
they lack training concerning the domestic violence statute; more than one-
third (37.1%) characterized this as a significant or very serious
problem.306 An even greater number (86.7%) indicated that the police
fail to enforce orders because they lack training about domestic violence;
almost one-half (47.3%) described this as a significant or very serious
problem.307  For example, one respondent from a rural western county
noted, "Outlying communities are still run by the 'good-ol-boys' and a lot
of those officers still feel that men can do as they please with 'their'
women and children .... We need sensitivity training and evaluations of
police officers to change their attitude on male "privileges.'" Educating the
police about the requirements of the domestic violence statute and the
dynamics of domestic violence may help sensitize them to the problems
facing battered women and thereby improve their track record in enforcing
orders of protection.
308
Some respondents described creative steps they have taken to educate
law enforcement personnel. For example, one respondent from an urban
midwestern community noted, "I... ride with the city police two times
a month and I do a lot of educating during those rides." Another
respondent from a rural western community reported, "Our sheriff's office
has initiated one-on-one training for deputies to understand victims' ...
feelings and responses to domestic violence. They attend court for
hearings with our organization, and, we hope, learn to understand the
mixed emotions victims have."
Other respondents, however, indicated that their attempts to educate
police officers have not been successful. First, a number said that their
overtures have generally been rebuffed. For example, one respondent from
a rural northeastern county commented, "We have offered training sessions
to all local, county and state police, district attorneys, judges and
305. Such training programs are already required in some states. E.g., NJ. STAT. ANN. §
2C:25-20 (West Supp. 1992); TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 415.032(b) (Vernon 1990); W. VA. CODE
§ 48-2A-9(i) (Supp. 1992).
306. Survey, supra note 21, at II, 64; cf. supra note 185 and accompanying text (discussing
similar question regarding judges).
307. Survey, supra note 21, at II, 65; see GOOLKASIAN, supra note 179, at 50-51 (quoting a
deputy chief of police as saying, "'Mhe real reason that police avoid domestic violence cases to the
greatest extent possible is because we do not know how to cope with them'"); cf. supra note 184 and
accompanying text (discussing similar question regarding judges).
308. For examples of the topics that might be covered in such training sessions, see supra text
accompanying note 187.
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emergency rooms" because "[w]e believe they need to know more about
the Battered Woman's Syndrome and many other dynamics of domestic
violence.... Only a very few have accepted." Likewise, a respondent
from an urban western community reported that efforts by her office to
initiate training programs "are sometimes met with resistance. The bottom
line is, they don't know and they don't want to know." Finally, one
respondent from a rural midwestern county reported an even more extreme
reaction to her organization's efforts to set up a training session for local
prosecutors and judges: the "state's attorney told us he could read and that
I didn't know anything he didn't. Then he spread rumors that those damn
women were trying to tell people how to do their jobs." Not surprisingly,
a training program never materialized in that community.
Second, some respondents reported that training had actually taken
place but had not changed ingrained attitudes towards battered women.
For example, one respondent from a rural northeastern county observed
that "[l]aw enforcement officers are now required to be trained, but there
is much cultural and habitual resistance to enforcement." Another
respondent from an urban northeastern county likewise reported, "They've
all had training-sometimes it doesn't sink in, or it is eroded by their
department's attitude." Finally, a respondent from a rural midwestern
community commented:
Police officers have been given copies of the statute and information is
printed within the protective order, itself. They have been trained
repeatedly. They do not arrest mainly because of personal beliefs about
domestic violence and the victims of domestic violence. They still feel
a "man's home is his castle" and he can do as he pleases. This is the
prevailing belief system of the criminal justice systems in our area.
Efforts to train the police may not only be unproductive, but may even
backfire, especially if they focus only on the domestic violence statute and
do not help alter the negative attitudes many officers have toward victims
of domestic violence. For example, one respondent observed that in her
urban western county, "More education of police on protective orders often
seems to result in requiring a protective order before the police are willing
to do anything-even enforce other criminal laws."
Training programs might have a greater chance of success, however,
if they were conducted jointly by police officials and domestic violence
advocates. For example, one respondent from an urban midwestern county
described a cooperative training program put into place by her domestic
violence organization and local law enforcement authorities:
I co-chaired the formation of our county's Domestic Violence Task
Force with the Patrol Commander of the County Sheriff's Office.
Together, we have provided training to law enforcement and court
personnel. He teaches arrest procedure. I teach the dynamics of family
238 [Vol. 2:163
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violence and how to work effectively with victims.
Such efforts to include a law enforcement presence in the training process
might legitimate the program in the eyes of the police, and thereby make
them more receptive to it. This type of collaborative training effort might
best be accomplished in connection with a coordinated response to domestic
violence, described in the following section.
3. Implement a Coordinated Response Approach to Domestic
Violence.-Creating a coalition or task force that facilitates communication
among the relevant constituencies seems to be a particularly effective way
of improving enforcement procedures. Typically, these coordinated
response systems include representatives from the local domestic violence
program, the police department, the prosecutor's office, the judiciary, and
perhaps local hospitals and private attorneys. They create an organized
structure whereby these various groups can communicate with each other
about the domestic violence issues facing their community.
Statistical analysis of the survey results unequivocally confirms that
jurisdictions with coordinated response systems have significantly fewer
overall problems in each of the three areas we focused on-access to the
courts, the procedures for obtaining orders of protection, and the
enforcement process.3°9 The coordinated response approach has the
greatest impact on the incidence of enforcement problems. The
respondents' general rating of the enforcement process was much higher
in jurisdictions that have implemented such an approach. Respondents
from these communities were also significantly less likely to report
experiencing problems in fourteen of the fifteen enforcement areas we
identified. The only enforcement problem for which we found no
statistically significant difference related to police officers' failure to
enforce orders of protection because they lack training regarding the
domestic violence statute itself.
310
In addition, a coordinated response approach seems to reduce the
problems women face gaining access to the courts and obtaining relief.
With regard to access, respondents in coordinated response jurisdictions
were significantly less likely to report experiencing problems in thirteen of
the twenty-four areas we identified. !  With regard to relief issues, the
respondents' general rating of the procedures for obtaining orders of
protection was much higher in jurisdictions with coordinated response
systems. Respondents from those communities were also significantly less
likely to report experiencing problems in eight of the twenty-four relief
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areas we identified.312 Thus, like a mandatory arrest policy, a coalition
or task force designed to focus on domestic violence issues and improve
communication among the various components of the protective order
system may dramatically reduce problems at all levels of the system.313
A number of respondents described features of their coordinated
response systems that have proven particularly effective for them. One
respondent explained that the task force in her urban southern county meets
every month and "resolve[s] issues before they become problems." A
respondent from a rural midwestern community reported that her domestic
violence organization "optimally likes to have a representative from law
enforcement on the Board of Directors. Law enforcement also provides a
liaison to our organization. The liaison also is responsible for training
officers in regards to domestic violence." Another respondent from an
urban midwestern county commented:
The biggest issue my agency has with protective orders is
enforcement .... [W]e have a police response log when problems
occur. We keep the original and place copies in the client's file and
send a stack to a responsive sergeant monthly so she can confront
individual officers and the system periodicaly ....
Finally, one respondent concluded:
Being a small rural Southern county has some advantages. Over the
. .. years -that' we've been in this business, we have spent a good
amount of time "just hanging out with the good ole boys." Through this
effort we have built relationships from tolerance to friendship and all
that is in between. We have learned that we cannot become complacent
and that we don't have to "like" the people we work with.
Even some respondents whose counties have not actually set up a
coordinated response system reported that informal efforts to communicate
with judicial and law enforcement personnel have been productive. For
example, one respondent from a rural midwestern community noted, "Our
program director has coffee with the sheriff weekly. This seems to have
been the most successful thing we've done-open up lines of
communicating." Another respondent from an urban midwestern county
reported:
312. Id.
313. Again, the t-test analyses summarized in App. B, Table 2 report only a correlationbetween
a coordinated response to domestic violence and a reduction in access, relief, and enforcement
problems, and therefore do not necessarily reflect a causal relationship. It may be that the various
constituencies find it easier to develop a coordinated response approach and communicate with one
another in communities with fewer problems. But see ATroRNEY GENERAL's TASK FORCE, supra
note 57, at 14-15 (recognizing the benefits of a coordinated response approach).
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When we hear of an officer not arresting, I call the deputy chief and
scream at him and he screams at the officer. The system works so long
as we know about the screw-ups, but we don't know about all of
them.... Establishing a good working relationship with the cops,
sheriff and prosecutor... allows us to get feedback to them on how
they are doing.
The same respondent also reported that advocates from her organization
"are allowed to ride along with police officers," at which time "significant
information about domestic violence is exchanged." She concluded that
"[rielationships with people like the cops and prosecutor seem to be a key
to getting the system to work for women."
As we found with other reform efforts, however, attempts to set up a
coordinated response system have been resisted by criminal justice
personnel in some areas. For example, one respondent said that the judge
in her urban northeastern county "has formed a task force but police
departments seldom attend." Another respondent indicated that a
coordinated response approach was adopted in her rural southern
community, but did not include the local judiciary because for eight months
the judge was too busy to set up an appointment. A respondent from a
similar county said that she "requested a meeting with the clerk of court
and his staff, but no such meeting has yet taken place. (Basically, it was
not felt that a need for such a meeting existed)." Finally, a respondent
from a rural midwestern community reported that her organization is
"currently attempting to assemble a coordinated response team (for the
third time in five years).... We have strategized until we are blue in the
face."
And even where coordinated response systems have actually been set
up, some respondents expressed dissatisfaction with the results. For
example, one respondent reported that coordinated efforts undertaken in her
rural southern community had been discontinued because "we learned
about each other's attitudes and procedures but didn't effect change."
Similarly, a respondent from a rural northeastern county observed that
"[o]n paper, our coordinated response works well," but "[p]ersonal
attitudes and biases on the part of individual criminal justice personnel
continue to hamper the response at times." Finally, one respondent said
that training and networking efforts in her rural western county were
"working pretty well" locally, but "[f]or the departments run in the 'good-
ol'-boy' way, the upper echelon will have to die before there will be any
major changes."
Here, as well as in other areas, then, attitudes can get in the way of
reform. Nevertheless, our statistical analysis of coordinated response
approaches suggests that they may dramatically reduce many of the
1993]
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problems facing battered women who seek protective relief and therefore
are worth the effort.
4. File Civil Suits.-Filing civil suits under both federal constitutional
law and state tort law to challenge the failure to enforce orders of
protection may give the authorities an incentive to step up their
enforcement efforts. 3 14  Recently, a number of such suits have been
initiated.
In perhaps the most widely publicized case, Thurman v. City of
Torrington,315 a battered woman filed a section 1983316 suit claiming
that the Equal Protection Clause prohibits the police from treating domestic
violence less seriously than stranger assaults. The jury found that the
police department had violated the plaintiff's constitutional rights by failing
to respond to her calls for assistance and awarded a substantial sum of
damages. 317  Other courts have ruled that police officers have a special
314. Filing civil suits may be another area in which attorneys and pro bono programs can
provide the greatest assistance.
315. 595 F. Supp. 1521 (D. Conn. 1984).
316. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988) (creating a civil cause of action in federal court against anyone
who violates another person's constitutional rights while acting under color of state law).
317. See Buel, supra note 296, at 218 & n.34 (noting that the jury awarded Thurman $2.3
million, and the parties ultimately settled for $1.9 million). For similar § 1983 cases, see Balistreri
v. Pacifica Police Dep't, 901 F.2d 696, 700-02 (9th Cir. 1990) (finding that plaintiff's equal
protection claim was supported by officer's comment that he "'did not blame plaintiff's husband for
hitting her, because of the way she was "carrying on,"'" thus suggesting "an intention to treat
domestic violence cases less seriously than other assaults, as well as an animus against abused
women"); Watson v. City of Kansas City, 857 F.2d 690 (10th Cir. 1988) (reversing order granting
defendant summary judgment where plaintiff's claim that police department had policy or custom
of responding differently to victims of domestic violence was supported by statistics showing that
arrest rate in domestic assault cases was 16% compared to 31 % in nondomestic assault cases
involving a known perpetrator, and by evidence that police department training program advised
officers to arrest only as a last resort); Bartalone v. County of Berrien, 643 F. Supp. 574, 576-78
(W.D. Mich. 1986) (denying defendants' motion to dismiss plaintiff's equal protection claim because
complaint stated an adequate claim for relief by alleging that defendant police officer failed to
respond to plaintiff's request for assistance "at least in part because she was a spouse seeking
protection from an abusive husband," and that defendant police chief "consciously chose not 'to
institute, promulgate, publish and enforce a policy of police intervention in spouse abuse cases'").
The Supreme Court's decision in DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Social Servs., 489
U.S. 189 (1989), that the state's failure to protect a child from his father's abuse did not violate
substantive due process because the state has no duty to protect individuals from private violence,
makes it difficult for a battered woman to file a § 1983 claim alleging that the failure to enforce an
order of protection violates due process. But cf. Coffman v. Wilson Police Dep't, 739 F. Supp.
257, 263-66 (E.D. Pa. 1990) (finding that a battered woman's allegation that a protective order
created a property interest under state law protected by the Due Process Clause survives DeShaney).
Nevertheless, DeShaney's restrictive reading of the Due Process Clause should not affect equal
protection claims like that at issue in Thurman. See James T.R. Jones, Battered Spouses' Section
1983 Damage Actions Against the Unresponsive Police After DeShaney, 93 W. VA. L. REV. 251,
331-39 (1990-1991). Overcoming the DeShaney hurdle does not necessarily guarantee victory in a
§ 1983 suit, however: the defendant may, for example, be able to prevail on a qualified immunity
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duty to enforce orders of protection and thus can be sued in tort when they
fail to discharge that duty.318  In response to similar suits, police
departments in other jurisdictions have entered into consent decrees that
required them to pay damages to the plaintiff, implement mandatory arrest
policies, or both.319
Several respondents described the gains realized as a result of such
suits. For example, one respondent from a rural western county noted:
Holding the systems accountable for their screw-ups (publicly) is helpful,
and therefore we need class-action civil lawsuits against legal agencies
to get their attention that this is a serious problem. I truly feel that the
Tracy Thurman case was the main push for police departments to change
their procedures on men beating women.
Another respondent from an urban western community said that in response
to a civil suit filed by her organization, the city "instituted the state's first
mandatory arrest policy . .. They finally stopped seeing us as a bunch
of crazy feminists and realized we were offering help and technical
assistance that would actually help them in their jobs .. . 320
Although prevailing in these suits may not be easy,321 those that do
succeed may help make the law enforcement system more responsive to the
victims of domestic violence.
defense. See, e.g., Hynson v. City of Chester, 731 F. Supp. 1236, 1241 (E.D. Pa. 1990)
(dismissing plaintiff's equal protection claim against individual police officers on the basis of
qualified immunity).
318. See Raucci v. Town of Rotterdam, 902 F.2d 1050, 1055-58 (2d Cir. 1990) (upholding
verdict against town and police officers for failing to arrest husband who ultimately injured wife and
killed son after repeatedly violating protective order); Sorichetti v. City of New York, 482 N.E.2d
70 (N.Y. 1985) (upholding verdict against city for injuries father caused to child protected by order
of protection where police failed to respond to mother's request for help enforcing the order, knew
of father's violent nature and threats, and failed to act despite promising mother they would do so);
Nearing v. Weaver, 670 P.2d 137 (Or. 1983) (holding that police officers can be held liable for
harm to the beneficiaries of an order of protection when they knowingly fail to enforce the order).
Again, however, these suits are not always successful. See James T.R. Jones, Battered
Spouses' State Law Damage Actions Against the Unresponsive Police, 23 RUTOERs L.J. 1, 11-13
& nn.33-34, 15-19 (1991) (describing immunity defenses available to defendants and cases finding
that police cannot be held liable for failing to protect specific individuals).
319. See, e.g., Bruno v. Codd, 419 N.Y.S.2d 901, 905 (describing consent decree that
obligated police department to respond promptly to battered women's calls for assistance and to make
arrests when they have reasonable cause to believe a protective order has been violated or a felony
has been committed); see also FINN & COLSON, supra note 2, at 59-60 (discussing other consent
decrees); Amy Eppler, Note, Battered Women and the Equal Protection Clause: Will the Constitution
Help Them When the Police Won't?, 95 YALE L.J. 788, 805 n.73 (1986) (same).
320. A respondent from an urban southern county likewise reported, "The police have the
authority to arrest on probable cause, with or without an order of protection, but usually fail to do
so. One local police department has been sued for failure to protect and so they are making arrests
now."
321. See supra notes 317-18.
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5. Miscellaneous Statutory Reforms.-In addition to the suggestions
described above, some of which can be implemented by legislation, a
number of other statutory reforms could be made to help improve the
enforcement process.
First, delays in serving emergency orders would be minimized by
mandating expedited service.322 Service by mail, publication, or both
should be permitted, either as a matter of course, or at least in cases when
the sheriff is unable to serve the emergency order promptly.323 If orders
are served personally, the sheriff should be required to communicate
certain information to the abuser at the time of service-describing the
terms of the order and warning the abuser that violating the order will lead
to arrest, for example. Finally, the statute should expressly require police
officers to enforce a protective order that has not been served so long as
the abuser was aware that the order had been issued. Thus, the order
would be fully enforceable if, for example, the petitioner had shown a copy
to the abuser or the police had read it to him.
324
Second, improvements in the police response could be effected by
criminalizing the violation of any provision of a protective order, even if
the misconduct does not involve an assault or other independent criminal
behavior.325 The statute should also specify-and should require that the
defendant be made aware-that violations cannot be excused based on the
woman's actions and that the order remains fully in effect even if she
initiates contact with the abuser.326  Moreover, police officers should be
322. E.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-3602(p) (Supp. 1992); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch 40, para.
2312-10(c) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1992); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 455.040(2) (Vernon Supp. 1992); WASH.
REV. CODE ANN. § 26.50.090(3) (West 1986).
323. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 518B.01(5) (West 1990) (permittingserviceby publication
if attempt at personal service was unsuccessful because respondent is avoiding service and a copy
of the order was mailed to respondent); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 71.17(a) (West Supp. 1992)
(allowing protective orders to be served by registered or certified mal); cf. N.J. STAT. ANN. §
2C:25-28(o) (West Supp. 1992) (allowing the court to order other appropriate means of service if
personal service cannot be accomplished); W. VA. CODE § 48-2A-3(f) (Supp. 1992) (allowing
service of plenary order by publication if attempt at personal service was unsuccessful or evidence
indicates that respondent left the jurisdiction, and copy sent by registered or certified mall was
returned).
Although the Due Process Clause requires "notice reasonably calculated, under all the
circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action and afford them an
opportunity to present their objections," Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S.
306, 314 (1950), the Supreme Court has "repeatedly recognized that mail service is an inexpensive
and efficient mechanism that is reasonably calculated to provide actual notice." Tulsa Professional
Collection Servs., Inc. v. Pope, 485 U.S. 478, 490 (1988).
324. See, e.g., Act of Sept. 24, 1992, Pub. Act 87-1186, § 223(d), 1992 111. Legis. Serv. 2941,
2981-82 (West) (to be codified at ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 40, para. 2312-23(d)); W. VA. CODE § 48-
2A-10(a) (Supp. 1992).
325. See FINN & COLSON, supra note 2, at 49.
326. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 518B.01(14)(e), 518B.01(18)(2) (West 1990); TEx.
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required to provide assistance to a battered woman even if they do not
arrest.327  They should also inform her about other resources-for
example, orders of protection and shelters-and help her gain access to
those services.
328
In addition, legislation could require law enforcement authorities to
develop written policies giving police officers guidance concerning the
appropriate response to reports of domestic violence. Written guidelines
could supplement the statute by describing in detail, for example, what
information ought to be communicated to an abuser when he is served with
an emergency order; what steps can be taken to aid a battered woman who
calls the police for assistance; in what circumstances arrests are
appropriate; and what information about other services and remedies should
be conveyed to victims of domestic violence.
329
Finally, recordkeeping should be mandated. A state-wide computer
network should be created and made available twenty-four hours a day to
track each protective order petition that is filed, its disposition (whether it
was granted or denied, and whether a plenary order was issued), the date
of service, and any reported violations, even if no arrest was made.
330
Including orders of protection in such a network, which already exists in
many states for other crimes, would send the message that domestic
violence is deemed as serious as other criminal behavior.331  This
computer network would enable police officers to quickly verify the
existence of a protective order even if the petitioner could not locate a copy
of the order or there was some question concerning its current
validity. 332  It would also give them additional information that might
FAM. CODE ANN. § 71.16(c) (Vernon Supp. 1993).
327. Twenty-four of the domestic violence reform statutes already require officers to provide
assistance to battered women, see FINN & COLSON, supra note 2, at 54-55, although at least some
officers fail to do so. See Baker et al., supra note 57, at 47, 55-56 (describing police practices in
the District of Columbia).
328. Thirty state statutes already require the police to provide information about protective
orders, FINN & COLSON, supra note 2, at 54-55, 60, although again they often fail to do so. See
supra notes 266-67 and accompanying text. Information about such resources should be available
in written form in languages other than English in any area where there is a substantial non-English-
speaking population and the police are not bilingual.
329. Such guidelines are already required in some states. E.g., Act of Sept. 24, 1992, Pub.
Act 87-1186, § 301.1, 1992 Ill. Legis Serv. 2941, 2986 (West) (to be codified at ILL. ANN. STAT.
ch. 40, para 2313-1.1); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 770(7) (West Supp. 1992); W. VA. CODE
§ 48-2A-9(g) (Supp. 1992).
330. Twenty-two of the domestic violence statutes already mandate that police keep a record
of all reports of domestic violence, FINN & COLSON, supra note 2, at 54-55, but the requirement
is often honored in the breach. See U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 11, at 20-21; Baker
et al., supra note 57, at 42-43.
331. See Henson, supra note 58, at 17 (describing the computer network that was set up in
Kentucky to track all civil protection orders at a cost of $9,700, or approximately S.81 per county).
332. Twenty-eight states already require that procedures be established so that officers can
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be useful in determining how to handle a particular situation: for example,
they could arrest the abuser if the order had already been served and serve
the order if it had not yet been served. Finally, a tracking system would
give judges access to information about the abuser's history and would also
help ensure that police departments are held accountable for lax
enforcement.
Third, the judicial record for enforcing protective orders could be
improved by prescribing mandatory sentences for violations.333 The
sentencing scheme should be a graduated one, with heavier penalties
imposed on repeat violators.
334
IV. Conclusion
Unfortunately, the promise of the domestic violence reform statutes
remains unfulfilled in many cases. Victims of domestic violence still face
substantial hurdles in gaining access to the courts, obtaining relief, and
enforcing orders of protection. In fact, these three components of the
protective order system are interdependent, with problems in one area
tending to infect the other areas as well.
In some instances, minor statutory adjustments are called for. To a
substantial degree, however, the statutes themselves are fairly thorough and
protective of women. The real challenge is much more difficult-to effect
changes in the ways the legislation is implemented. To a large extent, that
goal requires altering the attitudes of the officials charged with applying
and enforcing the statutes.
Further statutory reform-clarifying the responsibilities of executive
and judicial officials, minimizing their discretion, and imposing additional
obligations on them-may prove somewhat helpful. But those who have
been willing to circumvent the current domestic violence reform statutes
are likely to respond similarly to additional legislation. For some officials,
education and communication may heighten sensitivity to domestic violence
issues. For others who are less responsive, taking steps to ensure that they
are held accountable for their unwillingness to implement the statutes-by
appealing adverse decisions, filing civil suits, and generally publicizing
verify the existence of a protective order. FINN & COLSON, supra note 2, at 54-55.
333. See, e.g., IOWA CODE ANN. § 236.8 (West Supp. 1992) (providing that abuser found in
contempt as a result of violatingprotective order must serve time in jail, but not specifying minimum
sentence); NJ. STAT. ANN. § 2C:25-30 (West Supp. 1992) (mandating minimum 30-day sentence
for second and subsequent violations); W. VA. CODE § 48-2A-10(d) (Supp. 1992) (mandating that
violator serve at least one day in jail and pay $250 fine). But see CAL. PENAL CODE § 273.6(b)
(West Supp. 1993) (repealing provision that mandated a prison term of at least 48 hours for
violations that cause physical injury).
334. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 273.6(e) (West Supp. 1993).
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their recalcitrance-may encourage greater faithfulness to the dictates of the
legislation. However this change in attitudes is accomplished, orders of
protection will not be effective in safeguarding women from abuse until the
law in action catches up with the law already on the books.
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APPENDIX A: SURVEY ON THE IMPLEMENTATION OF ORDERS OF PROTECTION'
General Instructions
1. This survey is about court "orders of protection"-also called protective orders, temporary
protection orders, restraining orders, and adult abuse orders. Orders of protection, at a minimum,
restramn the abuser from harming, harassing and/or contacting the victim.
2. If you are not a domestic violence advocate who assists battered women in obtaining orders of
protection, please pass this survey along to a co-worker who does.
3. This survey asks for both a description of the system for obtaining orders of protection in your
community and your assessment of the problems linked to that system. If you assist battered
women in multiple counties, please answer the questions based on the county in which you do the
most work or the system you are most familiar with.
Section I: Description of the Implementation System for Orders of Protection2
1. Who assists petitioners with orders of protection in the county that your domestic violence program
serves?
82.2% a. Domestic violence program's advocates assist with court paperwork, including
petitions and fee waivers.
93.5% b. Domestic violence program's advocates accompany petitioners to court/attend
hearings.
41.8% c. Court clerk(s) assist with court paperwork, including petitions and fee waivers.
2.8% d. Court clerk(s) accompany petitioners to court/attend hearings.
11.7% e. State's/District's Attorney's Office assists with court paperwork, including petitions
and fee waivers.
9.5% f. State's/District's Attorney's Office accompanies petitioners to court/attends hearings.
35.4% g. Lawyers or law students assist with court paperwork, including petitions and fee
waivers.
40.6% h. Lawyers or law students accompany petitioners to court/attend hearings.
21.5% i. Other.
2. If lawyers or law students assist petitioners seeking orders of protection, who are they?
30.5% a. The majority of the lawyers are "public" (legal aid/services) attorneys.
24.0% b. The majority of the lawyers are private attorneys.
6.5% c. Public and private attorneys represent an equal number of petitioners.
7.4% d. Law students assist some petitioners.
11.4% e. The local bar association has developed a program that provides pro bono services
for battered women seeking orders of protection.
1. The following abbreviations are used in this Appendix: "N" refers to the total number of
responses received for a given question; "R" gives the range of answers received for that question;
and "M" denotes the mean answer to the question.
2. In answering the questions in this section of the survey, the respondents were usually asked
to check all answers that applied to the protective order system in their county. As a result, the
percentages reported typically add up to more than 100%.
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6.5% f. There is no organized pro bono program, but private attorneys frequently provide pro
bono services to battered women seeking orders.
42.8% g. Private attorneys rarely provide pro bono services to battered women.
14.8% h. Other.
3. Which of the following describes the petitions for obtaining orders of protection in the county that
your domestic violence program serves?
21.8% a. The "simplified" forms (also called state mandated forms or request forms; refers
here to anything except blank paper) provided can be easily completed by the
petitioner without any assistance or interpretation from anyone else.
57.5% b. The simplified forms provided can be completed by the petitioner if she has limited
assistance from the court clerk or advocate.
20.6% c. Petitioners need a great deal of assistance/interpretation in completing the simplified
forms.
15.4% d. No simplified forms available in our county.
3.4% e. The simplified forms are available in one language other than English.
0.3% f. The simplified forms are available in more than one language other than English.
15.7% g. Other.
4. Do women have any trouble completing any of the following section(s) of the petition?
61.5% a. Understanding the technical terms/legalese (e.g. "respondent," "petitioner" etc.).
63.4% b. Describing the abuse so the judge can understand what happened.
77.2% c. Understanding what the remedies mean or what to ask for in the order
16.9% d. Other.
5. What kinds of assistance do court personnel provide- to petitioners?
35.7% a. The court provides petitioners with written guidelines that explain the procedure for
obtaining orders of protection.
24.0% b. The court provides petitioners with written guidelines that outline the requirements
for obtaining orders and/or fee waivers.
27.1% c. Court personnel are available to assist petitioners who have literacy barriers with
completing the forms.
16.0% d. Court personnel are available to provide translation services to non-English speaking
petitioners.
33.2% e. Other.
6. On the petition, how extensively or in what detail must the petitioner describe the abuse?
11.1% a. Petition requires only that specific boxes be checked (e.g. 'physical abuse";
"emotional abuse"; "threats to harm", etc.).
88.0% b. Petition requires detailed description of most recent incident of abuse.
47.4% c. Petition requires detailed description of prior abuse.
72.0% d. The respondent abuser receives a copy of the section of the petition where the abuse
is described when he is served with the order of protection.
12.3% e. Other.
7. Can the filing or service fees for the order of protection be waived for indigent petitioners?
59.1% a. Forms are available for requesting a waiver of fees.
10.5% The abuser's income and assets must be listed on the form.
2.8% b. No forms are available for requesting a waiver of fees.
39.4% c. Fee waivers are routinely granted by the judge if the paperwork is completed.
20.0% d. Most but not all of the fee waivers are granted by the judge.
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2.5% e. Fee waivers are not typically granted by the judge.
6.8% f. If a fee waiver is not granted, the judge routinely grants a deferral of payment of the
fees until a later date.
1.2% g. Fees cannot be waived.
44.0% h. Other.
8. In what county are petitioners required to file requests for orders of protection?
17.8% a. Petitioners who are residents of the state may file in any county, even if the
abuse/violence occurred outside the state.
83% b. Petitioners who are residents of the state may file in any county, but only if the
abuse/violence occurred in the state.
34.2% c. Petitioners may only file in the county they reside in.
17.2% d. Petitioners may only file in the county in which the abuse occurred.
28.9% e. Petitioners may file in either their county of residence or where the abuse occurred.
46.5% f. Petitioners may file in the county they reside in, the county where the abuse/violenco
occurred, or any county to which they flee to avoid further abuse.
15.8% g. Other.
[DEFPN1TION:'An ex parte order of protection is a temporary order that usually expires after 14-21 days. It is
typically the first order that the petitioner obtains and it is available without notification to the abuser.]
9. Which of the following describes the procedure for obtaining ex parte orders of protection in the
county that your domestic violence program serves?
NOTE: If a court officer other than a judge grants ex parte orders in your county, please
answer the following questions as they apply to that individual's procedure.
14.2% a. A single judge is assigned to hear orders of protection, holds hearings at a fixed time
every day of the week (Monday-Friday).
10.8% b. Hearings are held at a fixed time every day of the week; judges rotate by day or
week.
7.7% The schedule is predictable; we know on any given day who the judge hearing
orders of protection will be.
8.7% c. A singlejudge is assigned to hear orders of protection, holds hearings at a fixed time
on a less than daily basis.
6.8% d. Hearings are held at a fixed time on a less than daily basis; judges rotate by day or
week.
2.5% The schedule is predictable; we know on any given day who the judge hearing
orders of protection will be.
e. If you checked (c) or (d), how often are hearings held?
4.3% 2-4 times per week.
5.9% once per week.
1.2% less than once per week.
52.6% f. After petition is filed at courthouse, the first available judge hears petition/signs
order.
13.0% g. A court officer other than ajudge (e.g. magistrate; court clerk) may grant an ex parte
order of protection. Who?
33.4% h. Other.
10. How accessible are judges and the courthouse to ex pate petitioners over the lunch hour or after
business hours?
23.8% a. Clerk's office is closed over the lunch hour.
60.5% b. Judges are unavailable over the lunch hour.
22.8% c. Judges are available to grant orders of protection 24 hours a day.
What is the procedure for obtaining orders after hours?
21.3% d. Judges are available 24 hours a day, but there is some reluctance to request assistance
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for petitioners after hours.
14.5% e. An order granted after hours needs to be renewed by the petitioner by the end of the
next business day.
11. Which of the following describes the hearing required to obtain ex parte orders of protection?
NOTE: If a court officer other than a judge grants ex parte orders in your county, please answer
the following questions as they apply to that individual's procedure.
44.8% a. Ex parte orders are signed by thejudge without a hearing (petitioner does not see the
judge).
38.7% b. Ex parte orders are signed by the judge after an informal hearing (hearing takes place
outside courtroom, e.g. in chambers).
32.2% c. Ex parte orders are signed by the judge only after a courtroom hearing.
10.0% The judge takes a recess from an ongoing trial to hear orders of protection; the
trial participants wait in the courtroom while the petitioner presents her petition.
29.2% The petitioner's family/friends are allowed to be in the courtroom while she
presents her petition.
19.7% "Official" observers (e.g. police trainees, court watchers) are sometimes present
in the courtroom.
25.6% Hearings are public; casual observers are sometimes present in the courtroom.
5.9% The judge does not allow any observers in the courtroom while she presents her
petition.
24.1% d. The hearings for ex parte orders of protection are taped or recorded by a court
reporter.
59.7% e. If the judge denies the order or any remedy requested, the reasons for the denial are
explained (orally) to the petitioner.
11.2% f. If the judge denies the order or any remedy requested, the reasons for the denial are
explained in writing.
14.4% g. Other.
12. How long do petitioners typically wait between the time they file the petition and the receipt of a
hard copy of the granted ex parte order of protection?
45.2% a. less than 1 hour.
25.2% b. 1-2 hours.
19.9% c. 2-4 hours.
11.8% d. longer than 4 hours.
10.0% e. petitioner must call courthouse later that week to check if order has been signed.
How long is the typical waiting time?
5.9% 24 hours.
5.3% longer than 1 but less than 2 days.
4.7% 2-4 days.
3.7% 5 days or longer.
13. Which of the following describesthe process for serving ex parte orders of protectionin the county
that your domestic violence program serves?
a. Approximately how long does it take (# days) to serve the respondent?
N=229; R=1-25; M=2.9
69.8% b. Sheriff's Department serves the order as soon as possible and makes every attempt
to find the respondent.
18.7% c. Sheriff's Department serves the order but they are assigned low priority and do not
get served rapidly.
29.0% d. Police Department can serve the order if they arrive on the scene and find that the
respondent has not been served.
32.4% e. A third party may serve the order on the respondent.
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8.7% f. Petitioner may serve the order on the respondent.
21.8% g. Orders are entered into the law enforcement computer system before they are served.
31.4% h. Orders are entered into the law enforcement computer system only after service.
41.9% i. The officer serving the order reads the key terms of the order to the respondent.
53.6% j. The officer serving the order warns the respondent that violation of the order can
result in an arrest.
57.9% k. If the order is not served in time for the next hearing, it can be renewed by the
petitioner. How is it renewed?
16.1% 1. Other.
[DEFINiTION: A "second" order of protection is an order granted after there has been notice to the respondent
abuser. It is the order that stays in effect for the longest period of time available under the statute. It is usually
an extension of the ex parte order of protection.]
14. Which of the following describes the process for obtaining the second order of protection?
54.0% a. Requests for orders are heard by the same judge that considered the ex parte order
of protection.
54.8% b. Many cases are set for the same time (crowded docket). Approximately how many
are set for a single time?
N=126; R=1-75; M=13.1
32.7% Only order of protection cases are set for this time.3
61.7% Cases not involving orders of protection are also set for this time.
47.6% c. Many respondents do not appear for the hearing.
d. Approximately what percentage of respondents do not appear?
N=215; R=0-95%; M=36.4%
45.0% e. Many hearings are uncontested by the respondents that do appear.
f. Approximately what percentage of hearings are uncontested?
N=204; R=0-98%; M=53%
62.7% g. Many hearings focus extensively on whether or not there has been abuse or violence.
h. Approximately what percentage of hearings focus on the abuse?
N=197; R=0-100%; M=82.9%
35.8% i. Many hearings focus on matters unrelated to the abuse/violence (e.g. possession of
the residence, amount of child support).
j. Approximately what percentage of hearings focus on unrelated matters?
N=128; R=0-100%; M=43%
20.4% k. Many petitioners do not appear for the hearing.
1. Approximately what percentage of petitioners do not appear?
N=172; R=0-95%; M=21.6%
14S5% m. Other.
15. Which of the following describes the hearing(s) required to obtain the second order of protection?
Note: Each of the following assumes the petitioner has appeared at the hearing.
17.0% a. If the respondent abuser does not appear, the order is signed by the judge without a
hearing (petitioner does not see the judge).
16.7% b. If the abuser does not appear, the order is signed by the judge after an informal
proceeding that takes place outside courtroom, e.g. in chambers.
63.9% c. If the abuser does not appear, the order is signed by the judge only after a hearing
in the courtroom.
73.5% d. If the abuser appears for the hearing, the order is signed by the judge only after a
hearing in the courtroom.
3. The figures reported in this line and the following one indicate what percentage of those who
said that many cases are set for the same time checked each individual response.
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25.3% e. If the abuser appears for the hearing, a courtroom hearing is held only if the abuser
contests the order.
19.1% f. If the abuser appears and the parties offer a proposed order upon which they have
agreed, the judge grants the order after the abuser acknowledges guilt/responsibility.
52.5% g. If the abuser appears and the parties offer a proposed order upon which they have
agreed, the judge grants the order without requiring the abuser to acknowledge guilt
or responsibility.
62.3% h. The proceedings for orders of protection are taped or recorded by a court reporter.
77.2% i. If the judge denies the order or any remedy requested, the reasons for the denial are
explained (orally) to the petitioner.
18.2% j. If the judge denies the order or any remedy requested, the reasons for the denial are
explained in writing.
8.6% k. Other.
16. To what extent are attorneys and other court personnel involved in hearings for the second order?
27.3% a. Many petitioners appear with attorneys.
b. Approximately what percentage of petitioners appear with attorneys?
N=198; R=0-100%; M=34.6%
31.4% c. Many respondents appear with attorneys.
d. Approximately what percentage of respondents appear with attorneys?
N=222; R=0-100%; M=32.1%
35.2% e. Petitioners appear with attorneys when matters such as child custody or support are
to be resolved at the hearings.
44.8% f. Respondents appear with attorneys when matters such as child custody or support are
to be resolved at the hearings.
30.9% g. The attorneys usually work out the contested matters prior to the hearing so a
contested hearing is unnecessary.
14.5% h. Court-appointed specialists or court workers make recommendations to the court
about contested issues.
25.9% i. Other.
17. To what extent does the judge routinely provide the information about the order of protection at
either the ex parte order or second order hearings?
57.1% a. The judge routinely delivers a warning and/or lecture to the respondent about the
inappropriateness and seriousness of his violent behavior.
82.4% b. The judge tells the respondent exactly what the order of protection prohibits.
79.6% c. The judge tells the respondent that violation of the order is a punishable offense.
67.3% d. The judge tells the respondent that while the order is for the petitioner's protection,
it is an order of the court and is taken very seriously by the court.
54.9% e. The judge instructs petitioners to report any violations of the order to the police.
30.6% f. The judge informs petitioners that they must come back to court to modify the order
of protection if they decide to try living with the abuser again.
19.8% g. Other.
18. To what extent can the petitioner obtain all the remedies available by statute in her second order
of protection?
51.9% a. Thejudge is always willing to considergranting each of the remedies requested in the
petitioner's second order of protection.
29.8% b. The judge is typically unwilling to consider granting specific remedies requested in
the petitioner's second order of protection.
Note: do not check a remedy below if it is not available by statute.
10.6% The judge will not grant 'no abuse" orders if the petitioner wishes to try living
with the respondent abuser again.
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22.4% The judge will not require counseling for the abuser.
16.1% The judge will not grant property possession.
22.0% The judge will not grant child support.
11.2% The judge will not grant child custody.
9.9% Other requests not granted.
14.3% c. Typically the judge will not grant an order for the longest period of time available
under the statute.
14.9% d. Other.
19. What happens when a petitioner appears in court to vacate her order of protection?
22.3% a. Judge expresses exasperation or frustration at this request.
42.4% b. Judge asks careful questions to determine the voluntariness of this request.
32.8% c. Judge advises her of her right to refile for another order of protection if there should
be further abuse/violence.
15.5% d. Judge refuses to vacate the order if she/he does not believe this request is voluntary.
3.4% e. If the respondent abuser also appears, the judge requires him to leave the room while
she/he speaks to the petitioner.
f. Approximately what percentage of petitioners ask to vacate?
N=170; R=0-95%; M=18.7%
31.3% g. Other.
[DEFINITION: A "renewal" of an order of protection is granted after the order of protection has expired. This
is not a new order of protection; it is an extension of the old order for the same amount of time.]
20. How are renewals of second orders of protection obtained?
33.0% a. Petitioners may obtain renewals pro se.
7.1% b. Petitioners need an attorney to obtain renewals.
16.4% c. There is a simplified form available for renewals.
44.4% d. Renewals are granted only after a hearing that requires notification to the abuser.
30.0% e. Other.
21. How frequently are renewals of second orders of protection obtained?
17.7% a. Renewals are routinely granted with minimal application by the petitioner.
39.1% b. Renewals are not routinely granted, but new orders are issued after petitioner has
filed a second petition and alleged that there is still a substantial threat of abuse.
32.0% c. Renewals are not routinely granted, but new orders are issued after petitioner has
filed a second petition and if there has been abuse since the issuance of the previous
order.
8.7% d. Judges are resistant to second applications or extensions, believing that relief should
be temporary.
15.2% e. Other.
22. To what extent can orders of protection be appealed and has this occurred?
12.2% a. Both ex parte and second orders of protection can be appealed directly to the state
appeals court.
10.0% Appealing requires a lawyer.
12.8% b. Ex parte orders cannot be appealed.
20.3% c. Ex parte orders of protection can be appealed, but this has never occurred.
20.3% d. Second orders of protection can be appealed, but this has never occurred.
4.1% e. Denials of ex parte orders of protection have been appealed by petitioner(s).
What happened?
3.1% Denial of order was upheld on appeal (petitioner lost appeal).
3.1% Denial of order was struck down on appeal (petitioner won appeal).
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5.9% f. Ex parte orders of protection have been appealed by respondent(s). What happened?
6.3% Order of protection was upheld on appeal (respondent lost appeal).
3.4% Order of protection was struck down on appeal (respondent won appeal).
4.7% g. Denials of second orders of protection have been appealed by petitioner(s).
What happened?
2.5% Denial of order was upheld on appeal (petitioner lost appeal).
2.8% Denial of order was struck down on appeal (petitioner won appeal).
6.9% h. Second orders of protection have been appealed by respondent(s). What happened?
5.9% Order of protection was upheld on appeal (respondent lost appeal).
2.8% Order of protection was struck down on appeal (respondent won appeal).
21.8% i. Other.
23. How and under what circumstances are orders of protection enforced by the police?
57.4% a. Petitioner must have a copy of her order with her to prove to the police that she has
an order of protection before they can arrest.
67.6% b. Arrests can only be made if order has previously been served on abuser.
30.2% There is a 24-hour registry whereby a police officer can verify the existence of
an order of protection within the county or state.
26.2% c. When the police are called to the scene of a violation, they only arrest the respondent
if he committed the violation in their presence.
17.6% d. The police will not arrest the respondent for simply violating the order unless that
violation constitutes a separate crime (e.g. battery).
44.1% e. If the respondent is no longer present by the time the police arrive at the scene of a
violation, the police make no further efforts to find or arrest him.
38.0% f. The police do not arrest for violations of custody or economic provisions of the
order.
36.1% g. Police have the authority to arrest when called to the scene of a violation but usually
elect not to arrest.
40.7% h. Police department has a policy of mandatory arrest for violations of orders of
protection.
20.1% i. Other.
24. To what extentare arrests for violations of orders of protection followed by contempt proceedings?
525% a. If the poiice do not arrest, a petitioner can file a private criminal complaint related
to the violation of the order of protection and any other substantive crimes.
25.0% b. The State's/District's Attorney's Office routinely prosecutes violators.
24.1% c. The State's/District's Attorney's Office infrequently prosecutes violators.
18.5% d. The State's/District's Attorney's Office will only prosecute violators where there has
been an arrest at the scene of the violation.
e. Approximately what percentage of violations of orders of protection result in
prosecution?
N=146; R=0-99%; M=24.7%
27.2% f. Violations are brought back to the court that issued the order and the court convenes
a violations hearing at which the petitioner or her attorney prosecutes the violation.
47.8% g. A petitioner may file a petition, asking that the respondent be held in civil contempt
for violation of the order of protection.
37.0% Petitioners may initiate contempt proceedings pro se.
14-5% Petitioners must have an attorney to initiate contempt proceedings.
49.1% h. If there has been a violation, a petitioner may ask that the current order of protection
be modified to strengthen the protections granted in that order.
21.9% i. Violation hearings are held promptly and occur much sooner than in the ordinary
course of criminal prosecution.
33.0% j. Violations are not given expedited hearing dates.
31.5% k. Violations are consolidated with the other substantive crimes charged during the
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incident where the violation of the order of protection occurred.
11.7% I. Other.
25. What kinds of punishments for violations of orders of protection have been imposed?
20.4% a. Judges or juries are reluctant to convict abusers of violating orders of protection.
56.5% b. Violators have been lectured by the judge as punishment.
50.6% c. Violators have been sentenced to probation as punishment.
48.1% d. Violators have been fined as punishment.
57.9% e. Violators have been sentenced to jail.
15.8% f. Other.
26. If you work in more than one county assisting petitioners seeking orders of protection, how similar
are the other county systems to the one you described above?4
46.9% a. The counties not described in this survey are basically the same as the one I described
above.
31.8% b. The counties not described in this survey vary along minor dimensions.
18.0% c. The counties not described in this survey are substantially different.
4. These figures reported below indicate what percentage of those answering the question
checked each individual response; almost half of the respondents did not answer the question at all,
presumably because they work in only one county.
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A. Access to the courts
Question Mean Percentage Responses
Scale:
I = very inaccessible
2 = inaccessible
3 = accessible
4 - very accessible
1 2 3 4
1. How accessible are the courts in your 3.4 8.0 1.9 35.8 54.3
county to potential petitioners who need orders
of protection and who are accompanied by
advocates?
2. How accessible are the courts in your 2.9 11.2 13.1 52.5 23.1
county to potential petitioners who need orders
of protection and who are not accompanied by
advocates?
3. What needs to be changed? n.a. n.a n.a. n.a. n.a
.:: " 3 verypooly:::
: : : i: :: 2.l. aor : y (:w .: .....pettywel
4 Very-well
1 2 3 4
4. How well do you think the procedures for 3.0 2.8 16.4 59.8 21.1
serving an order of protection in your county
work?
5. What needs to be changed? n.a. n n.a. n.a. n.a.
Scale:
1 ='not a problem
2= slight problem
3 = iignificani problem
4 = very serious problem
-1 2 3 4
6. The demand for orders of protection is so 1.8 49.5 28.8 15.0 6.6
high that our domestic violence program can't
help everyone who needs assistance.
7. The court clerks in our county do not 1.9 44.0 29.7 19.0 7.3
provide enough assistance to or actively
discourage petitioners who are filing for
orders of protection.
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8. The complexity or quantity of paperwork 1.7 50.2 33.9 11.3 4.7
required for orders of protection in our county
prevents people from filing petitions.
9. Petitioners may have to travel significant 2.1 32.1 37.4 24.0 6.5
distances in order to obtain an order of
protection.
10. The court clerks in our county do not 1.6 60.3 20.2 13.8 5.7
inform petitioners filing for orders by
themselves that the filing and service fees can
be waived.
11. The judge in our county refuses to grant 1.2 86.3 9.6 3.1 1.0
some fee waivers, even in cases where the
petitioners have little income and cannot
afford to pay for the order.
12. The judge in our county refuses to grant 1.2 87.5 9.3 2.8 0.3
some fee waivers because of the abuser's
income and/or assets.
13. In our county, hearings for ex pate orders 2.3 22.1 38.8 28.4 10.7
of protection require petitioners to take off
from work and/or find babysitters for lengthy
and often unpredictable amounts of time.
14. Petitioners in our county must wait too 1.5 62.4 26.6 7.2 3.8
long between filing for the ex parte order and
the signing of the order, the delay increases
victim risk.
15. The times that the judge in our county is 1.5 63.7 27.1 7.0 2.2
available to hear ex parte orders of protection
are so few or so inconvenient that filing for an
order becomes impracticable.
16. Judges' unavailability during certain hours 1.9 37.0 45.3 13.0 4.7
to grant ex parte orders of protection increases
victim risk.
17. The sheriff's department in our county 1.9 37.3 41.5 15.8 5.5
does not serve ex parte orders of protection
rapidly enough to meed petitioners' needs.
18. Some petitioners are discouraged by the 1.8 38.8 46.3 10.1 4.9
sheriff's inability to serve the respondent
abuser and do not return to court to get their
ex parte orders extended.
19. The courthouse environment in our county 1.8 41.3 41.6 10.9 6.2
is so intimidating that it prevents women from
seeking orders of protection.
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20. The courthouse environment in our county 1.8 42.8 37.8 13.1 6.3
is so intimidating that it is difficult for
petitioners to explain what they need from an
order of protection or to describe their
experiences adequately.
21. The public nature of the procedures for 2.0 24.1 53.6 16.6 5.6
obtaining orders of protection and/or the
embarrassment of going to court prevent some
women from seeking orders of protection in
our county.
22. In our county, the docket for hearings for 1.4 67.6 23.1 6.9 2.5
second orders of protection is so crowded that
the wait discourages petitioners from seeking
these orders.
23. Respondent abusers are sometimes 1.1 92.7 6.6 0.6 0.0
successful in changing the place of the order
of protection hearing to another county.
24. Rules about which county petitioners are 1.4 62.6 32.4 4.0 0.9
required to file petitions in prevent women
from obtaining orders of protection.
25. Rules about which county petitioners are 1.5 62.4 29.5 5.6 2.5
required to file petitions in prevent women
from obtaining particular remedies available in
orders of protection (e.g. possession of
residence).
26. Many victims of domestic violence in our 2.2 21.6 42.0 26.9 9.6
county do not realize that orders of protection
are an option; the police and other service
agencies do not adequately educate people
about orders.
27. Access problems in our county (e.g. any 1.7 53.5 28.5 12.8 5.1
of the problems in #6-26 above) are more
serious for women of color seeking orders of
protection.
28. Access problems in our county are more 2.2 29.7 32.8 25.9 11.7
serious for women who have the fewest
economic resources.
29. Access problems in our county are more 2.6 19.4 27.1 32.2 21.3
serious for women who do not speak English.
30. Other access problem exists in our county n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
(please describe) or additional comments.
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B. Obtaining the Requested Judicial Relief





.4 = very well
1 2 3 4
31. How well do you think the procedures 3.1 3.5 12.0 57.6 26.9
for obtaining an order of protection in your
county work?
32. What needs to be changed? n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Scale.
I not a problem
2 slight problem
-3 significant problem
4 = very serious problem
1 2 3 4
33. The judge in our county denies some ex 1.6 56.8 28.6 10.2 4.4
parte orders of protection because the judge
is unwilling to accept that the abuse or
violence is serious enough to justify an order
without notice to the abuser.
34. The judge in our county denies some ex 1.8 40.4 40.4 13.8 5.4
parte orders of protection on the basis of
informal rules (i.e. non-statutory grounds),
such as the petitioner has waited too long
since the last abusive incident or the
petitioner has dropped a previous order of
protection.
35. The judge in our county denies individual 2.2 28.9 36.4 22.4 12.3
remedies in some ex parte orders of
protection that decrease the effectiveness of
the order, such as denying the petitioner
possession of the residence or requiring the
petitioner to allow the abuser to have
visitation with the children.
36. The judge in our county denies some 1.5 59.6 31.7 8.0 0.6
second orders of protection because the judge
is unwilling to accept that abuse or violence
has occurred.
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37. The judge in our county denies some 1.5 57.7 32.3 8.0 2.0
second orders of protection on the basis of
informal rules (i.e. non-statutory grounds),
such as the petitioner has waited too long
since the last abusive incident or the
petitioner has dropped a previous order of
protection.
38. The judge in our county denies some 2.0 41.4 28.1 19.5 11.0
remedies in orders of protection that greatly
reduce the petitioner's ability to economically
provide for herself and/or children, including
child support, maintenance/alimony, or
compensation for losses suffered because of
the abuse.
39. The judge in our county denies some 1.6 59.2 28.0 9.0 3.9
orders of protection or some remedies
because of lack of knowledge and/or training
about the order of protection statute.
40. The judge in our county denies some 2.0 39.0 31.7 18.4 10.8
orders of protection or some remedies
because of lack of knowledge and/or training
about domestic violence.
41. The judge in our county grants "mutual" 1.8 41.3 37.5 16.3 4.8
orders of protection (petitioner and abuser
both have orders against the other) even in
cases where an order against the petitioner is
inappropriate.
42. The judge in our county tends to 1.7 48.3 36.4 12.9 2.5
disbelieve a petitioner when she becomes
emotional or confused while testifying.
43. The judge in our county expresses 1.8 44.7 36.5 15.1 3.8
impatience and responds insensitively to a
petitioner who becomes emotional or
.confused while testifying.
44. In our county, women of color have 1.5 64.5 26.1 8.1 1.3
more difficulty obtaining what they need
through an order of protection.
45. In our county, women who have the 1.9 47.0 28.3 15.6 9.0
fewest economic resources have more
difficulty obtaining what they need through
an order of protection.
46. In our county, women who do not speak 2.3 27.6 33.9 24.3 14.1
English have more difficulty obtaining what
they need through an order of protection.
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47. The judge in our county restricts the 1.7 56.8 25.8 11.3 6.1
advocates' role in the hearing for orders of
protection in some way.
48. In our county, petitioners don't get what 1.7 53.9 31.5 8.8 5.7
they need in an order of protection unless
they have an attorney.
49. Petitioners' financial circumstances 2.9 19.7 13.7 27.9 38.7
prevent them from being able to hire
attorneys to represent them in the hearings
for orders of protection.
50. Attorneys in our county are either 2.4 23.4 32.9 27.3 16.4
unwilling to work with petitioners on orders
of protection or are difficult to work with
because of non-financial reasons.
51. The judge's behavior and/or commentary 1.9 40.9 33.1 16.6 9.4
during the hearings for orders of protection
fails to send the message that the court
system supports the petitioner's right to end
the violence.
52. The judge's commentary during the 1.8 44.3 37.9 12.1 5.7
hearings for orders of protection includes
victim-blaming statenents.
53. The judge who hears orders of protection 1.9 42.3 37.0 12.8 7.9
suffers from some degree of burnout that
makes her/him less responsive to battered
women.
54. Some petitioners do not appear for the 1.4 65.8 29.3 3.6 1.3
hearing for their second order of protection
because they do not know that they must
appear to obtain the order of protection.
55. Some petitioners do not appear for the 2.4 11.3 50.5 28.0 10.3
hearing for their second order of protection
because the abuser threatens to retaliate if
they obtain the order.
56. Some petitioners do not appear for the 2.8 4.8 29.5 44.2 21.5
hearing for their second order of protection
because they believe the abuser's promises to
reform or to leave them alone.
57. Other problem obtaining judicial relief n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
exists in our county (please describe) OR
additional comments.
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: -... .. .. -_ _ : _ _ .1 .,. :..2 3 4
58. How well do you think the 2.4 15.1 31.7 47.4 5.8
procedures for enforcing an order of
protection in your county work?
59. What needs to be changed? n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
1. .notap1-roblem.- :.. --litht problem
.=:F -3 .ict probem
.. 4 very seousprobem -
:i i: :*:: '*I 1. :'i:2 :3 44
60. Police response in our county is very 2.4 13.6 45.1 31.5 9.8
slow or ineffective when violations of
orders of protection are reported.
61. Police response in our county is so 2.3 21.8 40.8 25.9 11.4
slow or ineffective that many petitioners
do not even call the police when the
order is violated.
62. Police officers in our county refuse 2.7 11.9 32.1 34.6 21.5
to enforce the order if they believe that
the petitioner has "broken the order" by
inviting the respondent over or having
other voluntary contact with him.
63. Police officers in our county refuse 2.6 18.3 29.3 30.3 22.0
to enforce the order unless it has been
officially served.
64. Police officers in our county 2.3 15.9 47.0 25.4 11.7
sometimes fail to enforce an order of
protection because they lack training
about the order of protection statute.
65. Police officers in our county 2.5 13.3 39.4 26.7 20.6
sometimes fail to enforce an oder of
protection because they lack training
about domestic violence.
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66. Police officers in our county 1.9 37.3 40.1 17.5 5.1
sometimes fail to enforce an order of
protection because the terms of the order
of protection are so vague that it is
unclear what behavior is prohibited.
67. Police officers in our county 1.8 41.6 37.2 15.8 5.4
discourage petitioners from enforcing
their orders of protection.
68. State's/district's attorney's office in 2.3 29.1 32.1 23.1 15.7
our county does not prosecute violations
of orders, except in very limited
circumstances.
69. State's/district's attorney's office in 1.6 57.1 29.8 8.3 4.8
our county.discourage petitioners from
enforcing their orders of protection.
70. Enforcing the order through civil 2.4 27.0 28.3 25.9 18.8
contempt is such a lengthy or
complicated process that most petitioners
in our county do not attempt this.
71. Judges do not sentence abusers to 2.8 14.1 24.5 32.7 28.8
any (or sufficient) jail time for violations
of orders of protectiori in our county.
72. Women of color are less likely to 1.7 52.7 28.0 11.5 7.8
have their orders of protection enforced
by either arrest or prosecution in our
county.
73. Women who have the fewest 1.9 45.4 27.8 17.3 9.6
economic resources are less likely to
have their orders of protection enforced
by either arrest or prosecution in our
county.
74. Women who do not speak English 2.1 35.9 32.1 19.7 12.4
are less likely to have their orders of
protection enforced by either arrest or
prosecution in our county.
75. Other enforcement problem exists in n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
our county (please describe) OR
additional comments.
Section III: Statistics Related to Orders of Protection in Your County
NOE: "Your" county refers to the county you described in the prior sections.
1. How many petitions for ex parte orders of protection were filed in your county in 1991?
N=140; R=0-20,000; M=807
22.3% This information is computer generated.
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63.3% This information is hand calculated.
37.4% This information is readily available to domestic violence programs.
2. How many of these petitions did your domestic violence program assist with?
N=186; R=0-2700; M=228
3. Of the petitions you assisted with, how many ex parte orders were granted?
N=170; R=1-2700; M=189
Percentage of ex parte petitions granted (Line 3 divided by Line 2).
N=168; R=14.3-100%;M=94.7%
4. Of the petitions you assisted with, how many requested fee waivers?
N=127; R=0-2226; M=145
5. Of the petitions you assisted with, how many were granted fee waivers?
N=124; R=1-2226; M=143
Percentage of fee waiver petitions granted (Line 5 divided by Line 4).
N=120; R=30-100%; M=95.4%
6. Of the petitions you assisted with, how many petitioners who requested ex parte orders requested
a second order of protections?
N=143; R=0-2400; M=153
7. Of the petitions you assisted with, how many second orders of protection were granted?
N=142; R=1-2380; M=142
Percentage of second orders of prosecution granted (Line 7 divided by Line 6).
N=134; R=8.3-100%; M=93.8%
8. What is your county's name?
9. What is the population of your county?
N=214; R=4000-9,000,000; M=332,740
48.2% Percentage of rural counties (population < 100,000).
51.8% Percentage of urban counties (population > 100,000).
Section IV: Domestic Violence Resources in Your County
1. To what extent/how well are the court clerks, judges, state's/district's attorneys, police, and
attorneys in your county trained or educated about domestic violence? What role have you and
your domestic violence program played in this training?
2. What other programs and policies related to domestic violence exist in your community? How well
do they work?
49.7% a. Mandatory or pro-arrest for battery.
60.6% b. Batterers' treatment program/counseling program.
44.1% c. Coordinated response to domestic violence (coalition of systems, potentially
including domestic violence program advocates, state's attorney, police, courts,
hospital, lawyers, sheriff).
Who's involved?5








3. Have you attempted any strategies to change the implementation or enforcement system for orders
of protection? What have you done? How successful have those attempts been?
5. The figures reported below indicate what percentage of those who said that a coordinated
response system was in place in their community checked each individual response.
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APPENDIX B: T-TEST ANALYSIS
We conducted a series of t-test analyses to determine whether there were significant differences
between counties whose police departments have a mandatory arrest policy and those that do not (Table
1) and between communities that have adopted a coordinated response approach to domestic violence
and those that have not (Table 2). We divided our respondents for purposes of these tables by using
their answers to Questions 2(a) and 2(c) in Section IV of the survey.
The following tables report the t-test value and accompanying probability value for any variation
in the incidence of the problems identified in Section H of the survey that constitutes either a significant
difference or a nonsignificant trend. Under scientific conventions, any difference at or below the .05
level is considered a statistically significant difference; results significant at the .10 level are
nonsignificant trends.
In reading the tables, Line 1 of Table 1, for example, indicates that the mean rating for how well
the procedures for serving protective orders work was 3.1 (on a scale of 1 to 4) in jurisdictions with
a mandatory arrest policy, but only 2.9 in counties without such a policy. The t-test value is 2.16, and
it is significant at the .05 level-that is, the probability (denoted "p" in the tables) that this particular
discrepancy occurred by chance is five out of one hundred, or .05.
TABL -. -ARI !
Mean Ratng
:. ey"I - " -: : Mandatory No T-Test
.- rest Ma-.latory Stist
County Arre~f
4. How well do procedures for serving OPs 3.1 2.9 2.16'
work?
7. Court clerks don't help/discouragepetrs. 1.8 2.0 2.34'
8. Complexity/quantity of paperwork prevents 1.6 1.8 2.65-
filing for OPs.
14. Delay in granting EOPs increases victim 1.4 1.7 3.11-
risk.
15. Filing for EOPs is impracticable because of 1.3 1.6 3.13"
judges' unavailability.
16. Judges' unavailability to grant EOPs 1.8 1.9 1.81*
increases victim risk.
17. Sheriffs don't serve EOPs quickly enough to 1.8 2.0 2.36*
meet petra' needs.
18. Petrs don't return to extend EOPs because 1.7 1.9 1.74a
sheriff unable to serve.
25. Venue rules prevent petrs from obtaining 1.4 1.5 1 .679
particular remedies.
26. Many DV victims don't realize OPs are an 2.1 2.3 2.04*
option.
"i,<:-t.05 -p<: .Ol -p.O01 <
1993] Orders of Protection
_. .. ..... . _ M ea R ating
.Problem,#. Ares "adtoM Stafistic
:*, :,: " ;: -.. ":. . / '-, :i. : Coimty ": Arrest".:: "-.; . "
31. How well do procedures for obtaining OPs 3.2 3.0 2.59V
work?
35. Judges deny remedies in EOPs. 2.1 2.3 2.29*
43. Judges impatient/insensitive to petrs if 1.7 1.9 2.09*
emotional/confused.
51. Judges fail to send message that support 1.8 2.1 2.56-
petrs' right to end violence.
52. Judges make victim-blaming statements. 1.7 1.9 1.99*
58. How well do procedures for enforcing OPs 2.6 2.3 2.95-
work?
61. Petrs don't call police because 2.1 2.4 2.36*
slow/ineffective response.
62. Police don't enforce if petr "broke" order 2.5 2.8 2.39
by having contact with abuser.
63. Police don't enforce OPs unless served. 2.4 2.7 2.08*
67. Police discourage petrs from enforcing. 1.7 2.0 2.15"
69. Prosecutor discourages petrs from 1.4 1.8 3.44-
enforcing.
73. Greater enforcement problems for indigent 1.8 2.1 2.75-
women.
Total aeess probki ." "J 7 .2.3r"
Total elief tib.i. ".. . .2 "".-.
otAl enforcem ent prblems J 12.3... 26"
-p<.o5 -P<: .oi -p<__-t..ool -R.<Ao
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'TABLE-2. COORDINATED RESPONSE
..-- _,_"_.. .. .- MeanRating
..Survey §11: Coordinated No T-Test
Problem I Response Coortihiated Statistic
CoU*m Response ..... .
4. How well do procedures for serving 3.2 2.8 4.52
OPs work?
7. Court clerks don't help/discourage 1.8 2.0 1.702
petrs.
8. Complexity/quantity of paperwork 1.6 1.8 2.10
prevents filing for OPs.
13. EOP hearings require petrs to leave 2.1 2.4 2.41*
work/kids for unpredictable/lengthy
amounts of time.
15. Filing for EOPs is impracticable 1.3 1.6 3.29"
because of judges' unavailability.
16. Judges' unavailability to grant EOPs 1.7 1.9 2.18*
increases victim risk.
17. Sheriffs don't serve EOPs quickly 1.7 2.1 4.11*
enough to meet petrs' needs.
18. Petrs don't return to extend EOPs 1.7 1.9 2.26*
because sheriff unable to serve.
19. Intimidating courthouse prevents petrs 1.7 1.9 2.51-
from seeking OPs.
20. Intimidating courthouse makes it 1.7 2.0 2.98-
difficult for petrs to explain.
21. Public nature of procedures/ 1.9 2.2 3.51"
embarrassment prevents petrs from
seeking EOPs.
24. Venue rules prevent petrs from 1.4 1.5 1.79a
obtaining OPs.
25. Venue rules prevent petrs from 1.4 1.6 2.49-
obtaining particular remedies.
26. Many DV victims don't realize OPs 2.0 2.4 3.96"
are an option.
27. Greater access problems for women of 1.6 1.8 2.42'
color.
*P_.o!.5 -p.01 p_<!.0ol 2p<::t.l0
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_.' _ "__ _ ._ :_ .. .... _ - _M ea*. Rating _ _ _
S .n.vey .: . . .J Coordiated-. No J " -"es(
.- ProResponse-, Coordiriated sttsi
Proble'l# ComityResponse-i ___
28. Greater access problems for indigent 1.9 2.4 4.15 "
women.
31. How well do procedures for obtaining 3.3 2.9 4.35-
OPs work?
34. Judges deny EOPs based on informal 1.7 2.0 2.60"
rules.
35. Judges deny remedies in EOPs. 2.0 2.4 3.66-
37. Judges deny OPs based on informal 1.5 1.6 1.881
roles.
43. Judges impatient/insensitive to petrs if 1.7 1.9 1.77a
emotional/confused.
44. Women of color have more difficulty 1.3 1.6 2.63-
obtaining what they need.
45. Indigent women have more difficulty 1.7 2.0 3.16w
obtaining what they need.
47. Judges limit advocates' role in OP 1.6 1.8 1.77*
hearing.
49. Petr's financial circumstances prevent 2.6 3.0 3.24=
hiring attorney.
50. Attys unwilling to help/hard to work 2.2 2.5 2.00"
with because of non-financial reasons.
51. Judges fail to send message that 1.8 2.1 2.35*
support petrs' right to end violence.
56. Some petrs don't appear for second 2.7 2.9 2.02
hearing because believe abuser's promises.
58. How well do procedures for enforcing 2.7 2.2 5.47-
OPs work?
60. Police response to reported violations 2.2 2.5 3.1 1I
is slow/ineffective.
61. Petrs don't call police because 2.0 2.5 4.42-
slow/ineffective response.
62. Police don't enforce if petr "broke" 2.4 2.9 4.19=
order by having contact with abuser. II
-p. _.05 fp.01 -p:.001 'p._<C.lO
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* . Mean Ratg
ztwm -: § H: ..  Coo t J NO j T-est
:oJ,, -.-- .. - .-.. '.. : : pose " Coordnat Stastfif
________________ County.. Response ___
63. Police don't enforce OPs unless 2.4 2.7 2.34"
served.
65. Police don't enforce OPs because lack 2.4 2.7 3.04"
training re DV.
66. Police don't enforce because terms of 1.7 2.0 2.98-
OP are vague.
67. Police discourage petrs from 1.7 2.0 2.72 "
enforcing.
68. Only limited prosecution of violations. 2.0 2.5 4.03-
69. Prosecutor discourages petr from 1.5 1.7 2.57*
enforcing.
70. Civil contempt is so lengthy/ 2.1 2.6 3.72 *
complicated that most petrs don't use.
*p_<.05 "p<.01 -p<_. 0 0 1 p.<.10
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APPENDIX C: MULTIPLE REGRESSION ANALYSIS
We conducted a series of hierarchical multiple regression analyses to test whether variations in the
features of a county's system for obtaining and enforcing orders of protection can predict the extent to
which battered women experience problems with those processes. The salient features of a system were
divided into five areas: (1) the procedures for obtaining emergency orders; (2) the procedures for
serving emergency orders; (.3) the procedures for obtaining plenary orders; (4) judicial behavior and
attitudes; and (5) the procedures for enforcing orders. Within each of these five areas, we chose a
number of individual variables, which together comprised one set of predictors in the regression model.
As outcome criteria, we used the mean rating for all of the problems included in each of the three areas
of focus in the survey: access to the courts (Questions II, 6-29), the procedures for obtaining orders
of protection (Questions H, 33-56), and the procedures for enforcing them (Questions U1, 60-74).
Table 3. Overall, the system variables predict more than one-third of the variance in the mean
rating for all access problems (Adj R2 = .37). The first set of predictor variables (Step 1) pertains to
the procedures for obtaining emergency orders. It accounts for 21.6% of the variance in the mean
rating for access problems. (rypically, scientific protocol considers any R2 chg whose probability ("p"
in the tables) is no more than .05 significant.) The second set of predictor variables (Step 2) relates
to the service of orders and accounts for an additional variance of 6.3 % above and beyond the variance
attributable to the variables included in Step 1. The predictor variables associated with the plenary
order procedures,judicial behavior and attitudes, and the enforcement system account for an additional
variance of 4.1%, 3.0% and 6.1%, respectively, beyond the variance attributable to the earlier steps
in the analysis.
In addition, the Pearson correlation coefficients ("r" in the tables) report the univariate relationship
between each predictor and each outcome variable. The larger the value, the stronger the relationship;
the sign indicates whether the relationship is positive or negative. (For our sample size, any r value
greater than .10 is significant at the .05 level (p_.05).) Thus, for example, the correlations reported
in Step I in Table 3 indicate that systems that have no simplified forms for protective orders or have
forms that are difficult to complete have more access problems, whereas communities where emergency
orders are issued in less than an hour have fewer access problems. The beta weights ("Beta" in the
tables) indicate the relative weight one would assign to each predictor variable in a regression equation
in order to predict the outcome variable.
Table 4. Judicial behavior and attitudes make the most significant contribution in explaining relief
problems (11.3 %), although each set of predictor variables makes an independent contribution to the
variance ranging from 4.0% to 10.4%. Together, the system variables predict 36% of the variance
in the mean rating for relief problems.
Table 5. As expected, the features of a county's enforcement system are more strongly correlated
with enforcement problems (14.8%) than are the other sets of predictor variables. Again, however,
the other sets of predictor variables make an independent contribution in explaining the variance in the
mean rating for enforcement problems.
In general, the regression analysis suggests that the overall protection order system, beginning with
the emergency order procedure and ending with the sentencing of those who violate an order, functions
as a cohesive whole. A problem in one part of the system acts as a weak link in the chain, adversely
affecting other aspects of the system as well. This finding is consistent with the results of the t-test
analysis of coordinated response approaches and mandatory arrest policies and coordinated response
approaches (Appendix B, Tables I and 2).
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TABLE 3 ACCESS PROBLEMS
Outcome Variable: Mean Acces
Problem Rating
.. 'Predictor Variable.:- r Beta Rcbg
Survey, R1 Step 1. Emergency Order Procedure
Question# . _. _--._ __._ _
5(a)/5(b) Court provides written guidelines re -.11 -. 10
procedure/requirements for OPs.
3(c)/3(d) No simplified forms available/ .30 .27
simplified forms are difficult.
10(c) Judges are available 24 hours a day. -.02 -. 02
1I1(a) EOPs are granted without hearing. .05 -. 06
12(a) EOPs are granted in less than 1 -.36 -.34
hour.
.216-
_. _ _ _ __._.. ej' ... .-.- .- _ __:._ _-_ _ _.._..._-
13(b) Sheriffs serve EOP as soon as -. 35 -.26
possible.
130) Sheriffs warn abuser that violating -. 21 -.02
EOP leads to arrest.
.063-
.90ep 3. Plenary OdrProceddre ___
18(b) Judge routinely denies certain .15 .15
remedies.
15(c) Hearings are required even if resp .08 .11
does not appear.
15(h) OP hearings are taped/recorded. .06 -. 01
1(g)/1(h) Attorneys help petrs with .17 .09
paperwork/hearings.
.041"
Ste 4. Judicial Behavior and Attitudes
19(a) Judges are frustrated when petr .14 .10
vacates order. =
'Standardized coefficients reported for the step in which they are entered into the model.
*p<.0S "p<.Ol -p<.000l
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Predictor Variable r -BeW Rchg
19(b) Judges ask questions to determine -. 10 -. 03
voluntariness of request to vacate.
17(a) Judges lecture resp about -.20 -. 14
inappropriateness of violence.
17(e) Judges tell petr to report violations -. 17 .02
to police.
.030 "
Step 5. Enforcement System
23(h) Police department has mandatory -. 11 -.02
arrest policy.
24(b) Violations are routinely prosecuted. -. 05 .02
23(g) Police have authority to arrest but .19 -. 03
elect not to do so.
23(e) Police make no effort to find/arrest .33 .25
absent abuser.
25(e) Violators have been sentenced to -. 19 -.07
jail.
.061"
______ Mutiple R (Adi. IR.) =.64(37)
" TABLE 4..CRELIEF PROBLEMS
Outcome Variable: Mean Relief
Problem Rating
Predictor Variable r Beta R2chg
Survey §1 Step 1. Emergency Order'Procedure
Question. "_
5(a)/5(b) Court provides written guidelines re -.11 -.09
procedure/requirements for OPs.
3(c)/3(d) No simplified forms .22 .19
available/simplified forms are
difficult.
10(c) Judges are available 24 hours a day. -. 01 -. 01
11(a) EOPs are granted without hearing. .07 .00
'Standardized coefficients reported for the step in which they are entered into the model.
.p_<.05 p<.0l -p<.000l
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... e- dic-... r .. iab ... Detal _____.
12(a) EOPs are granted in less than 1 -.24 -.21
hour.
.1O4*
::.:!~~ . ::-.: -: 1..Se;.:&ri of.Orderm.:-.:
13(b) Sheriffs serve EOP as soon as -.26 -. 18
possible.
130) Sheriffs warn abuser that violating -. 19 -.06
EOP leads to arrest.
.040
.. : . .... . ...1 ..d.. Pro .du.
18(b) Judge routinely denies certain .22 .23
remedies.
15(c) Hearings are required even if resp .13 .15
does not appear.
15(h) OP hearings are taped/recorded. .07 .00
l(g)/1(h) Attorneys help petrs with .16 .09
paperwork/hearings.
.082 -
19(a) Judges are frustrated when petr .29 .24
vacates order.
19(b) Judges ask questions to determine -. 16 -. 09
voluntariness of request to vacate.
17(a) Judges lecture resp about -.27 -. 19
inappropriateness of violence.
17(e) Judges tell petr to report violations -.20 -. 01
to police.
'- 6&ms fo si~em .....
23(h) Police department has mandatory -. 07 .03
arrest policy.
24(b) Violations are routinely prosecuted. .00 .13
aStandardized coefficients reported for the step in which they are entered into the model.
p<.05 p<.01 -p<.0001
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_ _ _" _ _ ."- . i :: : '" .....:a .... "
23(g) Police have authority to arrest but .22 .07
elect not to do so.
23(e) Police make no effort to findfarrest .31 .21
absent abuser.
25(e) Violators have been sentenced to -. 15 -.06
jail.
.0589
I .. . TALI. ENM REEi'POLM
..... "Yanble: Ma
Survey* t:: Stp ersenyOrder PoeTIM e
5(a)I5(b) Court provides written guidelines re .05 .05
__________ procedure/requirements for OPs.
3(c)13(d) No simplified forms available/ .19 .16
__________ siplified forms are difficult.
10(c) Judges are available 24 hours a day. .05 .04
11(a) FOPs are granted without hearing. .08 .03
12(a) EOPs are granted in less thanlIhour -.20 -. 18
.0727
13(b,) Sheriffs serve FOP as soon as -.32 -.25
__________ possible.____
13(j) Sheriffs warn abuser that violating -.24 -.14
EOP leads to arrest. .8
.:i iZ:.::  i :i ....... ..  ".~~.. . .... ... : ................. "........ .. :..... .... ". .. . ..-...
1.a8Ju(b) Judge routinely denies certain .19 1
1nmceiies ore frte s i t
'Stanardze cecins reported fortheou e hinghic thyae .0ee3ithemdl
12(a)j.0 FO.: . s ar- gane i lsstan1 ou .20-1
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: . - ...Ared 'ct r Vaiable .- Oe. _•-.. .
15(c) Hearings are required even if resp .12 .13
does not appear.
15(h) OP hearings are taped/recorded. .07 .00




19(a) Judges are frustrated when petr .20 .18
vacates order.
19(b) Judges ask questions to determine -. 13 -.07
voluntariness of request to vacate.
17(a) Judges lecture resp about -. 15 -.04
inappropriateness of violence.
17(e) Judges tell petr to report violations -.21 -.05
to police.
045*O
23(b) Police department has mandatory -.18 -.02
arrest policy.
24(b) Violations are routinely prosecuted. -. 17 -.03
23 (g) Police have authority to arrest but .35 .12
elect not to do so.
23(e) Police make no effort to find/arrest .44 .31
absent abuser.
25(e) Violators have been sentenced to -. 21 -. 14
jail.
.148
__ _ _ Multiple.R A ij: ._ ____ .64(317) J
Notes. "Standardized coefficients reported for the step in which they are entered into the model.*p.<.05 P<.0l "*p<..0001
